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Introduction; A Few Words about Words
Unlike academic papers that are written with the use o f very “formal” language, I
have purposely written this thesis in a conversational, informal manner The reason for
this is that I believe academic language can serve to separate those who know from those
who do not know. For example, one of the criticisms I have of many “scientific” texts
(including the one I will examine in this paper) is that their authors use language and
terminology that most persons do not easily understand. The result is that some people
will “get it” while some others will take out their dictionaries and re-read passages
several times in an attempt to “get it.” However, most will probably surmise “this is out
o f my league” and miss experiencing the kind o f power that might have come with the
knowledges put forth in the text. As a social worker, I am charged with, among other
things, providing equal access o f resources to all people. Therefore, by writing in a
conversational manner, I am doing my best to “walk the walk” and take a step toward
doing just that.
I might add that writing in such a relaxed way is a relatively new venture for me. In
the past, the bulk o f my writings have been very formalistic, at least according to me,
many people who have read my writings, and the “formal” level I have set on my wordprocessing program’s grammar check. In fact, Michel Coconis, the chairperson o f my
thesis committee, remarked on how “different” my writing has been for this project,
noting that previously, even my email messages had subscribed to the rules of “proper”
academic writing. No doubt, this new way o f communicating my work has been very fun
and expansive for me. By turning over this new, breezy leaf, I have experienced myself in
a brand new way that has opened space for lots o f new possibilities with my writing.

Although I have had the fortunate freedom to write it in an informal manner, the
presentation of this paper is still not without restrictions, namely the rules put forth in the
American Psychological Association’s (APA) Publication Manual (1994). While
following the APA’s rules is standard practice in social science writing, doing so serves
to create and sustain a particular vision o f what constitutes sociological knowledge
(Richardson, 1990). For example, the APA instructions require me to incorporate
publication dates for citations into the text, center my writing around a research question,
and identify what “bit” o f knowledge I am contributing (as if knowledge were a puzzle
made up of several pieces that together show the “real” picture). Whether or not these
prescribed writing practices represent me and my ideas o f what is and is not important, I
am obligated to participate in them because “that’s just the way we social scientists do
things around here.”
While I have presented some criticisms, I must stress that my point here is not to
condemn APA writing style. After all, having a standardized system for writing social
scientific literature probably helps those involved, both as readers and writers, to
communicate and process information more efficiently. I just think it is only fair to share
the awareness that by certain conventions informed by particular values have shaped this
paper you are now reading. If I were to ignore the APA rules, this paper would not be
eligible for publication as a thesis. Consequently, fewer people would read it, limiting the
opportunities for any way it might be helpful, and denying the appearance o f any new
knowledges and/or meanings it might inspire. As Richardson says;
The conventions [of APA writing style] hold tremendous material and symbolic
power over social scientists. Using them increases the probability o f one’s work

being accepted into core social science journals, but they are not prima facie
evidence o f greater—or lesser—truth value or significance than social science
writing using other conventions (p. 17).
At the same time, I should acknowledge that I have gotten away (thanks to my thesis
committee) with breaking some o f the APA writing rules. In addition to writing in an
informal manner, I have taken liberties in using footnotes, a practice discouraged by the
APA Publication Manual 11994). And while footnotes do not conform to APA
stipulations, I believe that the additional information they contain is an important part o f
what makes my thesis “what it is.” Finally, committing one other transgression, I have
written this paper in the first person voice and not the voice o f the third person as
prescribed by the APA manual. That is because the first person perspective allows me to
be myself instead o f pretending to be an outside, objective observer. In the end, I feel that
by veering somewhat off the path beaten by the standards o f social science writing, I have
done what I can do to make my voice heard with as little static as possible.
Why the Social Construction o f Sex and Social Work
In order to satisfy an optional requirement for my Master o f Social Work (MSW)
degree, I have done research and written this thesis pertaining to the social construction
of human sexuality. The question then becomes "what does the social construction o f
human sexuality have to do with social work?” Well, my searches o f the Social Work
Abstracts and PsychLit databases have told me that many social workers might answer
that question with “not much.” Although the field o f social work is devoted to promoting
“the general welfare of society... and the development o f people” (National Association
of Social Workers, 1997, p. 16), social constructionism as it relates to persons’ sexual

welfare and development has been largely ignored in the social work literature. The
sexual welfare and development issues that social work journals usually address include
sexual abuse, sexual orientation, transgenderism, sex education, treatment for sexual
offenders, reproduction, birth control, and acquired immune deficiency syndrome
(AIDS). I should add that this is true not only o f social work journals, but others such as
those related to medicine, psychology, sociology, couples therapy, and o f course,
sexuality. This is not to say that there is no one discussing the social construction of
human sexuality, only that they are very few. Throughout this paper, I will discuss and/or
cite those articles and books that I have been fortunate to discover.
While this paper could easily fit with most o f the social science disciplines, there are
reasons it is primarily a contribution to the social work literature. The most obvious of
these reasons is simply this: I am a social work student. After completing an
undergraduate education in psychology and deciding I wanted to become a sex therapist,
I decided to go to graduate school for social work. Although I had other options such as
clinical psychology or counseling, I was excited by social work curricula emphasizing the
impact o f envirorunents and situations on individuals, groups, and communities. As you
will read later, the idea that social contexts shape people’s realities has become very
important to me. Further, the prospect o f a MSW degree fueled my fire because it would
allow me more opportunities to work with people while I pursue a doctorate degree.
These things along with suggestions and recommendations from some o f my
undergraduate professors helped point my way to the MSW classes I recently finished
and the thesis you are about to read.

O f course, human beings are sexual beings and therefore, sexual matters are human
matters. The field o f social work is, by definition, concerned with all aspects o f people
including their sexuality. While the combination o f sexuality and social work does not
often result in my particular topic, I believe that examining the ways in which sexual
realities are socially constructed is right up social work’s alley. As I hope to demonstrate,
deconstruction, or discovering how certain ideas become “reality” over time, serves to
liberate persons from oppressive, scientifically legitimized “truths,” truths that leave little
or no room for experiences for which they do not account.
Other reasons for this being a social work thesis relate directly to the code o f ethics
of the National Association o f Social Workers (NASW) (1997). For example, section
6.04d reads:
Social workers should act to prevent and eliminate domination of, exploitation of,
and discrimination against any person, group, or class on the basis o f race,
ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status,
political belief, religion, or mental or physical disability (p. 17).
As you will read, this paper addresses the “domination of, exploitation of, and
discrimination against” certain people by showing how the dominance o f certain ideas
has created and/or supported those conditions.
In another part o f the NASW Code o f Ethics, section 6.04a states “Social workers
should engage in social and political action that seeks to ensure that all people have equal
access to the resources, employment, services, and opportunities they require to meet
their basic human needs and to develop fiilly” (p. 16). I contend that the presentation of
this thesis is a form o f social action that provides a resource for human development. At

the same time, Gergen (1985) reminds me that all social actions, including this one, bring
about consequences. My hope is that this paper will have positive consequences for
“basic human needs” by serving as a springboard for new thinking that will guide new
practices and create new resources.
At the same time, I am aware that its consequences might be less than desirable. For
example, some might perceive my deconstruction o f Masters and Johnson’s work as
blatant disrespect toward the two people who helped pave the way for me to pursue my
passion as a researcher and therapist in the field o f human sexuality. To this possibility,
all I can say is it is very important to me that this thesis is not perceived as a doctrine o f
truth but rather an account o f my experiences. While I am tempted here to invoke the
“don’t believe everything you read ” caveat. I’ll instead invite you to believe it was an
important possibility for me at the time it was written, believe it for yourself if it fits, but
always remember it is but one perspective, one reality in a world o f infinite possibilities.
Mv Situation
As I do with the people who come to see me for therapy, I feel it necessary to situate
myself. By this, I mean make public my biases, influences, and assumptions to the best of
my ability so that the reader has an idea o f “where I was at ” when I began this project as
well as my state o f mind and thinking throughout the entire process. Therefore, this thesis
begins with an invitation to join my journey o f creating this paper, from beginning to end.
Along the way, there will be discussions about the practices of narrative therapy as well
as some o f the ideas and philosophies by which narrative practices are informed. Selected
destinations include overviews of postmodernism, poststructuralism, social
constructionism, as well as the work o f French philosopher, Michel Foucault. From there.

we will follow the development o f my ideas, the downs and up o f my methodology and
finally, delve into the “meat and potatoes” o f the issue—deconstructing Masters' and
Johnson's Human Sexual Response.
In the Beginning
When I first thought about writing a Master’s thesis, I was immersed in both a
revelation and revolution. For many years or maybe even a lifetime, I had been a student
and life participant in the discourses o f positivism, structuralism, modernism, or whatever
other labels apply to those theories and methods that claim to discover and proclaim such
things as “objective truths” and “reality.” Mind you, the prospect of discovering truths
and reality was very appealing to me. After all, these seemed to give me a degree of
certainty and predictability that would make my life and the lives of others much easier.
However, as an aspiring social worker and psychotherapist,’ I found myself having
considerable difficulty applying some o f the “truths” I had learned to my own life. More
specifically, I had endured a long-standing relationship with depression and I was
desperate to find out how I could be “fixed.” While therapy and medication helped a
little, stopping depression from having its way with me completely seemed, well,
completely impossible. For some reason, things that worked for others, things that were
“proven” to be effective in valid, reliable research, would only help a little and/or for a
little while.

' I don’t believe myself to be a psychotherapist, or one who engages in “the treatment o f mental and
emotional disorders through the use of psychological techniques.” First, while I do think that people
sometimes have relationships with problems that yield unwanted effects, I do not think that people have
“disorders.” Second, I do not believe that I “treat" anything; I have conversations, conversations where I
ask people questions that invite them to open space for possibilities. At present, I have not settled on a label
with which I am happy However, since “therapist” and “therapy” are terms familiar to most, I have chosen
to use them in this paper. Still, they are not adequate descriptions o f myself or the work I do.
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So for many years, I thought there must be something terribly wrong with me (a
conclusion, by the way, o f which the depression was in full support). However, I
gradually started to figure out that the depression seemed inescapable because I had
believed, incorrectly, it was an inseparable part o f me. After all, my therapist had
diagnosed me with major depression at which point I became a person with a “disorder."
He even hypothesized that my depression was at least partially due to my neurochemistry
and I probably inherited it genetically, since his assessment o f me revealed that my
grandparents had some o f the same symptoms that I had. Essentially, the problem was
me, I was the problem and there was no way to change it. Like someone with a condition
such as diabetes, I would have to spend a lifetime monitoring my depression, taking
medication, and going to therapy to reduce its symptoms. With this dreaded disorder
living inside of me, I would just have to try my best to be happy.
My own training as a social scientist and therapist did not help matters any. An
undergraduate education in a strictly quantitative research-oriented psychology program
taught me that in order to help a person, I had to identify symptoms, conduct and
evaluation, make a diagnosis, and then determine the “best" treatment based on valid and
reliable research findings. As McKenzie and Monk (1997) note:
This way o f working often presumes that there is some kind of objective truth that
can be known about a person or a problem, and once it is discovered, the counselor
can be confident in proceeding with the intervention. This helping metaphor
encourages the counselor to give the client new knowledge, techniques, and skills
to correct her irrational thinking, cognitive distortions, faulty processing, or
maladaptive functioning.

Clients are invited into the unknowing position at the beginning of the
therapeutic enterprise, and the counselor is encouraged to take up the knowing
position, with expert knowledge that can be transmitted to the person impaired by
some form o f disability or deficit. Success is measured by the degree to which the
client accepts the counselor’s expert knowledge. This is evidenced in the
implementation o f specific plans and objectives, the acquisition o f and
demonstration of new skills, the development o f correct and rational thinking, and
the application o f problem-solving procedures (p. 84).
However, my own lived experience told me that this approach was not only
disrespectful o f the knowledges individuals have about themselves, it was impossible.
For example, regarding the process o f diagnosing and treating, I wondered how I could
be a better expert on someone else’s life than that person. After all, I was coming to the
table with a whole set of life experiences, biases, and assumptions that were unique to
me. Why should not I respect that others would be bringing theirs with them as well?
Why should I not honor their knowledges, which are a result o f their lived experience?
Furthermore, if the practice o f internalizing problems had rendered such horrendous
effects on me, why would I work in ways that would inflict the same burden on people
who came to see me? For me, there was no “why”; I simply would not. None o f this
added up for me, though the old notions I had learned about all the things a good therapist
“should” do were still trying to convince me otherwise.
When I began looking around for an escape from working with people in the ways I
had experienced and been taught, I could not find it right away. Sure, there were lots o f
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folks getting behind the idea that persons seeking mental health services^ are much more
than their problems and the labels they are given (which sometimes become their biggest
problems). Still, I was not around many therapists and social workers who were putting
these values into practice. It seemed to me that a great many people in the “helping
professions” had forgotten the maxim o f “never judging a person until you have walked a
mile in her/his shoes” and were making all kinds o f judgments about people that they
justified with the diplomas hanging on their walls. At the same time, implementations
designed to improve the efficiency o f mental health services (i.e., managed care) were
increasingly supporting the kind o f “assess them, diagnose them, treat them, then
terminate them” mentality that I was hoping to escape. While I had a precious few
professors who were in full support o f my getting “outside o f the box,” there seemed to
be no practices informed by philosophies that matched my ideals. That is, until 1 learned
about a relatively new and exciting way o f working with people in a respectful way, a
“therapy o f literary merit” (White, 1988a) that came from the land “down under.”

^ Unlike many therapists, I choose not to refer to the people who consult me as “clients” or “consumers.”
While it is more respectful and less pathologizing than previous labels (e.g., “patient,” “schizophrenic,” or
“borderline”), I see the use o f these words as a technique that objectifies people and regards them as things.
Additionally, calling someone a “client” or “consumer” suggests a one-way account o f therapy where the
person consulting is the only one receiving, or “consuming” something from the relationship. In my
experience, this account is not at all accurate, as therapists also gain new knowledges and meanings about
themselves and their work. For these reasons, identifying human beings as people seems, to me, more
respectful.
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Two or three things I know, two or three things I know for
sure, and one o f them is that to go on living 1 have to tell stories,
that stories are the one sure way I know to touch the heart and
change the world.
Dorothy Allison (1995)
Narrative Therapv
In the late 1980s, Australian Michael White and New Zealander David Epston
blazed new trails by introducing narrative therapy. While a thorough description o f their
ideas is certainly beyond the scope of this paper, I do want to present a very brief
overview.
Predicated upon principles o f social constructionism, narrative therapy makes use of
a narrative metaphor^ where individuals look at the various stories that impact and
constitute their lives. Much of this work involves the deconstruction o f “dominant
stories” while paying more attention to and developing “alternative stories” (Freedman &
Combs, 1996). In narrative therapy, “dominant stories” are those descriptions o f the
world that have gained dominance over other descriptions. In other words, they are
extremely popular ideas about “reality,” so popular that they often take on the status o f
“common sense.” On a societal basis, this status is often supported by the findings of
“scientific research” that seems to prove such dominant stories are in fact, part o f a
single, knowable reality. On a local, familial level, dominant stories often achieve the
status of “reality” by families' adherence to certain beliefs about “the way things are,”
beliefs that are commonly passed down through generations. In all instances, the real
' Gregory Bateson (1979) talks about the “interpretive method” in social science as the way social scientists
study processes by which people organize and make sense o f the world. He believes it is impossible for
anyone to know objective reality since everyone has a particular context full o f presuppositions and
premises with which they receive events. While these contexts create particular “maps” o f the world which
can be useful, Bateson is quick to remind us o f Korzybski’s maxim “the map is not the territory.”
Following this thinking. I, as well as many others, have chosen to refer to theories, methods, and
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effects^ o f power put these stories into dominance and keep them there where they then
exert their own real effects on people’s lives.
However, narrative therapy contends that the dominant ideas people think o f as
composing “reality” are instead social constructions which are situated in certain social
and historical contexts. Therefore, by looking at the way these dominant stories have
been socially constructed, it is possible to “deconstruct” them and account for the ideas,
actions, and power that created them in the first place and now keep them in a place of
dominance. Doing this gives persons the opportunity to see dominant stories not as
“reality” but as particular realities that may or may not fit for them and their lives.
On the other hand, alternative stories are those lived experiences for which dominant
stories caimot account That is, they are particular realities people experience, which do
not fit with society’s most popular descriptions o f “reality. ” Now, what I and many other
therapists find is that often times, dominant stories are in support o f certain problems in
persons’ lives while alternative stories do not leave much space for these problems to “do
their thing.” In other words, if particular problems are having undesired effects on
people’s lives, these problems are usually supported by particular dominant stories—
dominant in a society, local community, specific culture, or an individual experience—
that have real effects on persons lives. Kamsler (1992) exemplifies this idea by describing
how perpetrators o f child sexual abuse author oppressive, dominant stories that influence
the stories survivors tell about themselves. These stories are often quite powerful because

philosophies as metaphors in order to remind myself that they are simply ways o f organizing realities and
not the realities themselves.
^ Since oppressive ideas and practices can be seen as social constructions, some therapists contend they can
be dissolved through deconstructive conversations. While 1 agree that such forces are socially constructed,
they still effect person’s lives in very real ways. For example, over the years socially constructed discourses
o f racism have contributed to the enslavement and murder o f countless human beings. To acknowledge
these “real effects,” I prefer to identify them as such.
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they are accompanied by threats (e.g., if you don’t do what I tell you or if you tell anyone
about this. I’ll kill your parents). Therefore, a survivor is usually under the influence o f
several prescriptions o f how to feel, act, and think, that were actively promoted by the
abuser during interactions with her/him. In therapy, deconstructing an experience o f
abuse invites persons to situate problems in the context in which they were created and
then identify possibilities for ways they prefer to feel, act, and think (alternative stories).
Another important aspect of narrative therapy has to do with something I have
already touched upon, the externalization o f problems. An oft-quoted maxim o f narrative
therapy is, “The problem is the problem, the person is not the problem.” This is not to say
that problems are never attributable to such forces as persons, organizations, or ideas,
only that these forces do not construct problems inside o f people. Instead, problems are
seen as separate from the persons they affect, existing in the spaces between people
(Epston, 1993; Tomm, 1989; White, 1988b; White & Epston, 1990). This extemalization
allows people to view problems as social constructions and not fixed realities within
themselves. Extemalization also provides a means for deconstruction in narrative therapy,
a topic that will be discussed later in this paper.
In conversations with the people who consult them, narrative therapists are interested
in working together to identify and develop “unique outcomes, ”events that are not
accounted for by problems or problematic dominant stories. Persons are then invited to
take a stand on both the problems and unique outcomes in their lives and decide whether
or not they prefer them. While a person’s preference seem obvious to the therapist, it is
important to check this out. Inevitably, sometimes what the therapist sees as a problem is,
for the person, not a problem and sometimes what the therapist sees as a unique outcome
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is not something the person prefers at all. If they are determined to be good things, unique
outcomes can then be further storied in order to ^ticken the plot” for a person’s
alternative story.
Getting at these unique outcomes and the alternative stories they represent means
therapists have to listen carefully for exceptions to problematic, dominant stories. For
instance, a man with depression who spends most o f his time isolated in his home may
incidentally mention that he recently went to dinner with a friend. A narrative therapist
might ask questions about this unique behavior such as, “What was involved in taking
this stand against the depression?” or “What do you think it says about you as a person
that you were able to ignore what the depression wanted you to do?” In my experience,
such questions often surprise persons initially because, they have told me, they have
never thought about their experiences in this way. Unlike the questions many therapists
ask, these types of questions are not asked to gain information in order to make an
assessment or diagnosis. Instead, they are intended to provide an opportunity for an
individual to re-experience her/his experience in ways that allow for the performance o f
new meaning. These questions also invite people to give attention to the parts o f their
experience that support their preferred ways of being and by doing so “thicken” those
parts and begin to make them “more real.”
In narrative therapy, documents (such as letters and certificates) are used as ways o f
maintaining and “spreading the word” about those descriptions o f persons’ identities and
lives that they prefer (Freedman & Combs, 1996; Freeman, Epston, Lobovits, 1997;
White & Epston, 1990). These written or printed records, which evidence the realities of
alternative stories, can be very helpful in reminding people of the existence o f their
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preferred constructions (See Appendix A for an example). In fact, David Epston once
conducted an informal survey o f people who have worked with him in which he found
that on the average they thought a letter was worth 4.5 sessions o f good therapy
(Freedman & Combs, 1996). By having a document or documents upon which they can
reflect, people have the opportunity not only to remember their unique outcomes but also
to experience their stories in new ways that may evoke different meanings. Later in this
paper, I will talk about a powerful document that a courageous young person named
Ryan, and I, created together
As I have already discussed, narrative therapy is very attentive to the effects of
power and the problems those effects create in people’s lives. My friend Gene Combs
(personal communication, December 4, 1998) points out that attending to issues o f power
is really “the crux o f narrative therapy.” For instance, when working with people who
come for therapy, it is important to look at the ways dominant discourses, such as racism,
sexism, heterosexism, or any o f the oppressive “isms,” biases, and prejudices have had
significant influence on their lives. Often times, people feel relegated to a lifetime of
enduring the negative effects o f these discourses because they seem to be reality or, “just
the way the world is.” However, one can always find evidence in people’s lives that does
not fit with “just the way the world is,” knowledges and experiences that, although they
might have been vanquished by the power o f dominant discourses, are just as real. Much
of the time, these phenomena do not even register in awareness and pass by unnoticed
because they do not fit with the dominant “life scripts ” persons learn to follow. That is,
people tend to give no attention to any experiences that do not fit with those scripts. It is
those exceptional experiences on which narrative therapists strive to “shine the light” so
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they can be further storied into awareness and “reality” (J. Freedman & G. Combs,
personal communication, December 4, 1998).
I should also say that when compared to many other psychotherapies, one way
narrative therapy often differs is by attending to meaning in a ll aspects o f people’s
experience. As Gene Combs says, “There’s a place that encompasses thinking, feeling,
and doing, and that’s experiencing. What we do with experience is part o f our story.
When we further story it (the experience), that then shapes the experience” (personal
communication, December 4, 1998). Adding her perspective to this idea, Jill Freedman
notes that in everyone’s lives “there’s experience you notice and then there’s
experience,” implying that parts o f people’s experience exist outside o f their awareness.
Narrative therapy assumes that many experiences o f preferred, alternative stories have
gone urmoticed due to the ascendancy o f dominant stories in person’s lives, families,
communities, and societies (i.e., the micro, mezzo, and macro levels discussed in social
work theory). By working with individuals to bring these experiences to light, narrative
therapists and the people who consult them can discover and develop evidence o f
preferred realities. As Harlene Anderson says, it is these types o f conversations that can
“open up space for possibilities ” in person’s lives (personal communication, October 23,
1998).
Postmodernism
Several authors believe narrative therapy fits nicely against a background o f
postmodernism (for example, Freedman & Combs, 1996; McKenzie & Monk, 1997;
Simblet, 1997; Winslade & Cotter, 1997), a philosophical stance whose theories and
practices contrast such modernistic ideas as objective, universal “truth ” and a singular.
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knowable “reality.” While there is considerable debate among therapists over what
qualifiers define and determine postmodernism as opposed to modernism, Harlene
Anderson (1998) offers the following distinctions listed in Table 1;
Table 1
Distinctions between modem and postmodern therapies

Modem

Postmodern

Objective reality

Socially constructed reality

Kjiowledge as independent

Knowledge as interdependent

Expert and non-expert

Shared expertise

Technological and instrumental

Mutually created with multiple possibilities

Private thoughts and assumptions

Public, shared thoughts and assumptions

Sole responsibility

Shared responsibility

Hierarchical structure and process

Mutual and egalitarian structure and process

Anderson goes on to further distinguish some o f the differences between modem and
postmodern therapies. For example, while modem therapies perpetuate the notion o f over
arching, universal narratives and metaphors o f human description—predetermined
discoverable truths about human nature and individual human behavior— postmodern
therapies value a multiplicity of descriptions, explanations, and imderstandings o f the
same events and experiences. The assumption here is that narratives and truths about
human nature and individual behavior are socially constructed and relational.
Another difference concerns the way postmodern therapies promote mutual and
nonhierarchical relationships in which a therapist and the persons consulting her/him join
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in a shared inquiry o f the issues at hand (problems) and a shared development o f the
possibilities. The person seeking consultation is the expert on his or her life (content) and
a therapist is an expert on dialogic conversation (process). This is different from
modernistic therapies, which tend to promote a more dualistic and hierarchical
relationship between a therapist and the people who consult her/him. Typically, these
relationships view the people seeking consultation as subjects o f inquiry and observation,
and the therapist as a representative o f a dominant social and cultural discourse, a
“knower” of the human story and what that story should be.
Poststructuralism
Michael White (1999) points out how the practices o f narrative therapy are informed
by postructuralist or nonstructuralist ideas about life and identity. In order to explain this,
let me first talk about some o f the structuralist understandings with which narrative
practices are in contrast.
Having developed over the past four to five hundred years, structuralism and
structuralist ideas have become so pervasive in Western culture, it is difficult to think
outside of them. One characteristic o f structuralist thought is the popular surface/depth
contrast, used to describe person’s identities. Essentially, this idea considers expressions
and other behaviors to be surface manifestations o f certain essences and elements that
exist inside people. Invariably, these pieces o f identity are together referred to as the
“se lf’ in Western culture. The assumption is that every person has one o f these “selves”
and this “self’ is inseparable from her/his identity. In fact, identity is usually thought to
be a product of, or synonymous with, the self.
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Naturally, thinking in this way brings with it, several implications, especially for
those who are in the business o f trying to help people deal with problems. As Michael
White (1999) notes;
If the actions and the experiences o f people’s lives that bring them to
counseling/therapy are understood to be expressions that are surface manifestations
of deeper “truths”— for example, o f certain elements or essences o f a self that is to
be found at the center o f identity—then these expressions require expert
interpretation. This requirement leads to the production of theories, to the
construction o f systems o f analyses founded on these theories that can be laid over
people’s lives, and to the development o f professional techniques o f remediation
that will fix whatever it is that is amiss at the center o f their identity (pp. 57-58).
White goes on to discuss how the idea that there exists such a thing as a “self,” a
“self’ that makes up the center o f a person’s identity, is a relatively recent phenomenon.
Apparently, in the history o f the world’s cultures, this way o f thinking (which is very
common to Westerners) is a fairly new and unusual construction. Much more common
are, and have been, nonstructuralist or poststructuralist understandings which account for
identity as a social and public achievement.
Unlike identities described by structuralist ideas, poststructuralist identities are
“negotiated within social institutions and within communities of people ” as well as
“shaped by historical and cultural forces” (White, 1999, p. 58). Within these structures, it
is common for persons to negotiate meanings that engender identity through narrative
frames. That is, people attribute meaning to experiences by locating them in sequences
that occur across time according to particular themes or plots. By “storying ” their

20
experience into narrative, people construct descriptions o f identity that they then organize
into modem culture’s identity categories—attributes, needs, traits, etc. Therefore, it is not
people’s motives that shape their actions; it is people’s accounts o f their motives that are
socially derived in narrative negotiations that do so.
Instead of the surface/depth contrast supported by structuralism, poststructural ist
practices differentiate between the metaphors of “thick” and “thin” (Geertz, 1973). For
example, the structuralist idea that individuals need “experts” to interpret and make sense
o f their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, offers very limited possibilities to people and
therefore, contributes to “thin” descriptions o f their lives. On the other hand,
poststructuralist ways o f working with people, such as narrative therapy, help people
break from thin conclusions about their lives, identities, and relationships. This results in
“thick” descriptions o f people that take into account such things as the way different
contexts help construct different “selves ” and the ways different preferred aspects o f
person’s identities often go unnoticed by them.
For example, many assessment tools are geared toward finding symptoms in people
that can then be put together in order to determine such things as problems, strengths,
disorders, or needs. These categories (i.e., problems, strengths, disorders, and needs)
offer “thin” conclusions because they tell a very one-sided, contextual, and limited story
about who the person is. In contrast, poststructuralist interviews are interested in “thick, ”
rich descriptions o f person’s identities that include exceptions to the problems that are
affecting their lives and the ways people become different in different contexts Perhaps
most exciting is the way poststructuralist conversations can invite persons to focus on and
“story” those parts o f their experience they prefer. Doing so presents an opportunity to
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generate thick or rich descriptions of their lives that offer more options and possibilities
than they might have ever imagined.
Social Constructionism
Another metaphor used in narrative therapy that I found to be particularly important
is that of social constructionism/ Essentially, social constructionism is the proposition
that human realities are socially constructed through the vehicles o f language and power.
It is a way of thinking about the world that questions assumed realities by deconstructing
them, or taking a closer look at the ways in which they were created. Burr (1995) notes
that, while there is no single definition o f what “social constructionism” means, there are
some basic tenets common to most social constructionist thinkers and writers. Some o f
these include (a) a critical stance toward assumed knowledge, (b) historical and cultural
specificity, and (c) the sustainment of knowledge through social practices.
Kenneth Gereen
In recent years, Kenneth Gergen has contributed a great deal to social constructionist
thinking. He contends that persons actively construct the meanings that frame and
organize their perceptions and experience. According to Gergen (1985), the social
constructionist approach is a process o f inquiry guided by such trends as symbolic
interactionism, symbolic anthropology, ethnomethodology, literary deconstructionism,
existentialism, phenomenology, and social psychology. Rather than defining what all o f
these disciplines are about, the point is that all o f them emphasize the individual s role,
guided by her/his culture, in structuring the reality that affects her/his values and
behavior. For Gergen, social constructionism is about understanding the generation.
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transformation, and suppression o f what people take to be objective knowledge. He also
points out how social constructionist practices explore the literary and rhetorical devices
by which meaning is achieved and how such practices expose the ideology and values o f
that which is taken for granted as “truth.” Later in this paper, I will discuss four common
social constructionist assumptions identified by Gergen
In their seminal text. The Social Construction o f Reality. Berger and Luckman
(1966) propose a four-stage schema through which human beings construct their realities.
The first, called typification, is the process through which persons sort their perceptions
into types or classes such as gender and religious groups. This is followed by the
institutionalization o f typifications (e.g., marriage, motherhood, law, etc.) which are then
legitimized by such activities as writing and publishing books. The combined processes
o f typification, institutionalization, and legitimization result in reification. Reification
apprehends human activities as if they were something other tfian human products, such
as facts of nature, results o f cosmic laws, or manifestations o f divine will.
Jill Freedman and Gene Combs (1996) observe that while reification is necessary for
efficiency, it can become problematic when people forget that terms and concepts are
simply useful social constructions, not external, preexistent realities. For example, my
grandparents were people who, not unlike many others o f their time, subscribed to what
we now call “traditional gender roles.” This meant that my grandmother did “womanly”
things like clean the house, care for the children, wash the family’s clothing, and prepare
the family’s meals. My grandfather, on the other hand, went to work and earned the
family’s income, fixed things around the house, mowed the lawn, and pursued other
' While narrative therapy seems to be predicated upon many o f the assumptions of social constructionism,
Michael White does not use the phrase social constructionism when referring to his work (J. Freedman,
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“manly” activities. Having grown up inside o f dominant discourses representing the
reification o f these gender roles, my grandparents did not see any other options for
themselves or if they did, they did not pursue them For them, the idea that women do
certain things and men do certain other things, was simply “the way things are supposed
to be.”
Today, thanks to many, many feminist voices, we know that women in my
grandparents’ day were getting the short end o f the stick in tall doses. For instance, many
did not have economic power because they did not work. Most o f those who did work
were relegated to “women’s work” like nursing, teaching, and secretarial positions where
they were often subordinate to males (e.g., male doctors, male administrators, and male
supervisors). While in some ways our society has “come a long way baby” regarding the
power imbalances between men and women, my experience tells me we still have a long
way to go.
For instance, in one o f my jobs as a therapist in a domestic violence and sexual
abuse/assault agency, I have been a part o f many sessions with women whose reified
“realities” contend that females are lesser human beings than are males. Unfortunately,
those realities gave men in their lives an authority to abuse them and exert enormous
control over their lives. For the majority of these women, the idea that such inequality
between men and women is a social construction, and not a universal “truth, ” was never a
possibility. This is not surprising given the fact that most were handed this reality o f
gender inequality by their families where it was also supported by dominant societal
discourses. But more than anything, they had experienced the real effects o f such a reality
time and time again.
personal communication, June 10, 1999.
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However, in our conversations I was always impressed to discover that there were
moments in these ladies’ lived experience when they acted in ways the “reality” o f
gender inequality could not even begin to account for. Sometimes it was thinking, “I
don’t deserve this,” sometimes it was calling a shelter to ask about services, and
sometimes it was even calling the police on the person who was abusing them. In any
case, these “unique outcomes” provided evidence o f a world where these women were
important and had a voice in matters, evidence with which they could begin socially
constructing new realities for themselves that they preferred.
The Significance o f Language
As I mentioned earlier, social constructionists observe it is through language,
combined with power, that persons construct their realities. Such social constructionists
include discourse psychologists, who discuss the performative, action-oriented function
o f language (Edwards & Potter, 1993; Potter & Wetherell, 1995). These authors tend to
see accounts as constructed to achieve particular social goals, rather than representing
and expressing intra-psychic events. Drawing upon the work o f Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Gergen (1994) notes that language serves neither as a picture or a map o f any reality;
rather (following Wittgenstein, 1953), it acquires its meaning from its use within human
interchange.
Social constructionist inquiry is principally concerned with explicating the
processes by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the
world (including themselves) in which they live...“[social constructionism] views
discourse about the world not as a reflection or map o f the world but as an artifact
of communal interchange” (Gergen, 1985, p. 266)

25
While Harre’s (1984) work has focused on how language provides people with ways
o f understanding themselves in the world, postmodern writers such as Harlene Anderson
(1990) and Jerome Bruner (1990) assert that individuals not only understand themselves
through language, they use language to actively constitute their realities, which are then
organized and maintained through narrative. Anderson, who along with the late Harry
Goolishian created the collaborative language systems model o f therapy, is especially
excited by the collaborative nature o f language. For her (and myself as well), the notion
that the meanings people attribute to things, events, and people in their lives are arrived at
“through social dialogue, interchange, and interaction that we socially construct” is a
liberating “move away from the notion o f individual authorship to the notion of multiple
or plural authorship” (Anderson, 1997, p. 41).
An example o f what she means by “plural authorship” is this: I think of myself as a
talented percussionist. However, this idea o f “talented” certainly does not come from me
alone. Instead, it is constructed by many forces including other musicians who tell me
that they view me as talented (this includes their ideas and experiences that influence
their views), musical “experts” who write books and articles saying people who are
capable o f playing things I am able to play are talented, and our society’s agreed upon
standards for what constitutes talent. Therefore, it is the interaction, interchange, and
dialogue o f many different persons, who describe and communicate “what makes a
percussionist talented,” that contribute to the idea that I am a talented percussionist. This
idea of multiauthored realities brings particular attention to the processes of
supplementation and joint action.
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Supplementation
Supplementation, a concept offered by (guess who?) Kenneth Gergen (1984),
describes the way in which the coordination o f human utterances and actions gives rise to
meaning. Basically, it is the process in which one person responds to, or supplements, the
statements or actions of another person. It is through this supplementation process that
the potential (Gergen’s emphasis) for meaning between interacting people develops.
Take, for example, a conversation between two individuals. While responses can range
from one word to an elaborate conversation, each person is simultaneously immersed in a
variety o f other relationships—past, present, and future—and the various contexts of
those relationships influence the supplementations and subsequent meanings developed
in a conversation. At the same time, the influence o f the supplementation within the
conversation has the potential to carry over into other conversations with other persons, a
reciprocal process that is constantly expanding. What all o f this means is that meanings
are never permanently fixed (or should that be, “What all o f this means fo r me at this
particular time is that meanings are never permanently fixed?” ) Anyway, the idea here is
that meanings are perpetually influenced, constructed, and reconstructed over time.
Joint Action
Similar to Gergen’s idea o f supplementation is Shotter’s rhetorical-responsive
process o f joint action. In defining joint action, Shotter (1984) states; “All actions by
human beings involved with others in a social group in this fashion are dialogically or
responsively linked in some way, both to previous, already executed actions and to
anticipated, next possible actions” (pp. 52-53). In other words, whenever persons engage
in conversations, they bring lots o f meanings to the table, meanings from both their past
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and future (anticipated) experiences. O f particular interest to Shotter is the way in which
people seem to be able to create and maintain between themselves an extensive
background context o f lived relations. This shared context enables persons to coordinate
their everyday mutual activities spontaneously, a coordination that is facilitated by the
process o f joint action.
Having discovered these ideas about the constitutive nature o f language, I knew that
my conversations with the people who consult with me would never be the same. No
longer would the questions and answers we exchange in therapy merely be ways of
exchanging information, they were now the ways in which I and others were influencing,
constructing, and reconstructing meanings, ways in which we were participating in the
continual processes o f constituting our realities. In addition to conversations, I began to
realize the same is true about the language contained in texts. As you will read later, this
played an important part in my answering the question, “What the hell should I write my
thesis about?” But first, another important part o f this whole adventure: ladies and
gentlemen, the philosophical stylings o f Michel Foucault.
Foucault and Power
As with other thinkers I find to be inspiring, I wanted not only to familiarize myself
with Michael White’s and David Epston’s ideas, I wanted to know what ideas inspired
them. Specifically, I wanted to learn about the thinkers who fueled their passions. One o f
these thinkers, French philosopher Michel Foucault, really caught my attention and so I
began the arduous task of reading and trying to comprehend the things he wrote. While
the enterprise o f reading Foucault (1980, 1982, 1984a, 1984b) continues to this day, I
have come to make meaning o f some o f his ideas (as well as Michael White’s
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interpretations of his ideas), ideas that I find terribly exciting. Particularly, I took interest
in the way Foucault thinks about power, especially his notions that (a) power has a
constitutive quality, (b) knowledge and power are inseparable, and (c) the ascendancy of
particular knowledges results in the subjugation o f others. These are central to the
philosophical underpinnings o f narrative therapy and they are ideas to which I have
become extremely committed.
Power is Constitutive
Common ideas about power include the following: (I) it is oppressive and repressive
in its operations and effects, (2) it is something negative, and (3) it is something that
limits, disqualifies, denies, and contains. However, Foucault (1980, 1984a) argues that
people predominantly experience the positive effects of power, that we are subject to
power through normalizing “truths” that shape our lives and relationships. In turn, the
operations o f power are what construct these “truths.”
When he talks about power being something “positive,” Foucault does not mean in
the usual sense o f the word (i.e., desirable or advantageous). Instead, he refers to it in the
sense that power is constitutive and shaping o f people’s lives. In contrast to the theory
that power is “negative” and therefore repressive, the idea that power is positive leads us
to consider its role in making up people’s lives.
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects o f power in negative terms;
it “excludes,” it “represses,” it “censors,” it “abstracts,” it “masks,” it “conceals.”
In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains o f objects and
rituals o f truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained from him
[sic] belong to this production (Foucault, 1979, p. 194).
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Foucault subscribes to the notion that through social constructionism, certain ideas
are accorded a truth status and these “truths” construct norms that shape and specify the
lives o f people. Rather than repressing people, Foucault proposes that power subjugates
persons through global and unitary “truths,” particularly the “truths” o f “objective
reality” proposed by modem scientific disciplines As subjects o f this power, people are
“judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertaking, destined to a certain
mode o f living or dying, as a function o f the truth discourses which are the bearers o f the
specific effects o f power (1980, p. 94).
Knowledge and Power are Inseparable
At the same time Foucault considers power to be constitutive, he concludes that
power and knowledge are inseparable. In fact, he believes this so strongly, he prefers to
place the two terms together as power/knowledge or knowledge/power. When studying
the history o f systems o f thought, Foucault sees that the emergence and success o f ideas
about labor, language, and life in general depended upon the techniques o f power.
Concurrently, the expansionist quality o f modem power (i.e., power that individuals
internalize and force upon themselves as opposed to power that is felt only when one is
confronted by physical representations o f power such as soldiers or police) depends on
the construction and reification of knowledges that propose the “truth.” Thus, a domain
of power is a domain o f knowledge and vice versa.
There can be no possible exercise o f power without a certain economy o f
discourses o f truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We
are subjected to the production o f truth through power and we caimot exercise
power except through the production o f truth (Foucault, 1980, p. 93).
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By putting power and knowledge together like this, Foucault is not saying that
knowledge is only problematic when those in power use it to suit their own needs.
Instead, he believes we are all acting within and through a given held o f
power/knowledge. Although our actions certainly have real effects, Foucault contends
that we cannot identify them with special motives. In other words, we are all caught up
within a web of knowledge/power and it is not possible to act independently from this. At
the same time we are undergoing the effects o f power, we are exercising power on others.
This is not to say that all people exercise power equally or that some people do not suffer
the subjugating effects o f power much more than others. It does however, offer a new
perspective:
Let us not, therefore, ask why certain people want to dominate, what they seek,
what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at the level o f
ongoing subjugation, at the level o f those continuous and uninterrupted processes
which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviors, etc. In other
words... we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually,
progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity o f
organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. We should try to
grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution o f subjects (1980, p. 97).
Foucault believes that it is the isolation o f specific knowledges from the
discontinuous knowledges circling around them that gives their discourses the effect o f
power. He argues that specific knowledges achieve this isolation by developing
“objective reality” discourses, discourses that grant them a status o f “truth” in modem
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science. For Foucault, it is extremely important to trace the history o f the knowledges
given this “truth” status and investigate their effects and limitations He states;
The central issue o f philosophy and critical thought since the eighteenth century
has always been... What is this reason that we use? What are its historical effects?
What are its limits and what are its dangers (1984b, p. 249)?
As I will discuss later, this is the premise upon which Michael White bases
deconstruction in narrative therapy.
Power Ascends and Subjugates
Rather than viewing the techniques o f power as forces operating from above to
change those below, Foucault posits that these techniques originate at the local level. In
fact, he believes that the availability o f these techniques enabled the successful growth o f
unitary and global knowledges (i.e., “truths”) from the 17*** century on as well as the rise
of capitalism (Foucault, 1979). When discussing the techniques o f power, Foucault
divides them into three categories: techniques o f social control and subjugation,
techniques for objectifying people and regarding them as “things,” and techniques for
objectifying people’s bodies. The objectives o f these techniques include:
1. Organizing and arranging persons in space in ways that allow for greatest
efficiency and economy.
2. Registering and classifying persons.
3. Excluding certain groups of persons and ascribing identity to these groups.
4. Isolating persons.
5. Observing and evaluating persons.
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In addition, Foucault believes that over the past 400 years, emerging technologies
have facilitated the ability o f techniques o f power to operate at local levels. That is, since
the 17* century, conditions have been established that allow for the ongoing evaluation
of persons according to particular institutionalized norms. In the culture of psychotherapy
and social work, the technologies o f this power include the practices of observation,
measurement, and evaluation as well as procedures for locating problems at particular
sites of identity (e.g., psyches, emotional centers, etc.). By using such technologies,
professions such as psychology and social work have done much to insert these new
practices o f power into popular culture. This has resulted in tremendous advancements in
the government o f person’s lives, since it is when people begin experiencing these
inescapable evaluative conditions in a personal, individual manner that they then become
the guardians o f themselves.
When describing the way in which individuals have become their own guardians,
Foucault uses the metaphor of a Panopticon prison where individual cells circle a central
guard station. Because prisoners can never be sure whether or not guards are watching
them at any given time, they take it upon themselves to constantly evaluate their own
behavior and forge themselves as “docile bodies

In Foucault’s opinion, evaluation and

normalizing judgement have replaced the judiciary, torture, and erasure as the primary
mechanisms o f social control in our society. Now, instead o f evaluating and changing
their behavior only within the presence of real consequences (e.g., military ceremonies
and spectacles), people modify themselves because they are constantly under what

^ Michael White (White & Epston, 1990) suggests that anorexia nervosa and bulimia might very well
reflect the ultimate achievement o f this type o f power.
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Foucault calls an ever present “gaze.”^ Thus, while power was once most potent at its
source, it is now most intense at its point o f contact.
Based on his contention that power and knowledge are inseparable, Foucault is very
concerned with how the aforementioned techniques o f power are required for the
expansion o f knowledge.
It is both much more and much less than ideology. It is the production o f effective
instruments for the formation and accumulation o f knowledge—methods o f
observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research,
apparatuses o f control. All this means that power, when it is exercised through
these subtle mechanisms, cannot but evolve, organize and put into circulation a
knowledge, or rather apparatuses o f knowledge, which are not ideological
constructs (Foucault, 1980, p. 102).
Foucault goes on to describe two types o f subjugated knowledges: previously
established knowledges and “local” or “indigenous” knowledges. Previously established
knowledges are those that have been eliminated or written out of the record by the
revision o f history that was achieved by the ascendance o f global and unitary knowledges
or so called “truths.” These knowledges, Foucault says, can only be resurrected by careful
scholarship that elucidates their struggle for survival and challenges the universal truth
claims that have made them invisible. The other knowledges he identifies, local or
“regional” knowledges, are those that can only survive at the fnnges o f society and are
accorded very low status. Essentially, these knowledges are seen as insufficient and

^ It can be argued that men are more often the instruments o f the normalizing gaze while women are more
often its subject (White & Epston, 1990).
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therefore, not acceptable within the "legitimate'' domain o f formal knowledge and
science.
Mv Experience with Strengths and Empowerment
With all of this talk about power, I should make mention of the strengths
perspective, a model endorsed by my MSW program that asks social workers to
“mobilize clients' strengths (talents, knowledge, capacities, resources) in the service o f
achieving their goals and visions " (Saleebey, 1997a, p. 4). As an alternative to working in
ways that focus on deficits, problems, and pathology, Saleebey contends that working
from a strengths perspective means “clients will have a better quality of life on their
terms” (p. 4). In the field o f social work, this perspective is considered an empowerment
approach, as it views the people consulting social workers “as persons, families, groups,
and communities with multiple capacities and possibilities, no matter how disadvantaged,
incapacitated, [or] deni grated... they may be” (Simon, 1994, p. 1).
In some ways, the strengths perspective fits with the philosophical stances I have
discussed earlier in this paper For example, within this model, there is an emphasis on
having social workers respect persons’ own views o f their realities and then leam from
those views what is most helpful. In addition, “storying " people’s lives by focusing on
resources and abilities brings about identity descriptions that can be filed into one o f
modem society's more favorable identity categories, that o f “strengths." Still, I should
state that there are aspects o f the strengths perspective model that I see as problematic.
Therefore, my reasoning in discussing it here is mostly to demonstrate knowledge, not
advocate for its use. Although the strengths perspective model has some clear advantages
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over other ways of doing social work, it is not a model with which I choose to identify
my thinking and practices.
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Beginning the Process
So there I was, in the midst o f newly revealed knowledge, fresh perspectives that
seemed to frt with my values and the kind o f social worker I wanted to be. I had begun
reading everything I could find about narrative therapy, postmodernism,
poststructuralism, social constructionism, and Foucault’s ideas about power and I was
applying these ideas to the ways that I was working with people in therapy Additionally,
I began studying with Jill Freedman and Gene Combs, highly regarded authors,
therapists, and teachers within the narrative therapy community, at their agency in
Evanston, Illinois. As I prepared to begin work on my thesis, I knew that these exciting
new ideas would be an important part o f it all.
At the same time, I wanted to pursue a project involving another longtime interest,
human sexuality. I suspect I am not in a minority when I say I am interested in sex, but
perhaps not a majority when I say that for some time now, I have wanted to pursue work
as a sex therapist. Having learned a substantial amount about this through reading several
books and journals, being a member o f the American Association o f Sex Educators,
Counselors, and Therapists, and an having an undergraduate minor in human sexuality, I
felt at least minimally prepared to pursue a thesis along these lines.
Great Expectations
From all o f this came my grand idea; I wanted to show how human sexuality is
socially constructed. That is, 1 wanted to discover for myself and then reveal to the world
how so many individuals, institutions (i.e., political, religious, educational, etc.),
communities, and others have, over the span o f centuries, played a part in creating
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various sexual beliefs, behaviors, and feelings. Perhaps not a simple task, but one that
was doable, or so I thought.
When I took a moment to put my enthusiasm on hold and consider the practicality o f
such an enormous undertaking, my plans quickly began to change. The more I talked
with my thesis committee and others, the more the project seemed doable only if I were
some kind o f sex-researching cat (not just a “cat” as in slang for “jazz musician”) with
nine lifetimes available. In short, it was much too much for a thesis and in order to satisfy
any part o f my original “show the world” intentions, I would have to “scale it down,”
“take a piece o f it,” or any o f the other phrases o f advice from both others and myself that
told me to draw a limit.
In order to finish my thesis before 1 got old enough to where my prostate gland
turned into a jujube, I began thinking about who or what, based on my experience, had
contributed to the social construction o f sexuality. Yes, there were guys like Magnus
Hershfeld and Havelock Ellis, from the early days o f sexology. As well, there were those
sexologists who came later, like Sigmund Freud and Alfred Kinsey. However, I was
looking for someone with a more direct link to the sexual realities we know today. With
this in mind, my answer became obvious: William H. Masters and Virginia Johnson.
Beginning with my first human sexuality course as an undergraduate, I had learned
how Master’s and Johnson’s work revolutionized not only the domains of research and
clinical sexology, it seemed to have a significant impact on the sexual attitudes o f society
in general. For example, their human sexual response cycle almost immediately came to
serve as the benchmark for physiological sexual processes in humans. Not only did this
model seem to make sense for many people (I could certainly make it fît with my sexual
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experiences). Masters and Johnson seemed to have the ‘"proof’ that it was a reality.
Unlike Alfred Kinsey (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, &
Gephard, 1953) who relied on individuals’ self-reports o f sexual experiences. Masters
and Johnson (1966) actually observed masturbating and copulating human beings in the
laboratory'. To make it even more legitimate, a number of these observations were made
with sophisticated “scientific equipment,” seemingly leaving little doubt that what they
would later report in Human Sexual Response was the real deal.
In addition to the human sexual response cycle, I recalled several lectures and
readings about Masters and Johnson’s important contributions to the burgeoning field o f
sex therapy. In particular, their sensate-focus technique (Masters & Johnson, 1970)
seemed especially important, as it was designed to help couples increase their
communication and create deeper emotional connections with one another while
addressing such sexual issues as arousal and orgasm. Not only was this therapeutic
technique popular when it was first introduced, it has apparently remained a popular
implement in sex therapists’ collections o f tools of the trade. In fact, when I went to the
literature to investigate responses to Masters and Johnson’s work, I was surprised to find
many articles discussing the successful use o f the original or modified models of sensate
focus (for just a few examples see Kayata & Szydlo, 1986; Apfelbaum, 1995; Bullough,
1994).
When looking for some backup to justify my choice o f subject, it did not take much
effort to find others who have noticed the enormous influence o f Masters’ and Johnson’s
work. For example, Stephen Levine (1995), a very prominent sexologist, calls their
research and writings “highly influential” and credits them with the rapid development o f
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sex therapy that began in the early 1970s (p 1). Another revered sexologist, Helen Singer
Kaplan (1995), sings their praises when she writes, “If I have gone somewhat beyond
their original conceptions... that is merely because one can sometimes see a little further
when sitting ‘on the shoulders o f giants’” (p. 8). Crooks and Baur (1993) state that “along
with the Kinsey research. Masters and Johsnon’s study of human sexual response is
probably the most often mentioned sex research” (p. 30). The impact o f their work is also
acknowledged by Hartman and Fithian (1998) who assert “Human Sexual Response
(1966) remains the keystone o f modem sex therapy, not just in the United States, but
anywhere sex therapy is studied or practiced” (p. 252). Even David Schnarch (1991),
whose sexual crucible method o f sex and couples therapy has itself become hugely
popular, notes their influence when he writes:
The field’s obsession with the mechanics of sex results, in part, from Masters and
Johnson’s concentration on performance problems and the phenomenal impact of
their model of human sexual response. Masters and Johnson’s famous four-stage
“phase” model of excitement, plateau, orgasm, and resolution focused on genital
and peripheral physiological changes and on classification o f sexual dysfunctions.
Their model’s exclusive focus on physiological response has had tremendous
impact on the field (p. 11).
Subject Matter
Having decided upon Masters and Johnson’s work as the topic o f my effort, my next
objective was determining what specific presentations and/or representations of their
work I would be examining. At first, I wanted to look at everything, including all of the
books and articles they wrote together, separately, and with other people. In addition, I
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planned to consider everything else I could get my hands and eyes on that alluded to or
provided examples o f their ideas, intentionally or not. This meant all o f the instructional
films about Masters and Johnson s sex therapy techniques, human sexuality textbooks
that discuss their work, movies and books that offer depictions o f sexual behavior framed
within their model o f human sexual response, and so on. O f course, once I started
imagining myself trying to locate every human sexuality textbook written since the late
I960’s, cleaning out the erotica section at every bookstore, and renting just about every
adult film under the sun, I realized this would be too much o f an undertaking. Once
again, I had envisioned a feat that was impossible for a Master’s level thesis project and
once again, it was time to break it down.
To do this, 1 first looked at what other writers were referencing when they talked
about the work o f Masters and Johnson. What I discovered was that almost everyone who
had anything at all to say about them was citing one or both o f their first two books.
Human Sexual Response (1966) and Human Sexual Inadequacy (1970). Perusing them
myself, it became obvious to me that Masters and Johnson probably presented their most
original and influential ideas in the pages o f these two texts. While sexual physiology
was the principle topic in Human Sexual Response. Human Sexual Inadequacy helped set
the stage for the field of sex therapy
Since both o f these books seemed so significant, 1 decided to use both o f them as the
subjects o f my undertaking. But again, I realized that even just these two books would be
more than 1 could handle for a project that was supposed to be on a smaller scale than my
dissertation will someday be. Therefore, I made the decision to “take it from the top,” to
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focus exclusively on the impact o f the publication that picked up where Alfred Kinsey
left off. Human Sexual Response.
A Deconstructive Joumev
And so it was, with all my postmodern and post-structuralist biases on board, I
embarked on a journey to find out how M asters’ and Johnson’s Human Sexual Response
might have contributed to the social constructions o f sexuality as we now know them. To
do this, I wanted to enlist a practice I learned from narrative therapy casually referred to
as “unpacking” and more formally referred to as deconstruction.
Some Background on Deconstruction
The term “deconstruction” represents a process of critical thought proposed
principally by French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1976; 1978). Essentially, the task of
deconstruction is to locate and “take apart” concepts which serve as axioms or rules
during a certain historical period o f theoretical thought. Derrida contends that many
readers make false assumptions about the nature o f texts, assumptions such as:
•

Language can express ideas without changing them.

•

A text's author is the source o f its meaning.

According to Derrida, deconstruction can subvert these assumptions by challenging the
idea that a text has an unchanging, unified meaning and questioning an author’s
intentions instead o f just accepting them unconditionally. Therefore, after a text is
deconstructed, its generally accepted or sanctioned meaning is shown to be only one of
many possible meanings.
While Derrida generally deconstructs philosophical writings, deconstruction can be
applied to any text since it is a theory o f reading and not just a theory o f literature.
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Derrida’s particular brand o f deconstructive reading is based on gaps in what we take to
be the common-sense experience o f texts and reality. Further, Derrida places a premium
on looking at oppositions and exclusions, both explicit and implied, in the established
meanings o f words and phrases.
Deconstruction in Narrative Therapy
Discussing the use o f deconstruction in narrative therapy, Michael White (1993) says
that deconstruction “has to do with procedures that subvert taken-for-granted realities and
practices; those so-called ‘truths’ that are split off from the conditions and the context of
their production; those disembodied ways o f speaking that hide their biases and
prejudices; and those familiar practices o f self and o f relationship that are subjugating of
persons’ lives” (p. 34). For White, deconstructing the stories by which people live
requires the objectification and externalization o f the problems for which they seek
therapy. In this way, individuals are able to identify the private and cultural stories they
live by and in the process, understand the constitution o f their selves and their
relationships across time.
Following this premise, Michael White suggests beginning the process o f
deconstruction by asking persons externalizing questions, questions that locate problems
outside of persons and invite accoimts o f the problems’ effects on their lives. For
example, some o f the deconstructive questions I have asked people in therapy include:
• What has anger talked you into doing before that you later regretted?
• When were some other times alcohol was able to convince you that you could do
things better with a buzz?
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• Some people have told me that depression likes to associate with other shady
characters like isolation and insecurity. Does this fit with your experience?
Further questioning about the habits and effects o f problems can make it possible for
people to determine how these problems might have been constructed in the first place
and what contexts and societal discourses support their continued existence. For
example:
•

You have told me that in order to be a “real man,” you must be able to have an
erection whenever your partner wants to have sex. Where does that idea come
from?

•

Are there certain places where it is easier for the drinking to talk you into
having a beer?

•

How do you think the idea self-sufficiency became so popular in our country?
How did you leam about it?

These questions make it possible for people to take a few steps back from problems and
get a better look at the ways they exist in “historically situated interchanges among
people” (Gergen, 1985, p. 267). At the very least, this can present an opportunity to
negotiate a different, more preferable kind o f relationship with the problem. At the very
most, this can eliminate the effects o f the problem, thereby eliminating the problem
itself* In any case, this process o f deconstruction via externalizing conversations has the
potential o f toppling oppressive dominant stories while making room for preferred ways
o f being. As Michael White writes:

* Elsewhere, Michael White has discussed how effects serve as “life support systems” for problems (White
&Epston, 1990).
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Persons experience a separation from, and alienation in relation to, these stories. In
the space established by this separation, persons are free to explore alternative and
preferred knowledges o f who they might be, alternative and preferred knowledges
into which they might enter their lives (White, 1988b, p. 39).
The Deconstruction o f Texts
Through Derrida and other reading, 1 had learned some o f the philosophies and
purposes o f applying deconstruction to written texts. For example, authors such as Tiefer
( 1995b) point out how the deconstruction o f texts can have a destabilizing effect on
existing models and frameworks— it can sort o f knock them on their keisters. Another
deconstructive author. Daphne Read (1989) observes that while this kind o f approach can
be considered seditious and subversive, there is value in challenging dominant,
conventional thinking, value because it can produce new meanings and open possibilities
o f conflicting meanings by bringing into the foreground knowledges that are
marginalized, minimized, or silenced. In fact, text deconstruction can sometimes yield
motivations and agendas that seemed to discredit most o f what was written. For example,
by deconstructing sexological research published before the work of Alfred Kinsey
(Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, & Gephard, 1953), Vem
Bullough (1985) and Katherine Davis (1988) discovered most studies were funded by
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Rockefeller had a compelling interest in the sex reform issues o f
his day and not surprisingly, the results of the research he financed supported campaigns
(a) against red light districts, (b) for prophylactic use, and (c) for limited sex education.
Bullough notes that the result o f such funding was the establishment of a dominant group
o f sexologists conducting and publishing the majority o f sex research in that era, namely
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(surprise) those who supported the ideals held by Rockefeller. Certainly, nowadays when
forcing one’s sexual agenda onto other people through biased research, a buck just does
not buy what it used to. Still, as you will read later, threatening to boycott a department
store can go a long way in controlling the reproductive rights o f women. But I digress.
Anyway, while I was learning more about the important findings o f deconstruction, I
really was not aware of a particular way I could deconstruct Human Sexual Response. I
liked Tiefer’s (1995b) definition o f text deconstruction as a “critical analysis o f existing
concepts, categories, and metaphors, ” that “serves to reveal a multiplicity o f potential
conceptual perspectives” (p. 59), as this sounded like the same kind o f deconstruction I
was doing in therapy. However, I needed more than a definition, I needed a method, a
sort o f “how to” instruction manual I could follow to do the work o f determining how
certain ideas and methods gain dominance over others and what knowledges or lived
experiences are suppressed and marginalized as a result.
A Precept for Deconstruction
It was not until nine months into this project that my ongoing search yielded
something more specific about the deconstruction process, namely Jonathan Culler’s On
Deconstruction: Theorv and Criticism After Structuralism (1983). In this book. Culler
outlines the following types o f conflicts for which deconstructive readers should be on
the lookout:
1. Asymetrical oppositions or value-laden hierarchies in which one term is promoted
at the expense of the other. By identifying these, readers can show how the second
term is used to constitute the condition for the first and therefore, reverse the
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hierarchy. However, this is not a simple matter since the reversal is now in the
condition of reversibility, and so on.
2. Places where a single term brings together different lines o f argument or sets of
values into one condensation.
3. Ways in which the text contradicts itself by suggesting a difference from itself.
These include interpretations the reader makes that might undermine the
apparently primary or “well established” interpretation o f the text.
4.

Instances where the text applies a figure or image o f its own creation to
something else in an attempt to naturalize (i.e., make the reader think, “hey, this is
natural, normal, etc.”) something that cannot be naturalized.

5. Conflicting readings o f the text which are representative o f conflicts within the
text. This demonstrates how instead of having a primary meaning, a text is full o f
a complex interplay o f potential meanings. Each reading then, is seen as only a
partial move in simplifying tfiis complexity of meanings.
6. Places where one idea, action, experience, or whatever, has been marginalized by
another. Derrida suggests that as with hierachized oppositions, the margin
encompasses or enables the rest. Therefore, a marginalized figure, concept, etc.,
can be re-read as the “center” or controlling element. This reorients that which
was marginalizing by revealing its inadequacy or incompleteness without that
which it relegates.
Although Culler’s list o f conflicts was certainly the most detailed plan I discovered
(and perhaps the most intriguing as well), it seemed too rigid for me, too systematic and
too prescriptive. And so, my search for specific methodology continued on without any

47
satisfying discoveries. But what d id I know about this project, what had I discovered
about the work I wanted to do? Well for one, I knew that the kind o f work I would be
doing for this project certainly fell within the domain o f qualitative research.
Furthermore, I knew that since I had long embraced (how romantic) egalitarian values,
the method I would use would have to be feministic in nature.
Regarding the idea o f doing qualitative and feministic research, this was both
liberating and frightening at the same time. It seemed liberating because I knew it would
give me the opportunity to “get in the ring” with my subject and go at it. The last thing I
wanted to do was pretend that I was a non-human doing research from a discotmected,
objective perspective. The frightening part had to do with my greenness when it came to
qualitative work. You see, I had received extensive training in quantitative research
methods as both an undergraduate and in graduate school. However, my knowledge of
qualitative methodology was slim and my experience with it nil. So, I hit the books, read,
and learned. What follows is my story o f the importance o f qualitative and feminist
methodologies and why I thought they were the best methodological backgrounds for
encountering Human Sexual Resix?nse.
A Qualitative Approach to Knowing
Initiated by John Stuart Mill (1843/1906), the traditional paradigm in social science
research has largely used quantitative methods. However, 1 believe it’s important for the
methodology in this project to be qualitative in nature and follow Lincoln and Cuba’s
(1985) notion o f using oneself as an instrument for collecting and processing data as well
as Glaser & Strauss’ (1967) belief that the validation of theory requires a qualitative
foundation. In general, arguments for the use of qualitative inquiry as opposed to
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quantitative inquiry fall under two divisions; internal critiques and external critiques
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
Internal critiques, or those which challenge the assumptions o f positivist inquiry,
show how shortcomings in quantitative research methodology can be eliminated, or at
least ameliorated, by the use o f qualitative data. Some o f these critiques o f positivistic
methodology include its disregard o f context, meaning, and purpose and also its inability
to discover diverse emic (insider) meanings when imposing a grand theory on groups,
societies, and cultures (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In fact, Marcus and Fischer (1986)
claim the latter is especially crucial in light o f mounting criticism that social science does
not provide adequate accounts o f nonmainstream lives. Other internal critiques of
quantitative methodology include the difficulty o f applying general data to individual
cases as well as the elimination o f the possibility o f discovery by emphasizing the
verification o f specific, a priori hypotheses (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
Although internal critiques present very solid arguments against the use o f
quantitative methods, criticisms from outside of the quantitative paradigm (usually by
those who propose alternative paradigms) seem to hold even more weight. Many authors
have made these external critiques based on many different reasons (Bernstein, 1988;
Guba, 1990; Hesse, 1980; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Reason and Rowen, 1981). One
particular basis involves the assumption that the language o f theory and the language of
observation are independent of one another. For example, traditional research approaches
posit that in order to maintain objectivity, hypotheses should be stated ways that are
independent o f the ways in which the facts needed to test them are collected. However, it
seems that since facts can only be facts within a specific theoretical construct, facts and
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theories are actually interdependent. This observation seems to undermine one o f the
basic assumptions o f quantitative work.
Another argument against the quantitative approach perches upon what is typically
called the problem o f induction. Essentially, this problem states that the same set of facts
can support several different theories, and while it is possible to deduct a set o f facts from
a theory, it is never possible to arrive at a single, ineluctable theory from a set of facts.
Thus, the position that quantitative science can arrive at ultimate truths is highly
questionable.
In its quest for objectivity, quantitative methodology has gone to great lengths to
detach investigators and their subjects. This means that when using “proper”
methodology, the inquirer does not influence her/his phenomena and vice versa.
However, as Lincoln and Guba (1985) have noted, such evidence as Heisenberg’s
Indeterminacy Principle^ (Schwartz & Ogilvy, 1979) and the Bohr Complementarity
Principle’^ (Wolf, 1981) have seriously weakened this ideal in the hard sciences. In the
social sciences, skepticism o f this attempt at objectivity is even greater. Indeed, it seems
more plausible that findings are constructed by the interaction between inquirer and
phenomenon than through objective observation o f things as they “really” are.
Egalitarian on All Fronts
In addition to being qualitative, the proposed methodology also uses a feminist
approach. While Nielson (1990) makes the point that there are many forms o f the

’ Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle asserts that the position and momentum of an electron cannot both be
determined because the action of the observer in measuring one inevitably alters the other.
The Bohr Complementarity Principle states that (a) there is no reality until that reality is perceived and
(b) perceptions o f reality will be contradictory and paradoxical. While one person’s immediate experience
o f reality does not appear paradoxical at all, a history o f perceptions constructed by different observers
presents many paradoxes and contradictions
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feminist method I decided to follow the description proposed by Brand and Anderson
(1998). That is, the method is mindful of the social and historical context o f both the
subjects and the investigator, recognizes values within the research context, and assumes
and emphasizes a connection between the personal and political. Perhaps the most
important distinction between this type of feministic approach and others is that it is not
primarily concerned with correcting androcentric biases in findings and methods.
Although androcentrism has traditionally been a common problem in research
methodology (Reinharz, 1992), my method is concerned with egalitarianism on all fronts,
including gender, social classes, sexual orientation, and race.
Back to Deconstruction
Having both made a case for a qualitative approach and decided upon the approach
of text deconstruction, my next objective was to find out exactly how to do it. For this, I
first went to the literature to find out who had done any kind o f deconstruction related to
matters of human sexuality. While I was not able to find an overabundance o f work, there
were some projects that seemed very important.
Perhaps the best known deconstruction o f sexuality is Michel Foucault’s The
Historv o f Sexualitv (1984a). In this work, Foucault attempts to disprove the thesis that
Western society has seen a repression of sexuality since the 17th century and that
sexuality has been unmentionable, something impossible to speak about. Rather, the
social convention not to mention sexuality has created a discourse around it, thereby
making sexuality ubiquitous (yes it is true; people everywhere are talking about sex).
This would not have been the case, had it been thought o f as something quite natural and
not a place where evil hangs out. In fact, the concept "sexuality" itself is a result o f the
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discourse created by the prohibitions o f certain “sexual” behaviors. These prohibitions
have created sexual identities and a multiplicity o f sexualities that would not have existed
otherwise. Now, before we all become convinced that I do not know what the hell I am
talking about, let me explain.
According to Foucault, historically, there have been two ways of viewing sexuality.
China, Japan, India and the Roman Empire have seen it as an “ars erotica” or "erotic art"
where sex is a special experience and not something dirty and shameful. However, it is
also something to be kept secret, but only because of the view that it would lose both its
power and pleasure if a person were to speak about it.
In Western society, on the other hand, something completely different has been
created, what Foucault calls "scientia sexualis", or the science o f sexuality. It is originally
( 17th century) based on a phenomenon that is diametrically opposed to erotic art; the
confession. That’s right, instead o f seeing sexuality as a strong, obvious force,
Christianity viewed it as something treacherous that could only be found by careful
introspection. Therefore every detail had to be laid forth in confession; every trace o f
pleasure experienced had to be examined to find the traces o f sin. It is in this “attention to
details” that we find the reason Western society gives such significance to sexuality.
Making sexuality something sinful did not repress it or make it disappear. Quite the
contrary, making sex a sin reinforced sex and it became something to be noticed
everywhere. Eventually, this idea o f confession spilled over into other societal spheres
including the judicial system, medicine, teaching, and psychotherapy.
Foucault also notes how the confession has been used as a form o f social control in
that it creates a power relation between such people as the preacher and the confessor or
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the psychotherapist and the person consulting her/him. As I talked about earlier in this
paper, Foucault sees power relations as central to any analysis of society and believes
these power relations are formed in all relationships where differences exist. Again,
Foucault does not see power as something negative or oppressing, but rather something
that is constitutive.
Moving ahead into the 19'*’ century, Foucault claims that sexuality was eventually
adapted to the modernistic demands o f rationality and turned into a science. However, he
is quick to point out that it was not the same thing we would call science today, but
actually a very prejudicial doctrine on human procreation. This meant that sexual
behaviors for anything other than procreation were deemed “unnatural” or pathological.
Whereas in the 16'*’ century the focus was on regulating the sexuality o f married couples
while ignoring other forms o f sexual relations, now other groups were identified and
labeled “perverse.” These included gay, lesbians, bisexuals, cross dressers, and
transgendered individuals. According to Foucault, the idea o f seeing these people as
specific groups would never have happened before the 18'*’ century because at that time,
sexuality was never seen as being a fundamental part o f a person. Instead, it was viewed
simply as an action, something she/he did.
In addition to the groups I have already mentioned, Foucault identified other persons
who became the object o f study for medical “science,” including;
•

The bodies o f women which became sexualized because o f their roles in bearing
children.

•

Children, who were at all costs to be protected from the dangers inherent in
masturbation and other sexual acts.
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•

Married couples, whose reproductive activities were seen as important for the purpose
of studying population growth.

•

All adults, whose sexuality became an object o f study. Any behaviors other than
heterosexual coitus were seen as dangerous.

Foucault emphasizes that the aim o f these new moral codes was not to abolish all forms
of sexuality, but instead to preserve health and procreation. An entanglement o f ideas
about the importance of population growth, the deadliness o f venereal diseases, and the
importance of developing a strong heredity (“degeneration” was to be avoided) helped
create the idea that many sexual behaviors were dangerous. Therefore, Foucault reminds
us that we must remember to situate these constructions o f sexuality in their historical
context.
In my judgement. The Historv of Sexual itv is an extremely important piece o f work
because it is one of the first writings that claims sexuality is not a natural category that
has a foundation in a single universal reality. Instead, Foucault says that sexuality is a
social construction whose meaning lies largely in its cultural connotations. This is why,
for example, it is problematic to speak of homosexuality in ancient Greece since what we
now call homosexuality cannot exist outside our specific cultural context.
Following Foucault’s observation that meaning of sexuality (or even the existence o f
a concept called sexuality) is dependent on context, Celia Kitzinger (1987) studied the
social construction of lesbian identities in an attempt “to understand how people
construct, negotiate, and interpret their experience” (p. 71). She found that meanings of
lesbianism vary widely and include, among others, personal psychologized perspectives,
romantic perspectives, sexual orientation perspectives, and feminist perspectives. From
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this, Kitzinger concludes that there is no such thing as a “real lesbianism,” as this single
concept does not reflect unitary experience. Again, it depends on the context.
In another sexual orientation deconstruction project, Jonathon Ned Katz (1995) uses
Foucault’s observation that what is commonly acknowledged and taught as history is
actually a particular history of selected discourses. For instance, Katz exposes how the
term “heterosexuality” originally identified what is now called “bisexuality” - attraction
to both genders. The term took on its current meaning after an inaccurate retelling of its
original meaning. He also opines that heterosexuality has relied upon the proposed
"abnormality" o f homosexuality in order to define itself, adding that this polarization of
sexual orientation will never bring about a change in what is perceived as "natural" since
one orientation is always being measured against the other.
Trouble Ahead
At this point, everything seemed to be in order for a successful venture. I had my
research question, I had done huge amounts o f reading, and I had enough enthusiasm for
about ten graduate students. However, it was then that an insidious problem began to
grow and while I didn’t realize it at the time, this problem was going to cause a lot of
pain for me as well as some frustration and hurt among my committee members.
However, it would also provide me with a huge learning experience on several levels. But
lest 1 get ahead o f myself, let me return to my story in the place where I left off.
Disposable Proposals
The first proposal I submitted to my thesis committee was extremely short and
succinct and was imacceptable because o f just that. In particular, my methodology section
was very weak and needed more elaboration and particulars. I knew that 1 wanted to

55
deconstruct the text but, as I mentioned earlier, I needed a detailed plan o f exactly how I
would do that. In my second proposal, I tried to be more specific but again, I came up
short. As I now look back on this, I think I was having difficulty because the authors of
the sexual deconstruction projects 1 had read and really liked (i.e., Tiefer, Robinson, and
Foucault) did not outline a specific methodology in their writings. Rather, it seemed to
me as though they had read information and then made critical observations. Simple
enough 1 thought but when 1 pitched this to my committee, they again wanted to hear the
details and 1 again, had none. Somehow in my pilgrimage to an acceptable methodology,
the mud 1 was walking in grew deeper and deeper until 1 eventually found myself stuck,
stuck in a big way.
The Constant Comparative Method
In order to get “unstuck” and proceed with the project, 1 opted to find a “legitimate”
method that 1 could at least use as a basis for my own. After again reading over my books
on qualitative research methods and conversing with my committee chairperson (See
Appendix D), 1 decided to go with a strategy used for developing “grounded theory,” " a
plan o f action called the constant comparative method. Basically, the constant
comparative method is a process o f going through some kind o f text (e.g., a book,
transcripts, case notes, etc.) and categorizing sentences, paragraphs, or other “incidents”
in order to come up with some kind o f theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967) describe this in
four stages; ( 1) comparing the incidents (parts o f the text) and putting them into
categories, (2) integrating the categories and their content, (3) delimiting the theory, and
(4) composing the theory. Now, let me explain what all that means.

Theory is “grounded” when it is developed from the data instead o f vice versa.
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When comparing the incidents in each category, the researcher begins by coding
each incident in the text into as many categories as possible, as categories and
information emerge. It is during this step that one must be mindful o f the defining rule for
the constant comparative method; “while coding an incident for a category, compare it
with the previous incidents in the same and different groups coded in the same category”
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 106). By doing this, more categories will emerge that are
created both by the researcher and the language o f the text. After coding for a category
several times, theoretical notions will manifest at which time the researcher should stop
coding and record a memo of her/his ideas. Glaser and Strauss emphasize that “there can
be no scheduled routine covering the amount to be coded per day. The analyst may spend
hours on one page or he [sic] may code twenty pages in a half hour, depending on the
relevance o f the material, saturation of categories, emergence o f new categories, stage o f
formulation o f theory, an of course the mood of the analyst, since this method takes his
[sic] personal sensitivity into consideration” (p. 107).
As the researcher continually compares different categories and their properties, the
second, assimilative stage of the constant comparative method comes into play. This
stage involves the integration of categories and their content into a developing theory, a
theory that accounts for the phenomena put forth in the text. As part o f this integration,
questions may arise that guide the data collection in a way that fills gaps and extends the
theory. For example, the content from three different categories might together
(integrated), offer an explanation for a particular behavior described throughout the text.
This explanation o f one behavior might prompt the researcher to wonder if the same
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explanation could be applied to other behaviors discussed in the text. To investigate this
possibility, the researcher might try integrating the content o f other categories, and so on.
Establishing limits for both the theory and the categories (i.e., delimiting)
characterizes the third stage o f the constant comparative method. At this point in the
process, the task o f coding and categorizing information can become overwhelming. In
order to curb this overload, the researcher would start eliminating non-relevant categories
while elaborating others as the theory solidifies. Most importantly, the researcher must
limit the number o f variables so she/he can generalize the applicability o f the theory what was once a process o f expanding into as many categories as possible now becomes
a process o f induction. In addition, as the researcher codes, compares, and categorizes
data a number o f times, some categories become supersaturated and require no further
content to support a notion. Therefore, the researcher also delimits by no longer coding
for “well-established” categories that support the theory.
Having completed the first three steps of the constant comparative method, a
researcher will find her/himself with (a) coded data, (b) memos, and (c) a derived, or
grounded, theory. Glaser and Strauss (1967) explain that information recorded in the
memos provide the content behind the categories o f the theory These categories then
become the major themes whenever the theory is presented.
Lincoln and Guba (1986) offer some operational refinements to the constant
comparative method, especially in the areas o f selecting incidents or units o f the text
(unitizing) and categorization. First, they note that units o f text will vary considerably;
they may be as small as one sentence or as large as an entire paragraph. Also, when it
comes to the delimiting process, Lincoln and Guba suggest that researchers err on the
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side o f overinclusion if a category appears to be sufficiently supported. They recommend
beginning by writing each unit on an individual note card and then establishing categories
based upon “look/feel alike” qualities. After several o f these categories are developed, the
researcher starts the memo-writing process that leads to a delineation of category
properties and the creation o f a rule. When the cards are exhausted, they can then be
reviewed to determine their categorical inclusion or exclusion based not on their
iook/feel alike” qualities, but instead based on their ability to fit the rule. When the cards
are again exhausted, the researcher examines the categories to determine if
“miscellaneous” cards should be included in a category or discarded as irrelevant.
Additionally, Lincoln and Guba recommend reviewing the categories one last time to
check for overlap and possible relationships.
A Variation o f the Constant Comparative Method
Although the constant comparative method is intended to be used with text such as
notes or transcriptions that have not yet been organized into a theory, I planned to use it
to deconstruct a book. Therefore, the text I was analyzing was put together in an
organized, cohesive manner. Furthermore, my project was concerned with deconstructing
grounded theories (those proposed in Human Sexual Response) rather than seeking them
as products, as the constant comparative method does.
So, here I was using a method (constant comparative) in a process (deconstruction)
for which it was not intended. My reason? Well, I really liked how the constant
comparative method continually refines the analysis o f a text by constantly feeding data
back into the process o f category coding. As a musician, it reminded me o f listening to an
orchestra and picking apart the various elements. First, you listen for what is being played
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by each of the sections (strings, woodwinds, brass, and percussion). Next, you refine your
listening by paying attention to the notes and phrases each instrument is playing (e.g.,
violins, cellos, oboe, baritones, tympani, etc.). While doing this, you may hear an
instrument playing something that could stand alone, such as a melody being played by a
French horn, while other various instruments might be playing notes that blend together
to sound a chord. Through careful listening, you can figure out which instruments are
working together to communicate a part, which ones are “speaking” alone, and the part
each is playing to create the overall sound you are hearing.
Anyway, I decided to treat every sentence o f Human Sexual Response as a unit of
information that I would code into categories. The reason for this was my belief that in
most cases, a sentence represents either part or all o f one idea but less often more than
one idea. Therefore, having the “chunks” o f data as single sentences as opposed to larger
units o f text would probably help minimize my difficulty in deciding where I should
place them. O f course, I was prepared to change my method by breaking the units o f text
into smaller pieces if doing so proved to be a more effective way of categorizing.
The next step o f my methodology involved categorizing each sentence according to
these four assumptions o f social constructionism proposed by Kenneth Gergen (1985):
1. Available concepts, categories, and methods determine the way professionals
study the world. These concepts suggest or even dictate certain lines of
inquiry while prohibiting others. For example, Kessler and McKenna ([1978]
1985) note how the assumption that there are only two genders prevents
scholars from designing studies that ask about the etiology o f gender
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conceptions and how they are promulgated. This assumption also precludes
the ability to view gender as a dependent rather than an independent variable.
2. The meanings and connotations of many of the concepts and categories people
use in scholarship and everyday life vary considerably over time and across
cultures. This makes such things as questionnaire research and the citation of
earlier scholarship problematic.
3. The popularity and persistence of particular concepts, categories, or methods
often depends more on their political usefulness than on their validity. For
example, while the positivist-empiricist model o f statistically driven,
laboratory-based psychological research has been greatly criticized for its
limitations, it continues because o f prestige, tradition, and congruence with
cultural values (Unger, 1983).
4. Descriptions and explanations of the world are themselves forms o f social
action and have consequences. Case in point; In discussing the consequences
o f prominent moral development theories, Carol Gilligan (1982) explains how
a system ignoring women’s ethical values and ethical development became
the academic standard by which moral function is judged.
Each unit of text (i.e., sentence) of Human Sexual Response was to be placed under
one of the four assumptions identified by Gergen (1985). The heading of each category
would consist of a question or questions based on whichever o f the four assumptions it
represents. The categories/questions were as follows:
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1. Had the meanings and connotations o f the research cited in Human Sexual
Response changed significantly from the time it was published to the time it was
cited by Masters and Johnson?
2. What available concepts, categories, and methods influenced the questions
Masters and Johnson asked and did these concepts, categories, and methods
preclude other questions fi’om being asked?
3. In what way were Masters and Johnson’s methods politically useful? How did
they fit in with tradition, cultural values, etc?
4. In what way is Human Sexual Response “social action” (by presenting a
particular reality) and what are the consequences o f this action?
After all o f the sentences were coded into these four categories/questions, 1 planned
to continue with the constant comparative method and continually compare and code
units o f data into newly created and refined subcategories. Following the
recommendation by Lincoln and Guba (1986), 1 wanted to place less emphasis on
demarcation and continue to classify data even after a category seemed to have sufficient
support. By initially organizing the text under these four categories/questions and then
later into subcategories, 1 plaimed to answer the four proposed questions. Also, in order
to limit speculation and conjecture when answering the questions, 1 was going to
triangulate, as much as possible, the answers with similar conclusions regarding Human
Sexual Response made by other authors.
Specific Methodoloev
Specifically, the process o f deconstruction would begin with a complete reading o f
Human Sexual Response (Masters & Johnson, 1966) without coding or taking notes. 1
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knew that reading from my social constructionist, deconstructionist bent, I would, among
others, carry the assumption that realities are socially constructed. Additionally, I knew I
would be thinking about models/theories concerning the social construction of reality,
particularly the aforementioned models proposed by Berger and Luckman (1966) and
Gergen (1985). With this initial reading, the idea was to begin thinking how Masters and
Johnson contributed to the social construction o f certain sexual realities.
After that, I planned to scan the entire text into a computer and convert it into the
word processing program called Microsoft Word. This way, all o f my coding,
categorizing, and memo writing could take place using a computer. Using Microsoft
Word’s highlighting capabilities, the coding o f text was to take place on a sentence by
sentence basis with each sentence highlighted in a particular color that corresponded with
the color assigned to the question/category under which it is placed (see Appendix B).
While there are 15 different highlight colors available in Microsoft Word, I would
initially use four, one for each question/category. I then planned to use the remaining 11
colors to represent subcategories. If all colors became exhausted, coding would take place
by changing the color o f the font in each sentence to correspond with a specific
subcategory (Microsoft Word is capable o f producing 16 different font colors, animating
the text o f a paragraph (there are six animations available), or using variations of existing
codes (i.e., adding the effects o f bold text, italicized text, underlined text, text in all
capitals, etc.).
I also wanted to establish each category as a new document in Microsoft Word and
save each of these documents as an individual file. As for the notes I would take along
the way, I plaimed to write and maintain them in their own Microsoft Word document
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file. In this way, each set o f notes could be titled, dated, and highlighted/colored the same
as the units o f text and categories to which they referred.
Putting the Plan into Action
So there I was, my scheme in a printed document (my thesis proposal), my laptop
computer and scanner fired up and ready to go. Finally, 1 could see the light at the end o f
the tunnel, I could visualize my completed thesis occupying one of those black binders
and sitting on the shelf at the office o f the School of Social Work. I went right to work,
scanning the pages o f Human Sexual Response and completing the arduous task of
converting them into Microsoft Word documents using optical character recognition
(OCR) software, a necessary component o f the text-scanning process. OCR software
“looks” at the letters and words that are being scanned and then attempts to “copy”
everything accurately into a word processing program. In other words, it goes beyond
merely taking a “picture” o f what is laid onto the bed o f the scanner, it processes that
picture into a word processing computer program so the text can then be edited. The
problem (at least with Text Bridge Plus, the OCR software I used) was that much was
converted inaccurately and I therefore had to go through everything 1 scanned and correct
all of the incorrect translations. As I’m fond o f saying regarding experiences in my life
that are much less than pleasurable, “it’s safe to say this sucked.”
Nevertheless, I eventually completed all o f the scanning and was ready to begin my
process o f coding and categorizing (see Appendix C). Actually, this seemed like it would
be “more fun than humans are allowed to have in certain jurisdictions” with all the
“cutting” and “pasting” (word processing lingo) and highlighting with different colors.
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Moreover, everything was self-contained on the hard drive of my laptop computer so as
long as I had my computer with me, I could work on my thesis.
However, the process did not turn out to be as much fun as I had hoped. In fact, the
more I worked on the project in the way I had outlined in my last ditch effort for an
acceptable methodology, the more my heart hurt. As the first round o f coding drew to a
close, I realized that a Grand Canyon o f a distance had grown between what I really
wanted to do with this thesis and what I was actually doing. Perhaps the best way to
communicate what I was experiencing during tfiis time is to share the following letter I
emailed to the members of my thesis committee at a time when the emotional
encumbrance o f this process had sucked the final slurp of carbonated excitement through
the straw punctured in my now empty soul:
After scanning and categorizing the entirety of Human Sexual Response. I’ve
decided to abandon the methodology 1 had outlined in my proposal. First, 1 found
that almost everything in the book fît under the category of “social action” since
Masters and Johnson were primarily reporting their observations and recordings
o f people copulating and masturbating in the laboratory. Indeed, the bulk o f this
was brand new information when it was published in 1966 and they only cite
previous research occasionally to show how their observations support, negate, or
expand it. In addition, the process o f taking information and forcing it into
categories is far too modernistic for me; it doesn’t fit with the way 1 want to
deconstruct the text.
This takes me to what 1 have been doing, and that’s writing a lot. The writing
“fits” with the kind of deconstruction others have done (e.g., Robinson, 1976;
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Tiefer, 1995) in that it identifies things such as assumptions, contradictions,
problems with language, and questions conclusions when there seem to be more
possibilities. This is what feels right to me for this project and whether or not that
fits into the way methodology “should be,” that’s what I am doing. I’m sure I
could do some categorization o f the material after I finish writing, but that seems
pointless and does not gel with my postmodern (if I have to give them a label)
values. This seems very meaningful because the product is a result o f my
interaction with the text, not my methodology’s interaction with the text.
I’m concerned that you will conclude that what I’m doing is not acceptable
for a thesis, that I am avoiding the methodology that is vital to this stuff. If that is
the case, then so be it; perhaps then, you would be willing to help me figure out
what I need to do to complete this degree (e.g., can I use any of this work as
independent study? etc.). While I may not have something the university
recognizes as a “thesis,” I will be doing something far more important by taking a
stand against the modernistic principles that seem to me to do more harm to folks
than good.
I work around too many people that are all too willing to categorize and make
assumptions about people according to research findings that are “legitimized”
with “proper ” methodology. O f course, such things as critical thinking can be
used in order to thwart the impact o f these kinds o f things but I’m not convinced
that it can completely. I believe, as Ken Gergen asserts, anything is some form o f
social action, that it contributes to constructing at least some realities somewhere.
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If I were to follow the methodology I had delineated, one could say, “Hey
look, Jason was able to categorize Human Sexual Response according to Gergen’s
model” and ray soul would be embarrassed. True, the way I am doing this is also
constructing a reality, creating results that people may use to oppress others. That
is unavoidable and that is exactly the reason I must do this my way, why I (with
all of my biases, assumptions, experiences, etc., much too rich to trivialize by
trying to operationalize) must interact with the text and write about the
assumptions, biases, and other observations that are meaningful to me. If the
institutions o f social science and academia think that it’s crap and not what a
thesis is supposed to be, that’s fine.
As I write all o f this, I am mindful of the fact that it is sometimes necessary
for one to compromise in order to get what one desires, such as a degree. At the
same time, my work is a part of me and I don’t intend it to satisfy anyone other
than myself. My life is too short to have it any other way and my experience is
that I find this kind o f writing much more meaningful. Certainly, there is a
discourse which says 1 am not entitled to write this way yet because 1 haven’t paid
my dues, established myself, etc., but I’m not participating in that.
My suggestion is; Let’s get together, you can read some o f what I’ve been
writing, and w e’ll decide from there what will happen.
As one can probably tell from reading this, 1 was anger and fhistration were fueling
my decision to take a stand against the things 1 perceived to be my oppressors. 1 should
also note that 1 had allowed months to pass with very little communication with my
committee, none o f it indicating the way 1 was feeling about the project. To say the least.
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they were taken aback by this letter, as they had no idea that I was in the downtrodden
place from where I was speaking or how I had gotten myself there. My committee
chairperson and I tried to iron this out through email conversations but due to the relative
indeterminancy o f written text (which I will discuss in a moment), the situation only got
worse.
In the midst of this all this “crappiness,” I found m yself wondering why I even
decided to go with the constant comparative method in the first place. In retrospect, I
think I allowed frustration to sell me on it. With a determination to feel relief no matter
what, frustration liked to use some high-pressure sales tactics. It even used the popular
sales technique where it called in its shady supervisors, failure and fear, who reminded
me that (a) I had not yet come up with a methodology “solid” enough and (b) if I did not
get one soon, I was going to “lose the deal” and not complete my thesis. Before I realized
it, I was signing up for a method that hurt my heart just, so I could have something
certain to grasp.
Finally, I met with my committee face-to-face and the result was a happiness, a
relief, and an enthusiasm that are impossible to describe to anyone reading this. I was
ecstatic! Not only would I be able to do what I wanted with the project, I would be able to
do something even better, something even more meaningful. That something is what you,
the reader, have been experiencing: my story of producing this thesis. My committee and
I decided that in addition to deconstructively gleaning themes and observations from
Human Sexual Response, looking for “evidence” to support them, and then writing about
them, I should offer retellings about the process of making this entire thing happen.
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As I mentioned before, writing about this procedure seems extremely meaningful to
me. I have learned so much from doing this and sharing the resulting knowledges and the
ways 1 constructed them might be helpful to others. In addition, writing about this is a
way to put the story of my preferred selves into circulation and grant me an audience for
these desired ways of being. As 1 have learned from studying and practicing narrative
therapy, documenting one’s preferred realities and then letting others know about them
helps to '‘thicken” one’s story and make it more “real.” This “spreading the news” is
often a very important aspect o f the work I do with the people the people who consult me
because it tends to make preferred realities that much more meaningful. An example o f
documenting and circulating persons’ preferred realities is my recent work with a nineyear-old boy named Ryan.
Ryan's Storv
Ryan is a wonderfully bright, creative, and clever boy who was sexually abused by
his biological parents and a grandfather when he was an even yoimger youngster. One o f
the problems this abuse created for him was a group o f troublemakers that he called “bad
feelings.” Much to Ryan’s dismay, “bad feelings ” were always trying to make things
tough for him. Sometimes, they were able to convince him he was not a good person,
someone who was “bad enough to rob a store or something.” Other times, “bad feelings ”
would do things like keep him awake at night, isolate him from his friends, and tell him
he was really different from other kids.
In spite of all o f these ways that “bad feelings” were pushing Ryan around, he was
able to recall and identify times when they might have taken control but he did not let
them. Through our conversations, we discussed and “thickened ” these unique outcomes
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so they became a much larger part o f the experience to which Ryan would pay attention
and give meaning. Gradually, those times when Ryan was running the show instead of
“bad feelings” became more noticeable and seemed to occur more often.
While Ryan and his adoptive mother were very happy with the positive changes he
was creating, Ryan and 1 wanted to find a way to capture an even larger audience for his
preferred selves. So together, we came up with an idea to create a book were Ryan could
document the many ways he was taking a stand against “bad feelings.” However, that this
book would be very different in that it would be available to other children who were
coming to see me. That way, they too could use the book to document the ways they had
put “bad feelings” in their p l a c e . I n this way, kids could learn ideas ftom other kids
about dealing with “bad feelings” and at the same time, put their stories o f triumphs and
victories into circulation. Since Ryan was responsible for starting project, we decided that
he would give it a name and design the front cover. Ryan decided on the title “Bad
Feelings about Bad Parents” and this wonderful creation, which continues to be of help to
other children, is part o f his legacy. I should note that after Ryan created the book and
wrote his entries into it, he concluded that “bad feelings” were no longer a problem for
him. Apparently for Ryan, putting his preferred outcomes into a book and knowing that
other children would read them was enough to send “bad feelings” on their way.
I think it is important to relate another aspect o f Ryan’s story and that is the
conversation we had about my including it in my thesis. When 1 first wrote the preceding
passage about him (after getting his permission), I was caught up in the modernistic
discourse o f confidentiality which mandated 1 substitute another name in place o f his.

This idea was also inspired by the book Playful approaches to serious problems: Narrative therapy with
children and their families (Freeman, Epston,, & Lobovits, 1997).
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When I told him that I had done this, he seemed offended and immediately asked if I
would use his real name instead. With his pride and excitement about making his story
known, Ryan reminded me that, unlike therapies that offer problematic descriptions of
people, narrative therapy tends to evoke rich descriptions o f people’s lives with many
possibilities. Most often, these are stories o f which people are proud so they are excited
to let others know about them. By circulating them to many different audiences, these
preferred realities become even more "real.” Having said that, I will say that I tell Ryan’s
story not only to spread the news about Ryan and his stand against “bad feelings. ” I also
tell it to preface the portion of this document (i.e., thesis) which lets people in on some of
the knowledges and preferred outcomes I have discovered and developed during the
sometimes painful process of deciding and developing my methodology.
The Relative Indeterminancv o f Texts
As I had mentioned earlier, dialoguing with my thesis committee chairperson via
email seemed to make matters worse because while we were reading what each other had
to say, we were not understanding the meanings behind the words. For example, some
things I said were perceived as arrogance when actually, ignorance was much closer to
what I was feeling while I was writing them. Obviously, we were each making our own
meaning out o f what the other was writing and this reminded me o f some important
reading I had done, reading that helped shape my attitude toward all written texts. In the
first chapter o f Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends. Michael White (1990) discusses,
among other things, the “relative indeterminancy ” o f texts, a discussion I went back to
reread. Similar to Derrida, White concludes there is a degree of ambiguity to all texts
since different readers will have different perceptions of meaning for the various events
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and metaphors included in them. Iser (1978) notes that because o f this ambiguity or
indeterminancy, persons must engage in “performances o f meaning” under the guidance
o f the text, performances because the indeterminancy “makes the reader produce the code
governing this selection as the actual meaning o f the text” (p.61 ). Thinking along these
same lines, Bruner concludes;
It is this “relative indeterminancy o f a text” that “allows a spectrum o f
actualizations.” And so, “literary texts initiate ‘performances’ o f meaning rather
than actually formulating meaning themselves” (Bruner, 1986, p. 25).
Following this idea, 1 expected not only that my “performance o f meaning” while
deconstructing Human Sexual Response would constitute something original, but also
that others’ have and would as well. To me, this “relative indeterminancy ” seemed to be a
significant element o f the socially constructed sexuality coming from this text since it
played a part in determining what has gotten “storied” and what has not. White (1990)
also discusses how the stories in texts are full o f gaps that individuals must fill in order to
perceive what they have read. Since people use their imagination and lived experience to
fill in these gaps, they are, in a sense, reauthoring the texts they read with every reading.'^
The anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1986) sees this as a good thing, especially when
individuals are concerned about losing their own voice when emulating another’s work.
The wrenching question, sour and disabused, that Lionel Trilling somewhere
quotes an eighteenth-century aesthetician as asking - “How Comes It that we all
start out Originals and end up Copies? ” —finds ... an answer that is surprisingly
reassuring: it is the copying that originates (p. 380).

Michael White also believes that individuals re-author their lives with every performance o f meaning and
this is one of the cruxes o f narrative therapy.
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Rugged Individualism
Another learning from this experience involved re-realizing how I am inclined to
perform a story o f self-sufficiency in my life, a story which leaves little room for help
from others and places a tremendous burden on myself to “deliver the goods.” In other
words, I had been thinking that it was up to me, and me alone, to develop the
methodology for my thesis, engage in the process, and then write about it. For me, letting
my committee know I was in trouble and asking them for help was not an option, since I
believed an intelligent person should be able to pull off such an endeavor without any
help. 1 certainly did not want to be seen as anyone who did not have the capacity to fly
solo, since to me that meant being less o f a person and a failure of sorts. While people
who are fond o f using the cognitive metaphor in therapy might read this and say, “Aha,
you identified and corrected faulty beliefs,” 1 see it differently. What 1 was doing was
participating in dominant, structuralist discourses that are not supportive o f relational
descriptions o f identity. Jill Freedman and Gene Combs (1999, pp. 28-29) identify some
of these discourses as:
•

Separation/individuation

•

“Rugged individualism” (the loner-hero)

•

Self
-

“Essential” or “core” self
Self-actualization
Self-esteem

-

Self-reliance

-

Self-policing
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•

Person as container (container metaphors)
Inner strength
Self-contained
-

Resources (finding it within)
Inner child
Repression (of emotion, for example) and the need for expression

•

Boundaries
-

“Strong fences make good neighbors”
Psychological discourses that privilege confidentiality, containment, and
individuality over spreading the news, interdependence, and community.

Wow, and thought I was such a hip poststructuralist, part of the new breed o f young
lions who were going to set the therapy world on fire with postmodernism. This
experience confirmed to me in a very meaningful way, how insidious popular discourses
can be by creeping into constructed realities even when a person such as myself wants
nothing to do with them. Ironically, I was depriving myself o f the same wonderful
collaborative process I invited people to be a part o f when they consulted with me. In the
midst of my enthusiasm about how persons' realities are socially constructed, I had
forgotten that putting my thesis together was itself a social action composed of socially
constructed realities. The more people I included in the construction o f these realities, the
more new options and possibilities would become available, and the better both the
process and product would be.
From this learning I remembered that, instead o f carrying around a single fixed self
inside my body, I would much rather be a person who thinks o f his “selves” as socially
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constructed processes that are ever changing depending on context. In this way, I realize
that the burden is not completely on me to make things happen in my life but instead that
I am always constituting my realities in relation to others. Additionally, I mentioned
earlier my first-hand experience of how difficult it can be for me to hold onto
marginalized discourses when I seem to be constantly surrounded by other discourses that
are at odds with them. To remedy this, I have learned to maintain contact with my long
distance narrative therapy friends through telephone conversations, email dialogues, listserve postings, letters, and reading their books. Without a doubt, having this audience is
vital to the development of my preferred selves.
Getting Down to Business
With the confusion cleared and the communication concordant, it was finally time
to get to work on Human Sexual Response. Following my previous methodology, I had
already read through the book one time (without taking notes) to get some general
impressions. I had also gone through the entire text and categorized each sentence, a
process that, as I will discuss later, was not much like reading at all. Still, technically I
was reading it, so I want to make mention o f that before discussing my “first” take on
things. And, there is one other thing I want to present before I discuss the first reading;
my approach to interpreting the text as well as a general description o f the text itself.
Whose Writing Is It Anvwav?
Deconstructing a text that represents itself as the creation o f more than one mind
was a difficult undertaking, as I could never be sure which observations and writings
were done by which individual. Although William H. Masters never referred to himself
as such, he seemed to be the senior author o f the text for a few reasons. First, he was the
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one who started the project alone in 1954 that eventually led to the publication o f the
book. Virginia Johnson later joined the study after responding to a newspaper
advertisement that Masters placed requesting a research assistant. Second, his
prominence in authorship is suggested by the fact that he was a Medical Doctor (a former
gynecological surgeon) at the time the book was written while Virginia Johnson had not
yet finished her bachelor’s degree. The book’s frequent use o f medical jargon lends
further credibility to this assumption. Finally, notwithstanding the custom o f listing
coequal authors in alphabetical order. Masters name is consistently given top-rank on the
title pages of their publications.
It was interesting to me that these traditional notions about the proper order o f
authority do not seem to gel with Masters’ and Johnson’s otherwise feministic stance.
Still, it seemed to me that William Masters probably did do the majority of work in the
project and his prominence was not the result o f gender bias. The fact that Masters and
Johnson have largely ignored this imbalance in contribution to the project and promoted
the work over the past few decades under both o f their names (although his name does
always come first) I believe is a testament of their commitment to feministic values. In
fact, I have never seen Human Sexual Response or any o f their other work discussed
using only one o f their names; it is as if they together somehow formed one mind, did the
research, and then wrote about it. For the purpose of this discussion, I will continue this
practice and treat the information contained in Human Sexual Response as having been
gathered, developed, processed, organized, and presented by the pair as a single unit.
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Mv Hesitation Proclamation
Before this discussion continues, I feel it is necessary to publicize my own difficulty
in questioning a model which I have known to be a “truth” or a “reality” since I first
began studying human sexuality. Just about every introductory human sexuality text,
most human sexuality courses, many practices used in sex therapy, and many discussions
o f human sexual processes assume the existence o f Masters’ and Johnson’s human sexual
response cycle. So, as a poststructuralist punk writing critically about the work o f such
highly revered individuals, I feel a bit hesitant doing something many would say I have
not yet earned the right to do. At the same time, I am excited that I have created this
possibility o f being a person who feels he does have the right to discuss his observations,
thoughts, feelings, and experiences and offer them not as facts but as possibilities. While
I am certain that I will someday look back at what I have written in this paper and feel
differently about some things, I am also certain that 1 will appreciate that I allowed
m yself space to have a voice.
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A Brief Summary o f Human Sexual Response
Earlier, I mentioned how it makes sense to me that a gathering o f sexual information
from direct observation would follow Alfred Kinsey’s method o f gathering sexual
information by interviewing (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy,
Martin, & Gebhard, 1953). In other words, people had already talked about their sexual
activities; now it was time for researchers to watch for themselves. Using a variety o f
mechanical devices to make their observations as accurate as possible, William Masters
and Virginia Johnson (1966) did just that. Then, they used Human Sexual Response to
report the physiological responses o f the persons who copulated and/or masturbated in
their laboratory. As they write:
The techniques of defining and describing the gross physical changes which
develop during the human male’s and female’s sexual response cycles have been
primarily those of direct observation and physical measurement. Since the integrity
o f human observation for specific detail varies significantly, regardless of the
observer’s training and considered objectivity, reliability o f reporting has been
supported by many o f the accepted techniques of physiologic measurement and the
frequent use of color cinematographic recording in all phases o f the sexual
response cycle (p. 4).
Masters and Johnson used these techniques in an attempt to answer two research
questions: “What happens to the human male and female as they respond to effective
sexual stimulation? Why do men and women behave as they do when responding to
effective sexual stimulation? ” (p. 10).
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I think it is important to note that the focus of Masters’ and Johnson’s research was
to observe physiological sexual responses, not psychological, emotional, or spiritual ones.
As they state;
It constantly should be borne in mind that the primary research interest has been
concentrated quite literally upon what men and women do in response to effective
sexual stimulation, and why they do it, rather than on what people say they do or
even think their sexual reactions and experiences might be (p.20).
Although, as I shall discuss later, there are instances when Masters and Johnson seem to
use psychological and not physiological experiences to support their ideas, they do
provide a great deal o f information about physical changes in persons who are engaged in
sexual activity.
Participants
Because they assumed members o f the general population would be too conservative
to participate in such a study. Masters and Johnson drev/ their initial participants from a
community o f prostitutes. They write:
For the first twenty months o f the program, a total o f 118 female and 27 male
prostitutes contributed their sociosexual, occupational, and medical histories to the
investigation. Ultimately, a small number of the total group (8 women and 3 men)
were selected for anatomic and physiologic study. The criteria for selection were
obvious intelligence, diverse experience in prostitution, ability to vocalize
effectively, and, of course, a consistently high degree o f availability and
cooperation (p. 10).
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While Masters and Johnson later discovered many willing participants who were not
prostitutes, they found the input from this early group to be extremely useful.
Suggestions by this select group o f techniques for support and control o f the
human male and female in situations o f direct sexual response proved invaluable.
They described many methods for elevating or controlling sexual tensions and
demonstrated innumerable variations in stimulative technique. Ultimately many of
these techniques have been found to have direct application in therapy o f male and
female sexual inadequacy and have been integrated into the clinical research
programs (p. 10).
Because Masters and Johnson are largely credited with pioneering sex therapy, 1 was
happy to see them give credit to their initial participants, people who were working as
prostitutes. Perhaps, it is these individuals who are the real pioneers.
As I mentioned earlier. Masters and Johnson (1966) presumed “that study subjects
from more conservative segments o f the general population would not be available” (p.
10). However, after conducting research with participants from the prostitute population,
they realized a couple o f problems. First, people who worked as prostitutes tended to
move around quite often so it became difficult to maintain consistency among the
participants. Second, Masters and Johnson found “varying degrees o f pathology of the
reproductive organs” which “precluded the possibility of establishing a secure baseline of
anatomic normalcy” (p. 11 ). What 1 assume they are talking about are sexually
transmitted diseases, which are highly contractible by people who have unprotected sex
with many different parmers 1 say this mindful o f the social atmosphere o f the early to
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middle 1960s which was void of the proliferation o f “safe sex” messages we see and hear
today.
Given this predicament. Masters and Johnson (1966) decided to take a shot at
gathering research volunteers from the general population. What they were surprised to
find were many folks who were eager to “get on board” the sexological bandwagon and
do their part in the largest study to date involving direct observation of human sexual
behavior. At first, participants were recruited from a small population o f people seeking
clinical assistance for either sexual dysfunctions or an inability to conceive. However, “as
knowledge o f the work in progress spread locally, volunteers o f all ages came from all
social strata, and from a wide variety o f educational backgrounds” (p. 11). In a later
interview, Virginia Johnson recounted how she and William Masters were inundated with
people who, aside from some fraternity pledges, were very serious about participating in
their research (Memit, 1996).
Looking over Masters’ and Johnson’s descriptions, I noticed that while the variety of
backgrounds may have indeed been wide, the number o f participants from each was
largely disproportionate. For example, there were only 11 black couples as opposed to 26
white couples and o f those 11,8 came from what the authors call “underprivileged
backgrounds” (p 14). Also, many of the participants had high levels o f education,
including graduate and postgraduate training. In fact, there were no participants in the
study who had not at least matriculated high school, a characteristic that is certainly
different from the general population. Furthermore, all o f the participants in their study
identified themselves as heterosexual.
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To their credit. Masters and Johnson acknowledged this problem by stating;
“Cultural attitudes and residual sexual taboos always have inhibited statistically ideal
population sampling. This study proves no exception to the general rule” (p. 9). Later, the
authors address the problem again:
The study-subject population as finally constituted for this investigation has been
established from selected segments o f a metropolitan community. More
specifically, it has been developed primarily from and sustained by the academic
community associated with a large university-hospital complex. The concentration
of study subjects from upper socioeconomic and intellectual strata provided by this
major source o f supply has not been offset by a statistically significant number of
lower-range family units obtained from outpatient clinic sources (p. 11).
What I find surprising however, is that Masters and Johnson never make mention of
what is, to me, the most obvious bias in their participant population. That is, regardless of
socioeconomic status, level of education, race, ethnicity, culture, or the many other
possible variables, it seems to me any study that has participants performing sexual acts
in the presence o f scientists and their equipment will attract participants who all share one
unique characteristic: none of them mind performing sexual acts in a laboratory amongst
researchers and their equipment. Indeed, research reports I have found conclude that
volunteers for sex research usually have much more liberal attitudes than non-volunteer
groups with a similar socioeconomic status (Hoch, Safir, Peres, & Shepher, 1981;
Clement, 1990). Therefore in the end, readers o f Human Sexual Response must be
mindful that they are not observing human sexual behavior directly but only as Masters
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and Johnson have observed it, with very unique persons from a highly skewed
population.
The Human Sexual Response Cvcle
Perhaps the most salient feature o f Human Sexual Response is M asters’ and
Johnson’s introduction o f what is probably their most famous conception, the human
sexual response cycle. Introduced in the first chapter, this conceptualization serves as a
framework by which the rest of the book is organized. Essentially, Masters and Johnson
argue that, in both men and women, the sexual response cycle is divided into four stages;
the excitement phase, the plateau phase, the orgasmic phase, and the resolution phase
(Masters & Johnson, 1966). According to the authors, “this arbitrary four-part division of
the sexual response cycle provides an effective framework for detailed description of
physiologic variants in sexual reaction ” (p. 4).
Before I offer a compendium o f the human sexual response cycle, I should point out
that Masters and Johnson (1966) stressed the similarity of sexual responses between men
and women;
Obviously, there are reactions to sexual tension that are confined by normal
anatomic variance to a single sex. Also, basic differences develop between the two
sexes in the intensity and duration o f established reaction patterns. These
differences will be underscored in context during the review o f organ systems.
However, again and again attention will be drawn to direct parallels in human
sexual response that exist to a degree never previously appreciated. Attempts to
answer the challenge inherent in the question, “What do men and women do in
response to effective sexual stimulation?” have emphasized the similarities, not the
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differences, in the anatomy and physiology o f human sexual response (p. 4,
authors’ emphases).
In particular. Masters and Johnson stressed that two physiological responses to
sexual stimulation occur in both genders; vasocongestion and myotonia. Briefly,
vasocongestion is the condition where body tissues become engorged with blood in
response to sexual excitation. Obvious manifestations of vasocongestion are erection of
the penis in men and lubrication o f the vagina in women while more subtle displays occur
in the clitoris, nipples, labia, and even earlobes.
Myotonia, on the other hand, involves increased muscle tension that occurs
throughout the entire body during sexual arousal. This includes both voluntary flexing
(e.g., moving one’s body in ways to facilitate the giving or reception o f stimulation) and
involuntary contractions (e.g., contractions o f the internal and external anal sphincters
during orgasm). Based on their observations. Masters and Johnson conclude that both
vasocongestion and myotonia are the primary underlying sources for all biological sexual
responses.
For both men and women, the first phase o f the human sexual response cycle, the
excitement phase, is characterized by responses such as muscle tension and increase in
heart rate and blood pressure. Although Masters and Johnson note there can be wide
variation between individuals, they do make some general conclusions about what most
men and women experience. For men, common phenomena include partial or ftill
erection o f the penis, a thickening and tensing o f the scrotum, and beginning
engorgement and elevation of the testes. The excitement phase in women includes an
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increase in size o f the clitoral shaft and vestibular bulbs as well as a separation of the
labia majora ftom the vaginal opening.
In the plateau phase, sexual tension continues to mount until it reaches a climax that
leads to orgasm. At this point, the testes in men have become completely engorged and
elevated, the penis is completely erect, and pre-ejaculatory fluid from the Cowper’s gland
begins to secrete through the urethral opening. For women, the clitoris retracts beneath
the clitoral hood, the labia minora deepen in color, and the Bartholin’s glands often
secrete a few drops o f fluid. It is also during this phase that Masters and Johnson describe
the development o f an “orgasmic platform” in women, referring to the markedly
increased engorgement o f the outer third o f the vagina.
The third phase o f the human sexual response cycle, orgasm, is also typically the
shortest, although women’s orgasms tend to last slightly longer than men’s. For most
men, orgasm includes the emission o f seminal fluid facilitated by contractions o f the
seminal vesicle, the internal urethral sphincter, and muscles around the base of the penis.
Contractions also occur for women and include those o f the orgasmic platform and
internal and external anal sphincters.
However, perhaps the most important news Masters and Johnson deliver about
orgasms in women is that, contrary to the two types o f orgasms that Freud (1953)
described (i.e., clitoral and vaginal), physiologically, there is only one kind. They write:
From a biologic ... [and] anatomic point o f view, there is absolutely no difference
in the responses o f the pelvic viscera to effective sexual stimulation, regardless of
whether the stimulation occurs as a result o f clitoral-body or mons area
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manipulation, natural or artificial coition, or, for that matter, specific stimulation of
any other erogenous area of the female body (Masters & Johnson, 1966, p. 66).
In fact. Masters and Johnson report that three o f the female participants in their study
were able to experience orgasm as a result of their breasts being stimulated. The authors
go on to conclude:
When any woman experiences orgasmic response to effective sexual stimulation,
the vagina and clitoris react in consistent physiologic patterns. Thus, clitoral and
vaginal orgasms are not separate biologic entities (1966, p. 67).
As I mentioned earlier, this flew in the face o f Freud’s (1953) idea that there are two
different types o f orgasms: clitoral, which he considered to be “immature,” and vaginal,
which he considered to be “mature” and thus preferable. The basis o f this distinction was
his idea that the clitoris is a stunted penis. Therefore, Freud inferred that orgasm resulting
from clitoral stimulation is undesirable since it is considered “masculine” rather than
“feminine” (Sherfey, 1972). By exposing this fallacy. Masters and Johnson undoubtedly
brought relief to many women who, based upon Freud’s assumptions, believed
themselves to be sexually maladjusted.
Finally, the fourth phase o f the human sexual response cycle, resolution, involves the
sexual systems o f both genders returning to a non-excited state. While some women can
experience more than one orgasm before entering the resolution phase, men generally
cannot (however, see Whipple, Myers, & Komisaruk, 1998). According to Masters and
Johnson, the most significant difference between men and women during the resolution
phase is the occurrence o f a “refiactory period” in men. This “shutdown phase ” is a
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period of time that m ust elapse before a man is able to begin experiencing another
erection and repeat the sexual response cycle.
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The First Reading
Following the methodology I had devised and followed until my spiritual and
emotional breakdown, I first read through Human Sexual Response in order to get a
general flavor for the text. O f course, the information was very familiar to me as I had
read about and been taught much of it in the human sexuality courses I took as an
undergraduate student. Still, I was struck by the ambition such an undertaking must have
required, especially beginning in the late 1950s which can be judged as a very
conservative time when compared with today’s social climate. While I did not experience
this era first-hand, I have read and heard numerous accounts of dominant societal
discourses of that era, discourses that regarded sexuality as something not to be regarded
at all. In other words, it was mostly ignored and not discussed with the exception o f very
general and euphemistic prescriptions in some health classes and marriage manuals. For
the most part, sexuality existed in the domain o f morality and any depictions of sexuality,
such as erotica and pornography, were publicly deemed immoral by lots o f folks.
However, Masters and Johnson did away with the euphemisms, brought out the
cameras, and put sex and all o f its sweaty and sticky “naughtiness” right into the spotlight
for the whole world to see. What is more is they made room for a variety o f characters to
take their turns at center stage. For example, not only did Masters and Johnson look at the
sexual responses of young and middle-aged heterosexual men and women, they also
studied a “geriatric group” o f 73 heterosexual men and women ranging from age 61 to
89. With this, the authors dispelled the myth that says “when persons become older, they
are no longer sexual.” Additionally, Masters and Johnson looked at the effects of
pregnancy on sexual response and compared the sexual responses o f women who were
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nulliparous (had never given birth), uniparous (had given birth once), and multiparous
(had given birth more than once).
In spite o f the impressiveness o f such a formidable endeavor, there were aspects o f
Human Sexual Response I thought could have been better. For one, the book was written
in a very awkward manner, a problem I will take up later in the paper. By awkward, I
mean it did not “flow” smoothly and I found myself frequently asking the question,
“Couldn’t they have stated this more clearly?” Another problem for me was the way the
book seemed geared toward medical professionals, written with excessive use o f medical
terminology, which sometimes made their writing very difficult to understand. For
example, when talking about the “sex-flush,” Masters and Johnson (1966) write, “This
maculopapular type of erythematous rash first appears over the epigastrium either late in
the excitement or early in the plateau phase o f the sexual cycle (p. 31).” Later in the text,
they discuss the anatomy o f the clitoris:
In the past, anatomic dissection, microscopic examination, and surgical ablation o f
the clitoris have established the organ as a homologue of the male penis. The
clitoris consists o f two corpora cavernosa enclosed in a dense membrane primarily
of fibrous-tissue origin. This capsule has recently been shown to contain elastic
fibers and smooth-muscle bundles. The fibrous capsules unite along their medial
surfaces to form a pectiniform septum which is well interspersed with elastic and
smooth-muscle fibers. Each corpus is connected to the rami of the pubis and
ischium by a crus. The clitoris is provided (as is the penis) with a suspensory
ligament which is inserted along the anterior surface o f the midline septum. In
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addition, two small muscles, the ischiocavemosus muscles, insert into the crura o f
the clitoris and have origin bilaterally from the ischial rami (p. 45).
To their credit. Masters and Johnson do supply readers with a glossary. Still, taking
frequent breaks to look up words made reading the book irksome at times.
This heavy use o f medical lingo also made me wonder about how much o f this
terminology is now a part o f current discourses in clinical sexology. How has it
influenced the theories and practices of sex therapy? Furthermore, does the language of
medicine serve to separate the "‘experts” from the folks who come to see them (the real
experts in my opinion) and cause people to think they must depend on these “experts” to
tell them about their own sexuality? Since Masters and Johnson (1966) conclude “the
primary reaction to sexual stimuli is widespread vasocongestion, and the secondary
response is a generalized increase in muscle tension” (p. 7), people may feel they need to
consult a professional in order to interpret and explain their personal sexual experiences. I
mean, many people understand what it means for them to get “wet” or get “a hard on,”
but not even the spell checker in my word processing program recognizes the term
“vasocongestion.”
In their defense, William H. Masters later said in a television interview that he and
Virginia Johnson intentionally used excessive medical terminology and even tried to
make the book read like a medical textbook (Memit, 1996). Their purpose in doing so?
They wanted to avoid criticism that the book was salacious instead o f scientific while
thwarting individuals from regarding and “using” it as pornography. Having read the
following passage as well as many others like it, I would have to say, “Mission
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accomplished! If I am in the mood for some erotica, I most certainly will not pick up
Human Sexual Restwnse.” See what you think;
Carpopedal spasm rarely has been observed with the male in the usual superior
coital position (see Chapter 18). The physical activity associated with this position
necessitates employment o f voluntary musculature o f the trunk, pelvis, and
extremities and usually precludes development o f involuntary striated-muscle
spasm in the extremities. If the male is in supine position during coition,
carpopedal spasm occurs frequently (p. 173).
In the end, regardless o f the possible consequences or the authors’ intentions, it seems to
me that the excessive use o f medical terminology in Human Sexual Response has
probably helped move sexuality into the realm o f medicine and health, a matter 1 will
discuss in the next section o f this paper.
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The Second Reading
Having read Human Sexual Response once and gleaned some general impressions, I
was set to go through it again. As I have already stated, the “real” second reading began
when I was still following my original methodology of coding and categorizing.
Essentially, I would read a sentence of the scanned text, decide how to categorize it, and
then cut and paste it (in my word processing program) into the category. This was
certainly not the way 1 would normally read a text, as my primary focus was on
categorizing and not comprehending.
About a week after concluding the process of categorizing sentences into the four
categories, I decided to scrap that methodology completely. Unsure o f what I should do at
this point (this was before the meeting with my committee), I went back to the beginning
and read through the entire text. Along the way, I used my notebook computer to record
notes about my observations (See Appendix E) and began writing pieces of the thesis you
are reading right now. This procedure took place over the course o f two weeks where 1
would read approximately one chapter per day, then sit down and write.
Throughout the remainder o f this paper, I will refer to this reading as the second
reading. While the actual second reading of the text happened when I was following my
earlier methodology, using the word “reading” to describe that tedious task of
categorizing sentences, one by one, seems a misnomer. To me, reading means leaning
back, getting comfortable, and making friends with a book and my experience was
nothing like that when I was applying my modification of the constant comparative
method to Human Sexual Response.
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Leonora Tiefer
As an avid reader, I was poring over some books and articles that I am certain
influenced the observations I made during the second reading o f Human Sexual
Response. Surprisingly, most o f these readings ended up being praises o f the text and not
criticisms, criticisms 1 had hoped to And in order to give me a more balanced take on the
perceived quality and value of Masters’ and Johnson’s work. In an interview, William H.
Masters commented on the book’s popularity with those who reviewed it:
O f approximately 700 reviews in both the medical and the lay press, some ten
percent was critical; by critical, I mean the writers felt the work should not have
been done for one reason or another. But 90 percent, if not totally supportive, were
at least neutral (Lehrman, 1970, p. 135).
1 was however, fortunate to discover some critiques in the writings of Leonore
Tiefer, a sexologist who has written a great deal about the social construction of human
sexuality. While 1 had previously looked to Tiefer (1995b) for ideas about text
deconstruction, it was between the first and second readings o f Human Sexual Response
(when 1 was categorizing sentences) that 1 took the time to delve more deeply into her
work.
Among other observations, Tiefer (1995c) notes how the medical/health model of
sex, which was “verified” by Masters and Johnson, gave legitimacy to female sexuality.
In Human Sexual Response. Masters and Johnson (1966) made the claim that women’s
sexual capacities equaled those o f men and in some cases, maybe even surpassed them
(e.g., the ability o f some women to have multiple orgasms before reaching the resolution
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phase). However, they not only confirmed female sexual responses were physiologically
“normal,” they extended these responses to the realm o f “healthy.” Now, in addition to
being permissible because it is a normal aspect of human functioning, pleasurable sex
was good for you and therefore, a worthwhile pursuit. Because sexuality has long been
located in the domain of morality where allegations about a woman’s sexuality could
easily destroy her social reputation and standing, this legitimization was extremely
significant (Freedman & D’Emillo, 1988). In Human Sexual Response. Masters and
Johnson (1966) went as far as proclaiming that, “the human female now has an
undeniable opportunity to develop realistically her own sexual response levels” (p. 138).
With “scientific” research now backing them up, the general public as well as sex
researchers and activists could argue that sexual behaviors fit with the “laws o f nature” in
order to bypass the old discourse o f “right and wrong.” Furthermore, if sexual behavior is
justified by biology, the idea that sexuality is part of the “natural order” o f things could
be justified even further with evolutionary theory (Caporael and Brewer, 1991).
For these reasons, many viewed sexuality’s inclusion in the realm o f medicine and
health (which I henceforth refer to as the medical/health model) as something positive.
After all, this meant that from now on, adjectives such as “healthy” and “normal ” could
very well replace the adjectives “dirty ” and “perverted ” when describing certain sexual
behaviors. O f course, for some, taking the “dirtiness ” and “perversity” out o f sex makes it
less “naughty” and less fun. Still, for others, a medical/health model o f sexuality makes it
“permissible” to explore and enjoy the sexual aspect of their humanness.
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The Medical/Health Model
Before I continue, I would like to offer a brief discussion of what I am referring to as
the medical/health model. For me, the medical/health model is a manifestation of what
Foucault (1979) referred to as techniques for objectifying people and their bodies and
regarding them as “things.” In essence, it is socially constructed system that offers ways
o f distinguishing what is “healthy” from what is “unhealthy” and classifying diseases and
illnesses. While there is widespread agreement with many of the medical/health model’s
distinctions (e.g., most people agree that cancer is a disease that makes people
unhealthy), it is important to remember that such classifications change as social values
about “normalcy” change. For example, the early to mid-1900s brought about a shift in
attitudes toward gay and lesbian persons when the belief that those people were sinners
was replaced (to a degree) by the belief that they were “sick” (Esterberg, 1990).
Eventually, “scientific” research began to show no significant differences (other than
sexual orientation) between homosexual and heterosexual folks (e.g.. Hooker, 1957).
Today, because

o f ever changing

social

values,

the official

stance

of the

psychiatric/psychological community is that there is nothing pathological about gayness,
lesbianism, and bisexuality.
Because Human Sexual Response (a) was principally authored by a male physician,
(b) read like a medical textbook, and (c) discussed the scientific observation o f
physiological phenomenon, I believe that it helped sexuality occupy space in the
medical/health model. As I had mentioned earlier, this stamp o f approval meant that the
kind of sexuality described by Masters and Johnson, i.e., adult, heterosexual coitus and
masturbation, was acknowledged by more people as something both healthy and
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desirable. However, Tiefer (1995c) points out assumptions of the medical/health model
that make it potentially problematic when applied to persons’ sexuality; the four
medical/health model assumptions of norms and deviance, universality, individualism,
and biological reductionism (Mishler, 1981).
Norms and Deviance
For Tiefer, one o f the biggest problems with applying the medical/health model to
human sexuality is that it then becomes subjected to judgements and categorizations of
normalcy, deviance, and pathology. Obviously, the assumption that there exists such a
thing as “healthy” sexuality brings with it the assumption there is also sexuality that is
unhealthy, abnormal, disordered, or downright sick. While sociologists have studied the
social processes by which sexual categories (e.g., promiscuity, frigidity, masturbation,
etc.) are created (Sahli, 1984; Schur, 1984), the “sexual health” norms o f the
medical/health model seem to be derived from cultural values, values that are
inextricably intertwined with ideas of morality. In Tiefer’s (1995c) opinion as well as
mine, there is just much too much lifestyle, historical, cultural, and biological variability
in standards of sexual behavior to establish clinical norms o f sexual behavior. This is not
only true across cultures, but within cultures as well.
Universal itv
Given the assumption that clinical norms in the health model are based on
multicultural standards o f biological functioning, Tiefer (1995c) believes it problematic
that the “standards” o f physiological sexual responses are derived from the admittedly
non-representational sample studied by Masters and Johnson (1966). As 1 will discuss
later, because Masters and Johnson only took measurements on individuals who could
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demonstrate arousal and orgasm in the laboratory, their human sexual response cycle (on
which clinical norms o f sexual functioning are based) seems invalid. Still, the human
sexual response cycle became the basis for a deeply entrenched standard in clinical
sexology, a standard against which “healthy” and “unhealthy” sexuality are determined.
As a result, absence o f the sexual responses required by Masters and Johnson for
inclusion in their study population can now qualify a person for a sexual disorder
diagnosis (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
Individualism
Following the medical/health model and situating a person’s sexuality in her/his
physiology and psychology leaves no room for the idea that realities (including sexual
realities) are socially constructed and therefore, highly dependent on context. Tiefer
(1995c) notes that this view can be especially problematic for women when patriarchal
sociohistorical contexts have played a part in constructing their sexuality. For instance,
say a woman grew up in a family where her father applauded his male children for having
many sexual conquests (e.g., “That’s my boy, a regular Casanova!”). However, the
woman’s father also subscribed to a double standard and he denigrated his female
children for their sexual desires (e.g., “I’ll have no daughter o f mine acting like a slut!”).
Now, if that woman were consulting a sex therapist because o f low sexual desire, there is
a chance this socially constructed idea o f “sluthood ” might be keeping her sexual
interests from having any kind o f a say-so in her life. After all, such a value-laden
message from her father, who along with her mother and/or other caregivers can be one
o f the most powerful reality-constructors in a child’s life, could very well overstay its
welcome for years. However, the medical/health model approach to dealing with his
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explanation o f women’s sexuality would probably be in favor o f an investigation into
physiological causes.
Instead o f looking at sexuality as something that emerges in relationships that are
embedded in particular social, cultural, and historical contexts, the medical/health model
construes sexuality as something that exists inside o f people. Therefore, the model
assumes that sexual problems are problems inseparable from people and that
consequently, people somehow play a part in creating, exacerbating, or at least enabling
them. In short, the medical/health model’s lack o f consideration for the social
construction o f persons’ individual sexual lives means that these lives are more likely to
become the subjects of pathologizing practices.
Biological Reductionism
Finally, Tiefer (1995c) believes that the medical/health model o f sexuality inevitably
places the primary focus on biological standards for normal and abnormal sexual
functioning. Other spiritual, emotional, and social aspects o f people’s sexual experiences
then have no say-so when (a) determining if there is a problem and (c) deciding what to
do if a person consulting a professional decides there is. For example, men have come to
see me for therapy when they stop experiencing erections with their partners. While the
medical/health model tells me to suggest physiological examinations and medication,
conversations about these persons’ lived experience often reveals that troublemakers like
stress, anger, or resentment are getting in the way o f rigid erections. The trouble I see
with biological reductionism is summed up quite nicely by Schneider and Gould (1987)
who point out that “social actors possess genitals, not the other way around” (p. 123).
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Problems with Language
In addition to Tiefer, another influence during the second reading was Paul
Robinson. In his book The Modernization o f Sex. (1976) Robinson proclaims “Human
Sexual Response and Human Sexual Inadequacy are undoubtedly two of the worst
written books in the English language" (p. 123). While such an impudent statement does
not fit with my preferred ways o f being, I do agree with Robinson that there are problems
with the manner in which Masters and Johnson wrote Human Sexual Response. For me,
these problems made it difficult to focus on the substance of their writing.
First, as I mentioned earlier in this paper, much o f the text seems extremely awkward
to me. For example, it is common to read phrases such as “it equally is obvious” instead
o f “it is equally obvious” (Masters & Johnson, 1966, p. 40). When discussing their
research population. Masters and Johnson state, “A population o f adult men and women
who were willing to serve as subjects in the reproductive biology laboratory provided the
opportunity for observations of anatomic and physiologic response to effective sexual
stimulation made and recorded during this investigation” (p. 9). This might have been
clearer had they simply stated, “We observed and recorded the anatomic and
physiological sexual responses o f men and women.” The authors also frequently use
verbs and prepositions that do not seem to go with their objects. “Decades o f ‘phallic
fallacies,” ’ they write, “have done more to deter than to stimulate research interest in
clitoral response to sexual stimulation” (p.45), presenting what I see as an unlikely
alternative o f either deterring or stimulating.
Other problems involve several errors o f language usage. For instance, they use the
word “definitive” when they seemed to mean “definite” (“a definitive color change that
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ranges from a cardinal-red to burgtmdy-wine color”), and use “define” when they seem to
mean “determine” or ascertain (as in “the man has an opportunity to define the general
level of her formal education”) (Masters & Johnson, 1966, p. 231). They also commit
such errors as using the word “reflect” instead o f “tell” and interchanging the words
“relevant” and “relative.” While it is usually possible to determine what they mean, the
frequent translation becomes tiresome and many words and phrases still remain unclear.
As an example. Masters and Johnson differentiate between the terms “functional” and
“functioning” when discussing the role o f the vagina in impregnation. While the
distinction is clear - “functional” describes the vagina’s role as a seminal receptacle,
“functioning” refers to its influence on the motility and longevity o f sperm - they never
explain why they chose these particular terms. Furthermore, the terms become even more
confusing during a discussion o f the penis, where “functional” now refers to the organ’s
role as a source o f erotic pleasure, and “functioning” to its role in insemination (1966, pp.
80-100, 188-89). Robinson (1976) notes similar uncertainty regarding their use o f such
terms as “context,” “baseline,” “objective,” and “concept,” all of which show up
repeatedly in the texts.
Perhaps one o f the biggest problems I encountered with Masters’ and Johnson’s
writing was their consistent use o f complex and pretentious expressions where simple
ones would have made their messages much clearer, at least to me. In just some
examples, they write “in the immediacy o f the postorgasmic period” instead of
“immediately after orgasm; “to alter their verbal response patterns” instead o f “to lie”;
“since college withdrawal” instead of “since leaving college”; “interdigitate” instead o f
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“combine”; “vocalize” instead o f “say”; “potentiator” instead o f “cause”; “the sexual
unit” instead o f “the couple” (1966, pp. 62, 87, 135, 309).
As I reread what I have just written here (immediately after writing it), I realize the
fact that I found problems with Masters and Johnson’s writing may seem insignificant.
After all, what seems important is the work they have done, not the way in which they
have written about it. Additionally, I am reminded that their intention was to present the
work as “scientific” and apparently, they believed that required them to write it as they
did. However, going back to the position I presented at the beginning o f this thesis, I
believe the writing in Human Sexual Response is more than just a matter o f style. From a
social constructionist perspective, the language in this text is a form o f social action
which has real consequences (Gergen, 1985). I think that one such consequence o f
Masters’ and Johnson’s language is their book’s inaccessibility to many readers. That is,
because Human Sexual Restwnse is written in a “scientific” manner (i.e., awkward,
complex, and pretentious), the types and numbers o f people who will read it (and decide
for themselves if they buy the authors’ claims) is very limited. Those more likely to read
it are the “professionals” whose socially-sanctioned “expertise” often guides the way
“average” folks deal with problems. If Human Sexual Response is only accessible to
“professionals,” many persons will never have the opportunity to evaluate whether or not
its content should be applied to their lives.
Earlier, 1 discussed how Masters and Johnson claimed to have written Human Sexual
Response as they did in order to ensure that it was received as “scientific ” and not
“pornographic.” However, Robinson (1976) believes that Masters’ and Johnson’s was not
so much “scientific” as it was just imprecise. Further, he argues that the reason they
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wrote the text in such an imprecise manner was because their sexual theory itself is
imprecise. He writes;
This [imprecision] is a particularly ironic falling in view of our tendency to think
o f them as the most scientific of sexologists, the researchers who have made the
most detailed examination o f what happens when human beings engage in sexual
activity. They have measured penises (flaccid and erect), photographed vaginas
during orgasm, and assessed the precise impact o f sexual arousal on blood
pressure, pulse rate, and ventilation. And, o f course, they do provide a great deal
o f new and useful information about these and other matters, for which we are
very much in their debt. But when they are obliged to place that information in an
analytic ftamework-when, in other words, they are obliged to become sexual
theorists-they are betrayed by the intellectual limitations so evident in their prose
style. In a word, they become vague (p. 126).
The imprecision o f which Robinson writes is illustrated in Masters’ and Johnson’s
most famous concept, their human sexual response cycle. As I mentioned before. Masters
and Johnson created the human sexual response cycle in order to divide human’s sexual
response into four stages: excitement, plateau, orgasm and resolution. The problem here
is that the authors make distinctions between the stages that are sometimes questionable.
For example. Masters and Johnson (1966) establish a division between the
excitement and plateau stages which at first, seems plausible.
In this [excitement] phase sexual tensions are intensified and subsequently reach
the extreme level from which the individual ultimately may move to orgasm (p. 6).

102

Now, it makes sense to me that many men and women might first experience some kind
of interest and arousal before experiencing an erect penis, erect clitoris, or lubricated
vagina. It also makes sense that for many people, this latter stage o f arousal is sustained
for a period of time until orgasm. However, as Robinson (1976) notes, when the authors
claim a person can remain in the excitement phase long after experiencing full
erection/lubrication or that a person can progress to the plateau phase without full
erection/lubrication, the distinction between these two becomes fuzzy. As they write:
Both erection and lubrication vary in reactive intensity if excitement-phase levels
of sexual tension are prolonged. The male may lose full penile erection during
long-maintained excitement levels of sexual stimulation. Under similar
circumstances the female may reduce or even stop production o f vaginal
lubrication. In both sexes these reactions are reversible, particularly when sex
tension levels are stimulated and/or maintained by manipulative rather than coital
techniques (p. 279).
Having read that, I certainly believe that these conditions (i.e., prolonged lubrication
or erection during the excitement phase, no erection or lubrication during the plateau
phase) are possible. Yet, determining the qualities that would distinguish these phases
seems to lie beyond the methodology that Masters and Johnson claim to relegate
themselves, “observations o f anatomic and physiologic response” to sexual stimulation
(p. 9). In other words, I believe the authors ignored the boundaries they imposed on
themselves and journeyed into the realm of subjective psychological experiences in order
to account for physiological responses that did not support their model. If this is the case,
it weakens their claims because they did not strictly adhere to their proposed method, a
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practice that is vital to the validity of such “scientific” investigation. While this departure
from methodology might not have been such a big o f a deal if they at least accounted for
it. Masters and Johnson do not bother to address it at all in the book.
O f course, one criticism o f the excitement and plateau distinction is simply “Why
separate them at all?” That is, since Masters' and Johnson’s (1966) definitions o f stages
are “primarily those o f direct observation and physical measurement” (p. 4), I wonder
how or why they would draw a line between observable responses that might very well
be the same. Again, I am inclined to believe that they are going well beyond the scope o f
their project o f discovering “what physical reactions develop as the human male and
female respond to effective sexual stimulation” (p. 4) and relying heavily upon the
subjective psychological experiences of those who participated in their study. In fact,
there are times when Masters and Johnson seem to admit this. For example, they describe
the plateau phase as “that level o f elevated sexual tension identified as thoroughly
enjoyable” (p. 119, emphasis added). In addition, they tell about one woman participant
having “five subjective plateau-phase experiences superimposed on maintained
excitement tension levels” (p. 119, emphasis added). A subjective (or psychological)
definition o f the plateau phase also comes through when Masters and Johnson discuss the
pre-ejaculatory fluid emitted by some males;
As stated, it [the pre-ejaculate] appears most frequently during voluntarily
lengthened plateau-phase experiences. For example, in active coition a man may
practice voluntary ejaculatory control at plateau-tension levels through several o f
his female partner’s orgasmic cycles. Other similar situations tend to increase both
frequency o f occurrence and secretory volume of the preejaculatory mucoid
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material They are automanipulative activity voluntarily maintained at plateauphase tension levels for lengthy periods with-out ejaculatory release, and fellatio
conducted in similar manner and with similar intent (p. 211 ).
According to Robinson (1976), the problem with a subjective definition o f the
plateau phase is that no definition would be precise enough to serve a useful scientific
purpose. He opines that “even assuming that most persons could recognize ‘that level of
elevated sexual tension identified as thoroughly enjoyable’ (or, more crudely, ‘when it
feels really good’), there would be little sense in trying to convert the feeling into an
analytic category” (Masters & Johnson, 1966, p. 128). Still, with the exception o f a few
statements such as those mentioned above. Masters and Johnson are intent on
distinguishing between the excitement and plateau phases in terms of objective and
observable physiological responses.
While Masters and Johnson’s distinction between orgasm and resolution seems clear,
the way in which they claim a person moves from orgasm to resolution seems to me,
doubtful at best. In short, they assert that the progression from orgasm to resolution is an
exact inversion o f the progression from excitement to plateau;
The human male and female resolve from the height o f their orgasmic expression
into the last or resolution phase o f the sexual cycle. This involuntary period o f ten
sion loss develops as a reverse reaction pattern that returns the individual through
plateau and excitement levels to an unstimulated state (1966, p. 6).
My dubiety with this return “through plateau and excitement levels to an unstimulated
state” is based on a phenomenon I discussed earlier the refractory period. Masters and
Johnson claim that immediately after orgasm, most men experience this period during
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which erection is impossible and stimulation of the penis is often irritating and perhaps
even painful. Now, this experience seems very different from the excitement and plateau
stages where stimulation tends to be erotic and pleasurable. Masters and Johnson even
admit that “effective restimulation to higher levels o f sexual tension is possible only upon
termination o f this refractory period” (1966, p. 7). So fr^om where 1 sit, the inversion back
through plateau and excitement that Masters and Johnson claim occurs immediately after
orgasm, only seems plausible with those women who are capable o f experiencing
multiple orgasms. I should also note that I know of three men, two discussed by Whipple,
Myers, & Komisaruk (1998) and another who consulted me (I will discuss him later),
who are capable o f ejaculating several times before entering a refractory period.
However, even in these rare cases, I do not know if they would describe their experiences
as similar to the inversion proposed by Masters and Johnson.
Biological Privilege
In addition to noticing and expanding upon the observations made by Tiefer and
Robinson, my second reading o f Human Sexual Response elicited other deconstructive
gleanings. One such observation concerns the effects of Masters’ and Johnson’s focus on
sexual physiology, a focus which, as I discussed earlier, led to sexuality’s inclusion in the
medical/health model. This is not to say that before Masters and Johnson, sexuality was a
stranger to medicine. To the contrary, sexologists such as Magnus Hirschfeld, Heinrich
Ulrichs, Carl Westphal, Havelock Ellis, and Sigmund Freud long ago began securing a
place for clinical and research sexology within the biomedical paradigm (Bui lough &
Bullough, 1993). However, I contend that Human Sexual Response did more than
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legitimize sex by making it “natural” and “healthy,” I contend that it ultimately afforded
a prerogative to biology and medicine when it comes to matters o f sexuality.
The Mechanization of Sexual Experience
According to many historians, as Judeo-Christianity spread increasingly into the
Western hemisphere, human sexuality separated from the mind and spirit and became
located within the body (Petras, 1973). This meant that any “impure” or “sinful” sexual
acts performed with or on one’s body, served as an open invitation for Satan to stop by
for a bodily possession (Levins, 1996). For example, there is a story in the Bible’s Book
o f Genesis in which Judah commanded his son, Onan, to impregnate his sister-in-law
shortly after her husband was killed. While Onan did have sex with her, he withdrew
before orgasm and ejaculated on the ground. Consequently, God struck him dead (quite a
price to pay when the withdrawal method of birth control does not even guarantee nonpregnancy in the first place). Anyway, the original moral o f this story was thought to be
the importance of obedience. Onan died when he did not obey his father. However,
European religious authorities interpreted this a little differently, claiming that Onan’s
use o f a woman’s vagina to excite himself to orgasm, coupled with his conscious attempt
to avoid impregnating her, constituted an act o f masturbation. Therefore, it was the sin o f
masturbation, and not disobedience, for which he was slain by God.
Foucault and Sermett (1982) argue that this Christian moral agenda of selfpurification led to the anti-masturbation preoccupation o f the 17**’ century. Apparently,
the belief that masturbation was something sinful spawned a speculation that it was also
extremely detrimental to people by causing, among other conditions, insanity (Levins,
1996). As a result, medical professionals organized national anti-masturbation
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movements that urged family members and peers to spy on and expose suspected
masturbators. Many o f the “guilty” were incarcerated in asylums or forced to have their
sexual organs surgically removed. Also popular were torturous devices that mentally ill
individuals (as well as those who were afraid o f becoming mentally ill) wore to dissuade
them from touching their genitals (Levins, 1996).
While the privileged position o f biology in sexology probably stemmed from early
researchers' hope that "objective science" would replace oppressive orthodoxies like the
one I have just mentioned. I’m convinced it has created its own oppressive constructions.
One of these is the overemphasis on sexual mechanics that has “normalized” certain
physiological functions, particularly erections for men. Indeed, men will go to great
lengths to remedy an inability to experience erections and be able to function “normally.”
In fact, the performative aspect o f sexual response is so important, many men who are not
able to have erections will choose to have no sex at all (Crooks & Baur, 1993).
Disregarding Other Possibilities
Besides mechanizing sexual experiences, I also wonder if Masters’ and Johnson’s
observations, measurements, and descriptions of physiological sexual responses set the
stage for a disregard and subsequent mystification o f sexuality’s social, psychological,
and even spiritual aspects (Segal, 1983). That is, is it because o f their emphasis on the
biological functioning o f penises and vaginas, which allowed for sexuality to be
embraced by the medical/health model, that people now tend to focus on biological
solutions for sexual dysfunctions and neglect other possible causes? Since I certainly
cannot “prove” a direct connection, my answer to this question is “probably and then
some.” The “probably” part o f my answer simply suggests that biological remedies for
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sexual problems makes sense if sexuality is viewed within the realms of medicine and
physical health and not emotional, cognitive, spiritual, or social contexts. However, the
“then some” part of my answer refers to a phallocentrism o f whose construction the
devoutly feministic and egalitarian Masters and Johnson would definitely want no part.
You see, nowadays when a man is unable to experience an erection and wants to
seek help, he will more than likely consult his physician. In most cases, his physician will
then introduce him to the many physiological remedies (i.e., medication, vacuum erection
devices, surgery, injections, or even implants) that are available with perhaps the mention
of seeing a sex therapist thrown in for good measure (A lthof 1998).
O f course, having previously mentioned that men dealing with erectile problems
have consulted me, this obviously does not occur in all such circumstances. But, here is
my point; There now exists a dominant discourse that says, “erectile dysfunction is a
physiological problem.” This discourse has, in my opinion, subjugated other discourses
including one that says, “erectile dysfunction might very well be influenced by such
meddlers as stress, depression, fear, or anxiety” and another that says, “sexual activities
such as sucking, licking, touching, and rubbing are just as important (if not more
important) as intercourse.” While the former obviously reflects social and psychological
aspects of sexuality, perhaps not so obvious is that the latter reflects the voices o f many
women who say, “for us, vaginal penetration is certainly not the main event”
Unfortunately, these voices tend to be ignored, as women’s desires and opinions are
largely invisible, suppressed, neglected, and denied in the discourse o f medical ized
sexuality.
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Medicalizinp Sexuality
In order to demonstrate my point more clearly, let me back up just a bit and
deconstruct the “erectile dysfunction is a physiological problem” discourse. As I
discussed earlier in this paper, the case has been made that Human Sexual Response did
much to move sexuality into the domain of medicine and health. Still, this is not to say
that Masters and Johnson believed all sexual problems have a biological basis. In fact,
when they later published Human Sexual Inadequacv. they report that only seven o f their
213 cases (3 percent) o f “secondary impotence” had an organic etiology (1970, pp. 184185). Similarly, the renowned Johns Hopkins Sexual Behaviors Consultation Unit
reported that between 1972 and 1981, there was an organic etiology in only 30 percent o f
105 men over fifty years old who were dealing with erectile dysfunction (Wise, Rabins,
& Gahnsley, 1984). However, Tiefer (1986) noticed that in the early 1980s, more and
more men who had difficulty obtaining/sustaining erections, were seeking treatment after
they themselves concluded the problem to be physiological. She recalls;
In the Center for Male Sexual Dysfunction in the Department of Urology at Beth
Israel Medical Center, New York City, more than 800 men have been seen since
1981 for erectile problems (I began working there in 1983). Very few who, on the
basis o f a simple history and physical, could be unambiguously declared
“psychogenic” were immediately referred for sex therapy: the remainder
underwent a complete medical and psychological workup. Over 90 percent o f
these patients believed that their problems were completely or preponderantly
physical in origin; yet we have found that only about 45 percent of patients have
exclusively or predominantly medically caused erectile problems and 55 percent
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have exclusively or predominantly psychologically caused problems. This
approximately fifty-fifty split is, in fact, what is often cited by the mass media. But
most o f our patients (more than 75 percent) are referred by their primary
physicians because o f their likely medical etiology and their need for a
comprehensive workup (p. 149).
The Problem with Medicalization
One could argue that this proclivity toward physiological bases o f erection
difficulties is a good thing since it brings with it, many advantages for men. For example,
some research shows that men tend to view physical explanations of sexual problems as
less stigmatizing. If this is the case, it is likely that physiological etiologies deliver less o f
a blow to many guys’ self-esteem and perceived masculinity (Peplau & Gordon, 1985).
Although the medical/health model might offer explanations that go easier on the
emotions, I believe there are many more disadvantages o f medicalizing sexuality than
there are advantages.
I discussed one o f these disadvantages earlier in this paper, the dependence on
professionals for interpretation created when medical terminology constructs sexuality.
Another I would add to the list is this: as the availability o f medical treatments for erectile
dysfunction has increased, so has the use of these treatments. However, as is common
with new technology and pharmacology, the long-term effects o f these treatments are
unpredictable. Take for instance, Viagra (sildenafil citrate), the new “wonder drug”
prescribed by doctors to treat erectile dysfunction. Clinical trials have demonstrated that
it can cause side effects such as headache, flushing, dyspepsia (indigestion), and
respiratory tract infection (Morales, Gingell, Collins, Wicker, & Osterloh, 1998). Viagra
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has also been linked to more than 100 deaths, according to the American Medical
Association (1999). Most deaths occur in men who have a history of heart disease, but
some deaths have occurred without that risk factor. Although the drug has not been
available long enough to determine what other detrimental effects it might have after
prolonged use, we do already know one of Viagra’s most severe negative effects, the big
hit it is taking on people’s wallets. At a cost o f up to $360 for 30, 100 mg tablets, only
40% o f all Viagra prescriptions are covered by insurance compared to 76% coverage on
all other medications (Padma-Nathan, 1998).
Regarding another treatment for erectile dysfunction, penile prostheses, Kabalin and
Kessler (1989) found that among 290 patients who received penile implants (inflatable
devices or semi-rigid rods which are surgically inserted into the penis) between 1975 and
1985, 43 percent experienced malfunctioning and had to undergo surgery a second time.
In a more recent review o f penile implants, Mulcahy (1998) notes that “design changes in
a particular model have occurred at a frequency of every 5 to 8 years, making the old
model obsolete” (p. 224). Although he reports “the overall satisfaction rate has been very
good” (p. 220), Mulcahy later says “with repeat surgery for repair, replacement, or
reinsertion of penile prostheses, patient satisfaction rates decline due mainly to the
decrease in size of the penis that occurs with each procedure ” (p. 225). These examples
remind us that in at least some cases, men seeking medical treatment for erection
problems might also be signing up for problems down the road.
Another disadvantage takes us back to the issue o f morality. As Tiefer (1986)
explains, “medicalization spreads the moral neutrality o f medicine and science over
sexuality, and people no longer ask whether men ‘should’ have erections. If the presence
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of erections is healthy and their absence (in whole or part) is pathological, then healthy
behavior is correct behavior and vice versa” (p. 595). Similar to the result o f using
excessive medical terminology to report on sexuality research, this view means that
medical/health “experts” are the ones constructing the norms and standards for sexual
behavior against which all persons’ experiences are measured.
While I am well aware that I have already said this about a gazillion times, the
biggest problem I see with the medicalization of sexuality is that it obscures and ignores
the social causes o f sexual problems. Instead o f being problems that exist in the space
between people, difficulties such as anorgasmia (female inability to experience orgasm)
and erectile dysfunction become the problems of individual women and men. Unlike the
research I mentioned that says men see physiological explanations o f sexual problems as
less of an attack on their self-esteem, I think locating sexual problems inside of persons
provides thin conclusions o f identities with deficits. To me, medicalization only further
entangles women and men in the discourse that equates self-worth with the ability to
experience orgasms, and masculinity with the ability to experience a rigid, reliable
erection. Certainly, it does not seem to invite people to challenge this discourse or ask
about its origin. The problem, as I see it, is summarized eloquently by Stark & Flitcraft
(quoted in Riessman, 1983) when they state, “Medicine attracts public resources out of
proportion to its capacity for health enhancement, because it often categorizes problems
fundamentally social in origin as biological or personal deficits, and in so doing smothers
the impulse for social change which could offer the only serious resolution” (p. 4).
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Medicalization and Phallocentrism
With all o f this talk about medicalized male sexuality, the question naturally arises,
“what about women?” Without doubt, medicalization has also played an important part in
the construction of female sexuality (Tiefer, 1991). For example, the past three decades
have seen a boom in medical ideology and practice regarding pregnancy, childbirth,
menstruation, menopause, premenstrual syndrome, fertility, and physical appearance (i.e.,
breast implants, tummy tucks, etc.). However, when it comes to the medicalization of
heterosexual functioning laid out in the human sexual response cycle, it appears to be
phallocentrism all the way.
At first thought, this may not seem to make sense. After all, the entire enterprise o f
medicalized sexuality is justified by the “need” for men’s penises to penetrate women’s
vaginas— women are an integral part o f the equation. Still, as I previously stated, this
“need” looks to be largely on the part o f men and not women. Feminists have long made
the case that, if women’s sexual pleasure is truly as important as men’s, coitus would not
continue to be the sine qua non when it comes to the dominant sexual script of
heterosexual relations (Clement, 1990). That means, instead o f being categorized as
foreplay, after play, or “special needs,” activities such as fellatio, cunnilingus, vaginal
and anal penetration with fingers and sex toys, and mutual masturbation would all qualify
for the coveted label of “sexual intercourse ”
Previously in this paper, I have alluded to my experience that when reading Human
Sexual Response, it is easy to gather that Masters and Johnson place a premium on
equality between genders. For example, they devote an entire chapter to discussing
similarities in the physiological sexual responses of men and women where they note that
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“parallels in reactive potential between the two sexes must be underlined. Similarities
rather than differences o f response have been emphasized by this investigation” (p. 273).
However, it can be argued that the ascension of the phallocentrism resulting from Human
Sexual Response has constituted very non-egalitarian conditions. One recent example
takes us back to the drug Viagra. While an increasing number o f insurance companies are
willing to pay for the drug, many o f those same companies still refuse to cover the costs
of contraceptive drugs and devices for women (Meckler, 1999). Another situation
involving Viagra and flagrant gender bias is Wal-Mart's refusal to sell the “morning
after” contraceptive pill for women, Preven (Levonorgestrel and Ethinyl Estradiol).
Apparently, Wal-Mart, a popular national chain of department stores, caved into pressure
when the group Pharmacists for Life International asked them not to sell the drug (Kissel,
1999). The 1,500-member group opposes Preven, maintaining it aborts a fertilized egg.
However, Prevents manufacturer, Gynetics Incorporated says the drug does not cause
abortions, rather it stops ovulation and prevents fertilized eggs from implanting in the
uterine wall. In any case, it seems to me that Wal-Mart's willingness to dispense Viagra
to help men experience erections but refusal to dispense Preven to help women avoid
unwanted pregnancies is certainly not the kind of gender equality for which Masters and
Johnson advocated.
Advocates for the Medicalization o f Sexualitv
So, with all o f the disadvantages to this medical discourse o f sex, why are so many
men likening their penises to automobiles and surmising, “if it doesn’t work. I’ll take it to
a mechanic?” According to Tiefer (1994), there are powerful advocates for the
medicalization o f male sexuality, advocates who “portray sexuality in a rational.
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technical, mechanical, cheerful way” (p. 369). By promoting and circulating the story o f
medical sexuality, these advocates have helped construct a dominant discourse o f organic
etiology that has marginalized and even silenced other less lucrative ideas about erection
problems.
The first o f these advocates are the folks on the “front line” who stand to turn big
profits from medicalized male sexuality: urologists. Apparently, urological treatments for
“impotence” began to evolve in the 1970s as an attractive subspecialty for urologists
wanting to make big money off a population of people who, because their problem is not
an illness from which they will die, will likely continue to need various outpatient and
inpatient services after their initial treatment. Because the 1970s also saw a proliferation
of sex therapists willing to help with erectile dysfunction, getting a “piece of the action”
required popularizing the idea that erection problems have physical causes that must be
diagnosed by a urologist. No doubt, this medicalization o f male sexuality has paid off big
time and with the American Urological Association making statements like “sexual
dysfunction in the male is a disease entity, the diagnoses and treatments o f which deserve
equal attention to that given other diseases” (Poll shows widespread use o f three major
impotence treatments, 1993, p. 6), the profits aren’t likely to decrease any time soon.
Although urologists are still getting the bulk of the business related to medicalized
male sexuality, the introduction of Viagra has created a dramatic shift in the physician
profile in the field o f erectile dysfunction. Currently, 55% of prescriptions for Viagra are
being written by primary care physicians, 21-25% by non-urology specialists, and only
20-24% by urologists (Padma-Nathan, 1998). From the looks of things, Viagra is helping
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primary care physicians move in on the business once handled almost exclusively by
urologists.
With their moneybags in hand, standing in line behind urologists and primary care
physicians are the medical industries. As for the money, make no mistake; as is the case
with other medical specialties, those bags they are holding are filling up fast. By
providing the resources that create the cultural authority essential to a medical model o f
sexual health, medical industries are turning a huge profit today while simultaneously
insuring the profits will continue flowing tomorrow. For example, the specialized
equipment needed to diagnose and treat erection problems “properly” can cost hospitals
and practices tens o f thousands o f dollars. When you add that to the millions spent by
patients each year on such things as penile implants and oral, topical, and injectable
medications, it’s easy to see how medical industries have pushed the discourse of
medicalized sexuality to a place where it occupies more and more space in people’s
realities.
Next up in the countdown o f those who advocate for medicalized sexuality is the
ever popular, ever powerful mass media. Tiefer (1994) believes that the media favors
medicalized information about sex because it allows for the publication of sexual material
without the blemish of pornography or obscenity. Because it has been “cleaned up,”
medical writing about sex is “safe” and therefore more likely to be published in
“reputable” publications. As Tiefer states, “New York Times readers will not see articles
on techniques o f fellatio, but they will see dozens of stories on penile injections” (1994,
p. 368).

117
Of course, addressing the mass m edia's role in perpetuating the medicalization of
sexuality cannot be complete without also mentioning the field that keeps the mass media
in business—advertising. Since their focus is on physiology and not lust or pleasure,
stories about the medical aspects o f sexuality often lend support to sexual drugs. In
return, pharmaceutical companies are more likely to pay big money in order to advertise
in publications or on television networks where medical discussions o f sexual problems
help legitimize the need for their products. One such drug company is Pfizer who has
spent millions o f dollars promoting the use o f its drug, Viagra. Advertisements for
Viagra, which claim the drug “improves the natural sexual response” (Fowler, 1998, p.
1371), seem to be popping up everywhere including psychology journals, popular
magazines, and television. Sustained by big-time endorsers such as former senator and
presidential candidate Bob Dole, the “buzz” about Viagra makes it likely that most
everyone is aware o f the “physiological Ax” this purple pill can provide for penises. As
one would expect, this “buzz” also makes it likely Pfizer’s profits will continue to
increase.
Incidentally, during a recent television appearance, the popular sex educator Dr.
Ruth Westheimer (1999) disclosed that Pfizer had asked her to be a spokesperson for
Viagra and she turned them down. Her reason? Apparently, she believes Viagra and the
medicalized-sexuality discourse to which it belongs place too much o f an emphasis on
the mechanics o f sexual experience while neglecting the emotional and social aspects she
deems important.
Completing Tiefer’s list of advocates for the medicalization o f male sexuality are
sexual entrepreneurs who have created a market by portraying themselves as something
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between consumers and professionals. Two such people are Bruce and Eileen
MacKenzie, a married couple who founded the self-help/urologists’ advocacy groups
Impotents Anonymous and I-ANON. Their book. It’s Not All in Your Head (MacKenzie
& MacKenzie, 1988), helped usher in the lucrative market of self-help publications
espousing medicalized male sexuality. Over ten years later, business is very good. A
recent query o f the best-selling books about erectile dysfunction from the online
bookseller Amazon.com (1999) yielded a list o f 24 titles of which only a few address
social etiologies o f erection problems. The others (including several authored by
urologists) all address various physiological solutions including surgical procedures,
medication, natural testosterone, and dietary supplements.
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The Third Reading
In addition to many other things, I have learned that a difficult yet crucial part o f
pursuing a project such as this thesis is deciding when to stop. When is enough, really
enough? Is the condition o f “enough” even something I could ever experience? After all,
there are so many ways to interpret and categorize sexuality (e.g., orientation,
development, intimacy, sexual problems, etc.) and so many spheres (e.g., religion,
academia, entertainment, clinical services, etc.) influencing and/or influenced by socially
constructed sexual “realities.” I think that, because of the enormous impact Human
Sexual Response has had on sexual matters in general, it is possible to consider its
constitutive role in all o f these realms. Certainly, for social workers or other social
scientists wanting to examine the social construction o f sexuality as it relates to Masters
and Johnson, there are many avenues to pursue.
For me, however, it was time to start closing up shop and read the text one last time.
What I did not realize was that this last time through would spark yet even more
deconstructive gleanings to fuel my enthusiasm for the project.
Another Ride on the Cvcle: Let the Biases Begin
With an eye out for more ideas that have contributed to the social construction o f
sexual realities, I began and completed (over the course o f about two weeks) my third and
final (at least for this project) reading of Human Sexual Response. This last time through,
I was a little more attentive to details including some very revealing sentences that
seemed to be “hidden” from me during my first two readings. What was most noticeable
however, was that I found myself questioning what has been perhaps the most popular
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product o f this text, the human sexual response cycle (See Appendix F for my notes from
the third reading).
You’ve Seen One. You’ve Seen 'Em All
Something that caught my eye the third time around was the way Masters and
Johnson (1966) referred to their famous model, the same way I just referred to it at the
end of the previous paragraph. Instead of “a” human sexual response cycle, it is to them
(and subsequently myself and many others) “the” human sexual response cycle. Based on
their use o f the word “the” instead o f “a,” it appears they believe that only one sexual
“cycle” exists for all human beings.
A more concise picture o f physiologic reaction to sexual stimuli may be presented
by dividing the human m ale’s andfemale's cycles o f sexual response into four
separate phases... This arbitrary four-part division o f the sexual response cycle
provides an effective framework for detailed description of physiologic variants in
sexual reaction, some o f which are frequently so transient in character as to
appear in only one phase o f the total orgasmic cycle (p. 4, emphasis added).
While the authors do say that there are “many identifiable variations” (p. 4), these
variations are always observed and identified in relation to their stages of excitement,
plateau, orgasm, and resolution. In fact, after introducing their model at the beginning of
Human Sexual Response, they use it as a frame of reference for discussing sex organs
and sexual responses throughout the remainder o f the book.
Orgasmic Biases
What is more, it appears Masters and Johnson assumed the existence o f their human
sexual response cycle before they even began observing participants. My basis for this
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charge comes from a sentence in the text to which, as I remarked earlier, I did not pay
careful attention during the first two readings. Regarding the acceptance of participants
for their research. Masters and Johnson instituted “a requirement that there be a positive
history of masturbatory and coital orgasmic experience before any study subject [could
be] accepted into the program” (p. 311). Now, this changes everything. Based upon this
statement, it seems their research has nothing to do with studying people to discover
“physical reactions [that] develop as the human male and female respond to effective
sexual stimulation” (p. 4) and everything to do with studying the physiological functions
o f people who had experienced particular, pre-selected sexual responses. In other words,
instead o f doing research and developing a model that fit with their observations. Masters
and Johnson appear to have first developed a model and then selected participants who
experienced sexual functions for which it could account. Therefore, their model o f human
sexual response should not be generalized and accepted as a universal “truth” about
human beings in general, it should be viewed as the “truth” at the time for the folks they
allowed into their research population.
Surprisingly, one book that helped popularize the “findings” in Human Sexual
Response did its part to construct the universal “reality” o f Masters’ and Johnson’s
human sexual response cycle. In Analvzing Human Sexual Response. Brecher and
Brecher (1966) legitimize the researchers’ bias in selecting only those participants who
experienced orgasms and disregard its potential effects on generalization. They write:
Men and women unable to respond sexually and to reach orgasm were also
weeded out. Since this was to be a study o f sexual responses, those unable to
respond could contribute little to it (p. 54).

122
William Masters himself made a similar comment in an interview published in Playboy
magazine two years after the publication o f Human Sexual Response (Lehrman, 1970):
“If you are going to find out what happens, obviously you must work with those to whom
it happens” (p. 140).
I must say that 1 disagree with the Brechers’ “analysis” (perhaps they might have
titled their book “Analyzing a Specific Kind of Human Sexual Response”) and I believe
William Masters ought to explain why he defends his and Virginia Johnson’s biased
participant selection with such a ridiculous statement. It seems to me that a study of
human sexual responses should include all types o f humans who experience all types o f
different sexual actions and reactions. Certainly, such a study should not preclude persons
because they have not experienced particular responses (i.e., orgasms). I mean, if I were
going to study hockey in North America in order to develop a “foundation of basic
scientific information” (Masters & Johnson, 1966, p. 4), I would not only include players
from the National Hockey League’s (NHL) all-star game. That would tell me nothing
about the experiences of other NHL players, players in smaller leagues or college and
high school players.
Furthermore, just because people have not experienced orgasms, this in no way
means they are, as Brecher and Brecher write, “unable to respond ” (p. 54). For instance, I
have had people who come to see me for therapy tell me that they thoroughly enjoy their
sexual experiences even when those experiences do not include orgasm. However, some
of them tell me that in such instances, their partners have difficulty accepting they are
satisfied, fulfilled. Sometimes, they cannot believe their partner has even enjoyed
her/himself at all without an orgasm to punctuate the experience. According to the people
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telling me their stories, these incidents are not cases o f their partners feeling unattractive
or inadequate because they could not make them cum, these are cases where their
partners have difficulty understanding how they can be satisfied without “completing”
the “normal” sexual response cycle o f which orgasm is a necessary component. In these
instances. Human Sexual Response (Masters & Johnson, 1966) would probably do a
good job o f making all parties feel like crap, as it refers to sexual response patterns
without orgasm as “failures” (e.g., p. 313) resulting from a lack of “effective sexual
stimulation” (e.g., p. 107).
I should add that this feeling o f abnormality is true for not only persons who do not
experience orgasms but also others whose sexual responses do not fit “the way it is
supposed to be.” Case in point; I recently saw a man in therapy that was devastated by
what he saw as his sexual “abnormality.” He described himself as having a very high sex
drive and usually experienced multiple orgasms (including ejaculations) without
experiencing the “resolution” stage o f Masters and Johnson’s human sexual response
cycle. In fact, he reports having to “lie there and calm myself down” in order to lose his
erection. If he did not do this, he says he would probably “keep going” indefinitely.
Now, this person is not a social scientist, has no “formal” sexuality education, and he
has never read Masters and Johnson (although he says he might have heard of them
before). He also told me that his sexuality has never caused problems with the various
aspects of his life and in fact, he has always enjoyed sex very much. Still, he and his
female partner were convinced there was something terribly wrong with him because he
did not have a “normal” way of functioning sexually. O f course, his ability is certainly
exceptional (see Whipple, Myers, & Komisaruk, 1998) and his partner, having had
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previous sexual partners, noticed that he was different from the other men with whom she
had been sexual. Nevertheless, they were both sure that he had a problem and just before
consulting me, they were about to go to the library to research sexuality to find out what
was “wrong” with him. If they were to read Human Sexual Response, it would have
surely showed them he was “abnormal” since the sexual response cycle for women
allows for multiple orgasms before resolution, but certainly not for men unless they wait
through a resolution stage.
Socioeconomic Biases
Another bias in Masters’ and Johnson’s selection o f participants for their research
involves intelligence and socioeconomic status. In chapter two, they disclose that “the
sample was weighted purposely toward higher than average intelligence levels and
socioeconomic backgrounds. Further selectivity was established by an extensively
detailed intake interview designed to determine willingness to participate, facility of
sexual responsiveness, and ability to communicate finite details o f sexual reaction ”
(Masters & Johnson, 1966, p. 12). Two pages later, they write. “Although the research
population purposely was weighted toward average or above-average intelligence, some
of the study subjects were of less favorable backgrounds” (p. 14). Again, Brecher and
Brecher (1966) jumped in to legitimize this bias o f selectivity by claiming, “The higher
than average educational level o f the women volunteers is hardly likely to affect the
acidity o f their vaginal fluids” (p. 60).
Well, this may be true but then again, it may not. After all, Alfred Kinsey and his
colleagues reported significant differences between people from different socioeconomic
backgrounds. Some o f these differences included whether or not people masturbated and
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if they did, how often. Kinsey also found socioeconomic differences correlated with
whether or not people engaged in premarital sex, had sex with prostitutes, enjoyed oralgenital sex, as well as what sexual positions people preferred. Regarding yet another
dissimilarity, Kinsey notes, “It is particularly interesting to find that there are differences
between educational levels in regard to nocturnal emissions—a type of sexual outlet
which one might suppose would represent involuntary behavior” (Kinsey, Pomeroy, &
Martin, 1948, p. 343). According to his findings, “There are 10 to 12 times as frequent
nocturnal emissions among males of the upper educational classes as there are among
males o f the lower classes” (p. 345). This work alone raises serious doubts about the
generalizability o f Masters’ and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle, as it tells a story
of differences both voluntary and involuntary sexual behaviors between socioeconomic
classes. To me, it is very possible these variations in behaviors will also mean variations
in physiological functions.
The “Help Me Make it Better” Bias
In the very last paragraph o f Human Sexual Response. Masters and Johnson (1966)
write: “Through the years o f research exposure, the one factor in sexuality that
consistently has been present among members o f the study-subject population has been a
basic interest in and desire for effectiveness o f sexual performance. This one factor may
represent the major area o f difference between the research study subjects and the general
population” (p. 315). Therefore, we know another bias in Masters’ and Johnson’s
research population was that the people involved wanted to have better sex. However,
because o f the biases in participant selection that I have already discussed, I wonder if the
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people involved in this research specifically had a desire for “effectiveness o f sexual
performance” that fit with Masters’ and Johnson’s values.
From the profiles o f four participants included in the final chapter o f Human Sexual
Response, we discover that for them, (a) sex was an important part of their lives and (b)
participation in the study helped them out sexually. Writing about the first person, a
twenty-six-year-old woman, the authors state that “sexual activity [is] a major factor in
[her] life” (Masters & Johnson, 1966, p. 304). Apparently, being a part o f their research
allowed for meaning that made sex even more important. Another woman profiled by the
authors “stated categorically ”along with her husband that participating in the research
was “of significant importance in their marriage ” (p. 307). O f the other two participants
who were profiled (both men), one had joined the study “hoping to enhance the sexual
component of [his] marriage” (p. 311 ). The other had a long history o f various types o f
sexual activity and wanted to expand his experience by participating in the study.
In the end, it is clear that enlisting only those volunteers who experience orgasms
and had “higher than average intelligence levels and socioeconomic backgrounds” (p. 12)
resulted in a group o f smarter, orgasmic participants. Further, it turns out these folks also
had a desire for “effectiveness of sexual performance” (p. 315 ), which for Masters and
Johnson meant a specific sexual style that must include orgasm. Considering all o f these
characteristics, I believe their participant group was certainly exceptional and not
representative o f the “general population” to which the authors refer throughout the text.
While I have already discussed a situation where a person felt abnormal because he
did not experience the type o f sexual response pattern laid out in Masters’ and Johnson’s
model, it is difficult to determine if his situation truly is a consequence o f their skewed
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sample. AÛer all, he may not have felt abnormal because o f ideas about sexual response
that evolved from Masters and Johnson, he might have gotten the idea somewhere else.
Then again, maybe his predicament was really a result o f the ascendency o f their human
sexual response cycle over other ideas about how people respond sexually. He did not
know where it came from and, as with similar situations, we deconstructed the problem
(i.e., feeling abnormal because he never experienced a resolution stage) with an
externalizing conversation about the effects o f dominant societal discourses and
discovering what “fits” for him. As Tiefer (1995a) notes, referring to Masters’ and
Johnson’s skewed sample, “I cannot specify the effect o f this sexually skewed sample
any more than I could guess what might be the consequences for research on singing o f
only studying stars o f the Metropolitan Opera” (pp. 46-47).
I should note that Masters and Johnson (1966) never offer a definition for “the
general population” (p. 8, p. 315) from which they state their participant group differs. In
fact, they never use another research sample to which they compare their participants,
letting themselves off the hook by stating “there are no established norms for male and
female sexuality in our society ” (p. 302). If this was the case, I wonder why they did not
do a better job o f eliminating biases so the “norms” they established by publishing
Human Sexual Response might be more representative o f all people. As I have already
mentioned, they declare in the beginning o f the text that their “study of human sexual
response has been designed to create a foundation o f basic scientific information from
which definitive answers can be developed to...multifaceted problems” (p. 4). Because o f
the difficulty in obtaining generalized research populations whose results might best
serve as a “foundation o f basic scientific information,” I would think that researchers
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with this goal would be extremely careful to control for their biases. Certainly, I would
not think that they would make their biases conditions for participation in their research.
At the very least, I would expect them to speculate about the possible consequences o f
such biases. O f course. Masters and Johnson do not and as a result, we now have
dominant sexual “realities” that are based on a sample o f exceptional persons.
Experimenter Bias
In social science research, there is an undesirable condition known as “experimenter
bias” (Grinnell, 1997). Experimenter bias occurs when researchers’ communicate (either
intentionally or unintentionally) their expectations to the research participants and this
affects their behavior. This o f course, opens the door for criticism regarding the validity
o f the results, since the participants may have been prompted to respond in certain ways.
One way Masters and Johnson (1966) appear to have implemented experimenter bias
is the aforementioned way they refer to sexual activities involving orgasm as “successes”
and sexual activities without orgasms and/or rigid erections as “failures” (p. 313).
For orientation, five episodes were necessary after team interrogation. The first
exposure was to background and equipment; during the second, coition was
attempted without ejaculatory success. The third episode developed as successful
coition for Subject D, but his wife was not orgasmic. During the fourth session
both husband and wife were successful in individual automanipulative episodes,
and in the fifth episode no difficulty was encountered by either partner in
response to coital or manipulative stimuli (p. 310, emphasis added).
Although the authors never say if participants knew they viewed things this way,
attaching such strong values to certain responses makes it likely that even if Masters and
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Johnson did not communicate these labels explicitly, they were probably at least implied.
At minimum, this language tells us that, instead of remaining objective, they had strong
opinions about which responses were “good” and which were not.
In other instances, it appears Masters and Johnson (1966) went well beyond their
role as researchers and acted as sex therapists for some o f the people involved in their
study. The authors discuss one married couple who “volunteered their services, hoping to
acquire knowledge to enhance the sexual component o f their marriage in return for their
cooperation with the program” (p. 311). Apparently, Masters and Johnson delivered their
end of the bargain, as the “wife has stated repeatedly that subsequent to program
participation her husband has been infinitely more effective both in stimulating and in
satisfying her sexual tensions. He in turn finds her sexually responsive without
reservation...Together they maintain that they have gotten a great deal more out o f
cooperating with the program than they have contributed, and they wish to continue on a
long-term basis” (p. 311 ). In fact, the authors practically admit their role as sex therapists
for their participants by stating, “When female orgasmic or male ejaculatory failures
develop in the laboratory, the situation is discussed immediately. Once the individual has
been reassured, suggestions are made for improvement o f future performance” (p. 314).
By serving in this therapist/teacher capacity. Masters and Johnson made sure their
research volunteers gave them the results that fit with their preconceived model o f human
sexual response.
What is “Effective” Stimulation?
Throughout Human Sexual Response. Masters and Johnson (1966) continually refer
to “effective” sexual stimulation. This begins in Chapter 1 with the research question.
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“What physical reactions develop as the human male and female respond to effective
sexual stimulation?” (p. 4), and then continues throughout the entire text. For example, in
Chapter 2 they remind the reader that “the primary interest has been concentrated quite
literally upon what men and women do in response to effective sexual stimulation” (p.
20) while in Chapter 5 the authors discuss “physiologic reaction o f the clitoris to effective
sexual stimulation” (p. 51). What is more. Masters and Johnson also make use o f the
“effective” adjective when discussing sexual “performance.” Samples o f this appear in
their chapter on pregnancy and sexual response and include writing about the
“effectiveness o f sexual performance among the women interviewed” as well as “change
in their [women’s]... effectiveness o f their sexual performance” after having two or more
children (p. 156-157).
The problem with all o f this talk about “effective” sexual stimulation is that Masters
and Johnson (1966) never state exactly what that means, barking at the reader to play a
sort of carnival game. “Step right up! Guess what we mean by ‘effective sexual
stimulation’ and you will win the prize o f understanding our research question!” My
guess is that effective stimulation is stimulation that results in responses that fit with the
author’s human sexual response cycle, a speculation supported by the following passage
about the vagina in Chapter 6:
The first physiologic evidence o f the human female’s response to any form o f
sexual stimulation is the production o f vaginal lubrication. Lubricating material
appears on the walls of the vagina within 10 to 30 seconds after the initiation o f
any form o f effective sexual stimulation (p. 69, emphasis added).
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Another example comes from M asters’ and Johnson’s discussion o f the labia minora (the
inner lips o f the female genitalia):
Many women have progressed well into plateau-phase levels o f sexual response,
had the ^ e c tiv e stimulative techniques withdrawn, and been unable to achieve
orgasmic-phase tension release... When an obviously effective means of sexual
stimulation is withdrawn and orgasmic-phase release is not achieved, the minorlabial coloration will fade rapidly (p. 41, emphasis added).
The seventh chapter’s discussion o f the labia minora presents yet another example:
When this sign [a bright red color] o f impending orgasm occurs (presuming that
effective sexual stimulation is continued), orgasm is sure to follow in women (p.
107, emphasis added).
Based on these passages, it appears that “effective” sexual stimulation is stimulation
that “moves” a person’s sexual functions through the stages o f M asters’ and Johnson’s
human sexual response cycle. This leads one to assume that ineffective stimulation must
be that which does not facilitate the responses o f their model, that which does not result
in what Masters and Johnson consider “progress ” (p. 112, for one example) or “success.”
Once again, the author’s seem to have had their particular human sexual response cycle
in mind before “discovering” the functions that fit with it. Once again, they are
incorporating biases and values into their quest for “basic scientific information” (p. 4).
Once again. Masters’ and Johnson’s results are unlikely to represent the general
population.
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Pathologizine Sexuality
One way Masters’ and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle has contributed to the
social construction of clinical sexology is as Tiefer (1995a) says, “through its role as the
centerpiece o f contemporary diagnostic nomenclature” (p. 49). In particular, it has had a
considerable impact on the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders (DSM). In the beginning, DSM-I did not list any
sexual dysfunctions (APA, 1952) and DSM-II listed them only as symptoms of
psychosomatic disorders (APA, 1968). Later, DSM-lII (APA, 1980) included a
subcategory o f psychosexual disorders (physical symptoms resulting from mental or
emotional problems) while DSM-IH-R (APA, 1987) contained a subcategory of sexual
disorders. The fourth and most recent edition, DSM-IV. (1994) lists an entire category o f
sexual disorders that contains subcategories o f sexual dysfunctions, paraphilias, and
gender identity disorders.
As one might guess. Masters’ and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle has
helped construct the DSM’s “norm” against which “problems” are measured, or as I like
to say, they helped put the “funk” in sexual dysfunctions:
The Sexual Dysfunctions are characterized by disturbance in sexual desire and in
the psychophysiological changes that characterize the sexual response cycle and
cause marked distress and interpersonal difficulty... A Sexual Dysfunction is
characterized by a disturbance in the processes that characterize the sexual
response cycle (APA, 1994, p. 493, emphasis added).
In fact, the article which first introduced sexual disorders to the DSM-III says it was done
so for individuals with an “inability to experience the normative sexual response cycle"
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(Spitzer, Williams, & Skodol, 1980, p. 153, emphasis added). While the DSM’s sexual
response cycle is not exactly the same as Masters’ and Johnson’s— it consists of four
stages labeled desire, excitement, orgasm, and resolution— it is certainly a derivative, as I
will now explain.
The construction of the first stage of the DSM’s sexual response cycle (i.e., desire) is
largely due to earlier sex therapists’ realizations that some people seem to have a
disinterest in sex. Its inclusion in the DSM, beginning with DSM-III, had much support
from sexologist Helen Singer Kaplan (1995) whose work was heavily influenced by
Masters and Johnson. She writes, “I first described the syndrome o f hypoactive sexual
desire and suggested that disorders o f sexual desire constitute distinct clinical entities that
are different from, and on a par with, erectile and orgasm phase dysfunctions” (p. 1). She
later states, “I consider all my work an extension of William Masters’ and Virginia
Johnson’s pioneering studies of the human sexual response” (p. 8, emphasis added).
So, here we have the guide by which all mental disorders are diagnosed using
Masters’ and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle (as well as work based on that
model) as a benchmark for sexual functioning. When 1 consider all o f the research biases
I have talked about as well as the lack o f generalizability that results from them, it seems
absurd that the field o f mental health has helped reify their model by affording it such a
dominant status. Frankly, I am angered because such a position has detrimental effects on
people’s lives, not the least of which are feelings one is “disordered,” “abnormal, ”or
“inadequate” (as in the title of Masters’ and Johnson’s second book) if her/his sexual
responses do not fit with Masters’ and Johnson’s model.
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Another Round o f “Who’s the Expert?”
As I have already mentioned in this paper, my experience is that the people who seek
consultation with a therapist or social worker because they are dealing with problems,
including sexual ones, are the best experts o f their own lives. For example, I mentioned
earlier in the paper a man who came to see me because he would have several ejaculatory
orgasms without experiencing Masters’ and Johnson’s resolution stage. On one hand, he
told me that he has no problem with his sexuality and in fact, he has always enjoyed it.
On the other hand, he somehow felt it was abnormal and there was something wrong with
him, a condition that his girlfriend readily confirmed. During our conversations where he
was the “expert” and I was the learner, he concluded that his sexual functioning was
normal for him and there was nothing wrong with or abnormal about the person he is.
However, if he would have visited a therapist following the “rules” laid out by the DSMIV, things might have been different. You see, after describing “the ” sexual response
cycle, the manual says that when it comes to disorders o f sexual response, therapists
should make the call. Although “no attempt is made in the criteria sets to specify a
minimum frequency or range o f settings, activities, or types o f sexual encounters in
which the dysfunction must occur, ” in any instances where a person’s sexual functioning
does not conform to the norm, “the judgment [for diagnosis] must be made by the
clinician” (APA, 1994,494). Therefore, Masters’ and Johnson’s model o f sexual
response, which is the basis for the DSM’s model o f sexual response, has led to
reinforcement o f the story that says people must rely on “experts” to tell them whether or
not they are appropriately functioning sexually.
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Parts is Parts
I should add that the the DSM-IV’s descriptions of sexual disorders read like a
“what’s what” o f sex organs and physiological functions. For example, the manual
describes the essential feature o f Female Arousal Disorder as “persistent or recurrent
inability to attain, or to maintain until completion of the sexual activity, and adequate
lubrication-swelling response of sexual excitement” (APA, 1994, p. 500). Another sexual
problem. Vaginismus, is described as “recurrent or persistent involuntary contraction of
the perineal muscles surrounding the outer third o f the vagina when vaginal penetration
with penis, finger, tampon, or speculum” (p. 513). Lest men might be left out o f these
performance evaluations, the manual states, “In the most common form o f Male
Orgasmic Disorder, a male cannot reach orgasm during intercourse, although he can
ejaculate from a partner’s manual or oral stimulation” (p. 507).
While there is all this emphasis on the physiological functioning o f specific body
parts, the DSM-IV never makes mention o f the human body as a whole. Instead, it sounds
as if a person’s body is an assortment o f different parts that become erect, lubricate, or
ejaculate at different points along a sequence o f sexual responses. Reading what I have
just written, I see an image of a kind o f assembly line where penises and vaginas ride on
a conveyor belt, performing certain responses at checkpoints set up along the way. If the
conveyor should happen to break down, one must call in an expert parts-fixer (i.e., a
“clinician”) who will systematically review each checkpoint to find out where certain
body parts are not functioning correctly. Although it is never mentioned in the DSM-IV, I
assume that when all parts are operating as they should and not deviating from “the”
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sexual response cycle, people should then have an overall satisfaction with their sexual
experiences.
Gender Similarities
The final observation from my third and final reading of Human Sexual Response
takes us back to the issue o f feminism. As I have already mentioned in this paper.
Masters and Johnson intentionally emphasized the similarities between men and women
and concluded that both genders experience “the” human sexual response cycle. The
DSM-IV and two o f its predecessors followed this emphasis by basing sexual
dysfunctions on Masters’ and Johnson’s gender-neutral model and then giving men and
women the same number and types o f dysfunctions (APA, 1994). I give an example o f
these parallels in Table 2.
Table 2
Gender Parallels in DSM-IV Sexual Dysfunctions
Women________________________________________Men_____________________
Female Sexual Arousal Disorder

Male Erectile Disorder

Female Orgasmic Disorder

Male Orgasmic Disorder

Dyspareunia and Vaginismus

Premature Ejaculation

Note. The DSM-IV’s sexual desire disorders do not specify gender.
In spite o f all o f this egalitarianism going on, many (including I) would argue that
Masters’ and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle hurts feminism more than it helps.
For example. Stock (1984) asserts that such a model, which claims male and female
sexualities are essentially the same, ignores the socially constructed gender differences
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and inequalities that exist for many. In a similar vein, Tiefer (1990) argues that the
alleged gender equality o f Masters’ and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle actually
disguises and trivializes the social realities o f gender inequality and therefore makes it
even more difficult for women to become sexually equal.
To me, deconstructing gender discrimination in sexuality means revisiting Masters’
and Johnson’s (1966) biased sampling. As you will recall, I earlier “threw a fit” because
these researchers only allowed volunteers to participate in their study if they had a “a
positive history o f masturbatory and coital orgasmic experience” (p. 311). These criteria
resulted in an unrepresentative sampling o f female participants who not only had orgasms
but masturbated as well. While individuals’ experiences certainly vary, much research
reveals a dominant cultural narrative that says men masturbate much more than women
(Gagnon, 1977; Gagnon, 1979; Gagnon & Simon, 1969; Simon & Gagnon, 1986). In
addition, much research shows that men are more often socialized to value physical
aspects of sexual encounters than are women, who tend to prefer the emotional and
relational aspects o f sex (Hite, 1987; Frank, Anderson, & Rubinstein, 1978; Peplau &
Gordon, 1985; Tavris & Sadd, 1977). Because Masters’ and Johnson’s human sexual
response cycle focuses on the physical, it values men’s preference over women’s.
I have also previously discussed how the “effective sexual stimulation ” Masters and
Johnson wrote about appears to mean stimulation that elicits the responses they have laid
out in their human sexual response cycle. Following the argument that this model is one
that values men’s sexual preferences, it is reasonable to conclude that “effective sexual
stimulation” also means the type o f stimulation men tend to prefer. Unfortunately, this
power imbalance only adds to the list o f conditions that have a negative impact on
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women’s sexuality including threats o f pregnancy, lower socioeconomic status, sexual
harassment, hearing negative messages about sexuality from their parents, and the fear of
male violence in heterosexual relationships (Snitow, Stansell, & Thompson, 1983; Stark
& Flitcraft, 1996; Vance, 1984; Ward & Wyatt, 1994).
Implications for Social Workers
By establishing a “foundation o f basic scientific information” (Masters & Johnson,
1966, p. 4), Masters and Johnson have laid claim to certain sexual “truths.” While these
types o f “truth” claims are commonplace in realms o f “professional knowledges,” I see
them as problematic for both social workers and the persons who consult them. While I
have already discussed the effects of these claims o f sexual “truths” on the persons who
consult social workers, I have not yet made space to consider their implications on the
lives of social workers who work with sexual problems. So, I will do that here.
For one, they can serve to isolate social workers from the persons with whom they
are working. That is, knowing “the facts” about human sexual response means that
knowledges located in local and historical contexts must be forsaken for the “truths”
discovered by Masters and Johnson. This makes fewer options available for interpreting
person’s sexual experiences and frustration when trying to fit those experiences with the
“reality” discovered by Masters and Johnson.
In addition. Masters’ and Johnson’s sexual reality leaves little or no room for social
workers’ values in the work they do. “Knowing” observers cannot explore options for the
expression o f their own values if those values do not correspond with the “truth.” This is
especially restrictive in the culture of “one-way ” accounts o f social work practice,
accounts where social workers help the persons who consult them but are not themselves
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affected by these relationships. Not only must social workers deny the values they bring
into conversations, they must also deny the changes o f their values in response to the
values o f those with whom they work. When working from a “knowing” position (i.e.,
knowing about Masters’ and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle) where scientifically
discovered “truths” are running the show, options to explore any non-normative value
systems are closed.
Furthermore, work informed by Masters’ and Johnson’s sexual “truths” creates a
“timeless” experience which makes it nearly impossible to attain enough knowledge to do
a good job. In other words, since Masters’ and Johnson’s ideas about human sexuality are
situated in a specific historical context, having only that knowledge available for use in
other contexts is usually not enough. Instead of learning about and respecting persons’
sexual experiences that are different from those documented by Masters and Johnson,
social workers subscribing to sexual realities are charged with “getting it right” when
applying the “truth” seeking technologies o f observation and evaluation. In addition, this
timelessness o f “truth” discourages social workers from plotting their experiences of
interactions with the people who consult them onto the unfolding o f their work.
As I see it, social workers who constitute their selves through the knowledges of
professional “truth” discourses such as Masters’ and Johnson’s become vulnerable to the
burden and fatigue of “burnout” that is somewhat common in this profession. This is
because “truth” claims leave little if any room for social workers’ experiences and values
that do not fit with the “reality ” established by “scientific” research. Therefore, an
important step toward avoiding burnout involves the deconstruction o f “truth” claims as
well as the practices they inform.
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In The End
Because o f a recent happening in my life, I find my self drawing a parallel between
Masters’ and Johnson’s human sexual response cycle and a popular model about
grieving. The model to which I am referring is the five stages o f grief proposed by
Elisabeth Kubler-Ross (1969). According to Kubler-Ross, persons who are facing death
or are dealing with a loss, make their way through stages o f denial, anger, bargaining,
depression, and acceptance. While later research has shown this model does not reflect
most person’s experiences (Kastenbaum, 1985; Marshall & Levy, 1990; Shneidman,
1980), it has still gained ascendance and widespread popularity in our society.
A few weeks ago, my wonderful 17-year-old cat, who has been one o f my best
friends since she was a kitten, passed away. Remembering all o f my wonderful
experiences with her, my soul feels very heavy and my heart hurts. As 1 wrestle with the
effects grief has been throwing my way while writing this last section, 1 keep thinking
about how my experience does not gel with the stages o f grief posited by Kubler-Ross,
just as persons’ sexual experiences may not fit with “the” human sexual response cycle. 1
should note that Kubler-Ross’ model is much more flexible than Masters’ and Johnson’s
and while deconstructing it is certainly not part of this project, there is a reason 1 bring it
up. I keep thinking that if 1 were to consult a therapist who was committed to the “reality”
of Kubler-Ross’ stages of grief, that person might not see me as experiencing everything
1 need to experience in order to be “okay.” The same might be true for a person seeking
help for a sexual problem if her/his experiences do not match “the” human sexual
response cycle. In fact, it would probably be much more difficult to escape the gaze o f
Masters’ and Johnson’s model, as its credibility is christened by its inclusion in the DSM,
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credibility that is highly questionable in light o f the built-in biases o f their research and
consequential inability to generalize their “findings.”
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Triangulation
Michael White writes, “At the outset o f the social sciences, social scientists, in an
effort to justify their endeavor, to establish plausibility, and to lay claim to legitimacy,
turned to the positivist physical sciences for maps upon which to base their efforts in the
interpretation o f events in social systems” (White & Epston, 1990, p. 4). One o f these
maps is the idea o f validity which according to McBumey (1994) means “the researcher’s
conclusion is true or correct—that it corresponds to the actual state o f the world” (p.
119). Because o f my non-essentialist stance, which is at odds with the idea o f an “actual
state o f the world,” the concept of validity does not hold much significance for me. As I
stated in the beginning o f this thesis, I do not intend for this paper to represent anything
more than my experience. However, the standards o f research practices in the social
sciences mandate that I address the positivistic idea o f validity. Therefore, I will do so
using a process 1 have actually discovered to be quite collaborative and not very
positivistic at all—triangulation.
Denzin (1978) identifies four different techniques o f triangulation, the use o f
different sources, investigators, methods, and theories. This means that in order to
determine if her/his findings are “on track,” a qualitative researcher can: (a) consult
multiple and different sources o f the information being studied (e.g., books, articles,
people); (b) use multiple and different investigators to conduct the same research and
compare findings; (c) apply multiple and different data collection modes or research
designs to the same subject matter and compare findings; or (d) see how research findings
fit with various theories.
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The technique that I have chosen for this project is the first, consulting different
takes on Human Sexual Response. First, as you have read, I looked to see what other
authors have written about this text in an attempt to compare my observations with theirs.
In addition, I asked two sexologists, John W. Petras, Ph.D., and Sharon Preves, Ph.D., to
read preliminary drafts of this paper and comment on the things I was writing.
First, a little background. Dr. Petras has been a sex therapist and professor of
sociology for more than 30 years. When I was an undergraduate student at Central
Michigan University, I took several human sexuality courses that he taught including
Introduction to Human Sexuality, Sex Therapy and Counseling, Sexual Orientation, and
Sex and Society. He is an AASECT (American Association of Sex Educators,
Counselors, and Therapists) certified sex educator, counselor, and therapist as well as an
AASECT certified clinical supervisor. I asked him to contribute to this thesis because of
his vast experience in the field o f human sexuality. In addition, he is someone who is
familiar with my past work so I was curious to know what he thought o f this present
project.
My other triangulation partner. Dr. Preves, is an assistant professor in the department
of anthropology and sociology at Grand Valley State University and has done much of
her research in the field o f human sexuality. She recently (within the past year) earned
her doctorate degree in sociology and has authored journal articles and book chapters
related to sexuality. After securing Dr. Petras’ services, Michel Coconis (my thesis
committee chairperson) put me in contact with Dr. Preves, who graciously offered to
participate. In addition to offering one woman’s sexological perspective, I also saw Dr.
Preves to be a kind o f “blind reviewer. ” With the exception of speaking with her briefly
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on the telephone once to ask for her to participate in this part of my thesis, I do not know
her at all. Because I have maintained a relationship with Dr. Petras for about five years, I
hope that in addition to offering her valuable perspectives. Dr. Preves’ input will also
serve to balance any biases he might have toward me. Additionally, Dr. Preves’ brings to
this project the perspectives o f someone who has been researching and teaching in the
field for the past eight years in contrast to the 30 plus years Dr. Petras has under his belt.
This is not to say that she is in any way less qualified, just to note that her experience is
situated in a different historical context.
The Reflecting Team Connection
While the traditional purpose o f triangulation in qualitative research (dare I use the
word “traditional” in the same sentence as “qualitative research?”) is to provide some
validity for one’s findings, I am drawn to its use as a collaborative effort for thickening
descriptions o f the researcher’s subject manner. In this way, I liken it to the process o f
using reflecting teams in therapy. So now, a little bit about that.
After a serendipitous family therapy session he co-facilitated with some o f his
colleagues, Tom Andersen (1988) first introduced the idea of the reflecting team to the
field of family therapy. While there is no “right” way to conduct a reflecting team, most
meetings follow a structure composed of four parts. In the first part, the therapist meets
with the people who are seeking consultation, while the team members assume a position
as an audience to this conversation. Most often, team members are behind a one-way
screen.
In the second part, the therapist and the people seeking consultation switch places
with the team - they now become an audience to the conversation that takes place among
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team members. During this time, team members reflect on, and interview each other
about, their experiences o f the first part o f the meeting. This offers an opportunity for the
emergence of new meanings and possibilities.
For the third part o f the meeting, everyone switches places again and the therapist
interviews the people seeking consultation about their experiences of the first interview
as well as the team’s discussion and questions about it. Again, the team is in a reflecting
position as an audience to this dialogue. Finally, the fourth part of the meeting consists of
the team, the therapist, and the people seeking consultation getting together to debrief and
deconstruct the therapy itself.
Because of my own experience of doing reflecting team work, I am inspired to think
of the triangulation process working in a similar way. First, a researcher interacts with the
subject matter, in my case Human Sexual Response. Next, “team” members make
observations about those interactions, as Drs. Preves and Petras have done. Finally, the
researcher incorporates the observations o f the team members with her/his own
understandings to develop a richer description o f the subject. Again, this idea is
something different fi"om using triangulation as a means for validity. Nevertheless, I
thought I should mention it, as it is an idea with which 1 have performed new meaning
about the process o f triangulation.
Certainly, I would have liked to have more “sexperts” participate on my team but I
was unable to gain access to all o f those I had in mind. While John Petras’ and Sharon
Preves’ participation was very helpful, the fact that I have triangulated with only two
other persons constitutes what could be seen as one limitation of this study. Additionally,
I might have reached even richer conclusions had I the time to send them my responses to
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their comments and invited them to continue the dialogue. Still, their reflections made
this project more o f a collaborative endeavor, an exciting way of working with which I
feel right at home.
John’s Take on Things
Overall, Dr. Petras was very complimentary o f my work, noting it is “your usual
excellent manuscript” (his underlining) and instructing me that his “comments are to be
taken within the context o f my conclusion that you have done an excellent job” (personal
communication, November 24, 1999). He also stated, “I think the ‘3"* Reading’ section is
the strongest of a strong critique” before going on to comment about specific things I
have written in this paper. For example, earlier in the paper when talking about the
awkwardness of Masters’ and Johnson’s writing, I note that it is common to read phrases
such as “it equally is obvious” instead o f “it is equally obvious” (Masters & Johnson,
1966, p. 40). Dr. Petras points out that actually, each o f these phrases means something
different from the other. While I agree with his observation, the context in which the
phrase was written makes it likely the authors wanted to convey the meaning o f the latter.
So, not only is the phrase awkward, it is also incorrect.
A bit later in the paper, I note that Masters and Johnson frequently use verbs and
prepositions that do not seem to go with their objects. “Decades o f ‘phallic fallacies, ”
they write, “have done more to deter than to stimulate research interest in clitoral re
sponse to sexual stimulation ” (p.45), presenting an unlikely alternative o f either deterring
or stimulating. Commenting on this observation. Dr. Petras says he sees no problem with
this choice of words. Having re-read it in a different frame o f mind, neither do I. The
point I was making is that just because something is not stimulating, that does not
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necessarily mean that it is deterring. However, when I consider that “phallic fallacies” is
a reference to misinformation about sex, I realize Masters and Johnson are saying that
this misinformation has, in some ways, deterred people from pursuing sexuality research.
Regarding my table paralleling DSM-IV sexual dysfunctions between genders. Dr.
Petras reminds me that in the realm of sex therapy, vaginismus and dyspareunia, painful
conditions that affect women, are thought to correspond with Peyronie’s disease, a
painful condition that affects men. Peyronie’s disease is a condition in which fibrous
tissue and calcium deposits develop in the spaces around the cavernous bodies o f the
penis (Levine, 1998).
One of the biases that manifests throughout this thesis is my position that the people
who confer with therapists are the best experts o f their own lives. Dr. Petras, questions
this assertion, stating “if [this were] literally true, they (we) would never be clients.
“Clients” are the experts only in the sense that they give you explanations o f themselves
which communicate to you their view of self, but not necessarily ‘expertise’ or even
knowledge of motives” ” (personal communication, November 24, 1999).
This is a point well-taken. After all, it does not make sense that an expert would have
to consult with a therapist, especially someone like me who assumes a “not knowing ”
position. I know that on more than one occasion, I have heard people who have visited
me for therapy say “you’re the expert, you tell me.” However, 1 believe the dominant,
modernistic discourse, which says therapists are “knowers” o f human matters, leads
many to believe they need a professional’s account o f their lives instead of just listening
to themselves. In the Foucaultian sense, privileged knowledge (especially that which is
afforded status by “scientific” research) gives professionals power which subjugates
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persons by making them dependent on professionals for explanations of their own
experiences. As I have discussed elsewhere in this paper, I contend that while a therapist
might be an expert on certain processes o f conversations, I see the person seeking
consultation as the expert on the content o f his or her life.
In addition to the feedback I have just discussed. Dr. Petras placed some checkmarks
alongside my writings. From my prior experience with his examinations o f my writings, I
thought I remembered these checkmarks to be indicators o f paragraphs he liked and with
which he agreed. A telephone call confirmed this was indeed the case. So, based on his
checkmarks, I have concluded that Dr. Petras largely agrees with my earlier
identifications o f Masters’ and Johnson’s biases in establishing their model o f sexual
response and their failure to speculate about the implications o f these biases.
Sharon’s Take on Things
Dr. Preves’ feedback on my work not only provided an opportunity for me to
“thicken” my perspective, it proved very helpful in the editing process o f this paper as
well. In addition to pointing out grammatical errors, her comments often invited me to
“give an example ”or “say more about this.” In general, she prompted me to go back over
my manuscript and consider not only what I had written but also what I had not written.
This resulted in the addition o f more details and descriptions as well as more instances
where 1 let readers in on my thinking and process.
Similar to Dr. Petras, Dr. Preves took no issue with some o f the language in Human
Sexual Response that I determined to be problematic. In these instances, she suggested
that 1 further explain my problem with the language (which I did). Regarding my
inclusion o f Paul Robinson’s (1976) critique o f the language in Human Sexual Response
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Dr. Preves notes how Robinson is quick to criticize Masters’ and Johnson’s writing as
“vague” when his own writing is perhaps guilty o f the same offense. With this
observation, I am in complete agreement. In fact, I would say that I found Robinson’s
writing just as difficult to read as Masters’ and Johnson’s! However, I thought it was
important to include his critique of their work since he was one of the very few authors I
found who were willing to “take them to task ” As I mentioned earlier in this paper, my
investigation yielded overwhelming praise for Human Sexual Response and I was eager
to balance things out with the writings of people who saw things differently.
Later in the paper when I write about the mechanization of sexuality, I comment that
men will go to great lengths in order to experience erections, sometimes opting to have
no sex at all when this becomes impossible. Dr. Preves commented that it would be
interesting at that point to discuss men who, because o f serious injury, are unable to have
erections or ejaculate and find out about their alternative forms o f sexual expression and
fulfillment. I agree that this would be extremely interesting and exciting since it might be
very helpful, even for people who have no problems with sexual functioning. After all, I
premise my criticism o f the mechanization o f sexuality on my view that it is extremely
limiting and makes available only thin descriptions o f person’s sexual identities. I think
any options for “thickening” sexual identities with non-mechanical accounts of
pleasurable sexual experience might help people free themselves from the structuralist
discourse that sees people as machines which sometimes need fixing. While an
investigation such as this is beyond the scope o f this thesis, it is definitively something I
will consider for future work.
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Throughout the manuscript o f this paper on which she wrote her comments. Dr.
Preves reminded me that when considering Masters’ and Johnson’s role in the social
construction of sexuality, it is very important to also consider the roles o f morals and
religious values. For example, their work only included the study o f physiological sexual
responses during two sexual activities; coitus and masturbation. Clearly, they excluded
other forms o f human sexual expression, such as oral and anal sex, that many people
during that era (and still today) considered immoral. Therefore, not only is Masters’ and
Johnson’s human sexual response cycle based on a biased sample, because of dominant
values it is based on a limited range o f sexual activities.
My Experience with Triangulation
As 1 mentioned earlier, I thoroughly enjoyed the collaborative aspect o f triangulating
my findings with other people and the meaning is presented for me. For that reason, I
found the experience of reading comments about my work and then commenting on those
comments to be exciting and adventurous. In fact, after having received Dr. Petras’
remarks first, I anxiously awaited the return o f my manuscript from Dr. Preves, similar to
the way I look forward to receiving books in the mail after ordering them from
booksellers on the internet. Again, while the concept o f validation does not fit well with
my postmodern self, constructing new possibilities through dialoguing with others is for
me, as good as it gets.
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Some Final Thoughts
Before I begin to wrap up this paper, I want to remind readers that because I scanned
the entirety o f Human Sexual Response into my notebook computer and then coded it
into categories, I have actually read the text a total of four times. However, as I have
already discussed, the experience o f scanning and coding did not seem like a reading
since my focus was on placing each sentence into a category. Instead o f paying attention
to content and context, I was concerned with finding the “best fit” for each unit of text.
If I ever again attempt the enormous undertaking of coding text, I will definitely
consider photocopying it instead of scanning it into a computer. In my case, scanning
Human Sexual Resiwnse took a very long time and the inaccuracy o f my OCR software
made the process even longer. The reason I wanted to scan it all into my notebook
computer was so the whole project would be self-contained and portable. But in addition
to misjudging the amount of time that scanning and converting the text would consume, I
did not anticipate the effects o f spending several hours at a time staring at a computer
monitor. These effects included eyestrains and headaches, problems I might not have
experienced had I been looking at pieces o f paper instead o f a lighted screen.
This is a Thesis?
Although I recently heard a social work professor remark that deconstructing Human
Sexual Response did not sound like the type o f research one should conduct for a
master’s thesis, I see it much differently. In fact, my feeling that this kind of work is
important is even stronger than it was when 1 began. So many people are limited by
dominant societal discourses about “reality,” discourses that have the power to harm by
imposing values on people whether they agree with them or not.
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Unfortunately, many people are not aware that “universal truths” are not truths at all,
but constructions that, as Foucault says, have ascended to a dominant position over other
realities. If social workers are serious about helping folks out, I believe more o f them
should be taking the time to deconstruct oppressive realities and show them for what they
are. Doing so invites other possibilities and opportimities to identify realities people
prefer and “story” the experience that corresponds with these realities. At the very least,
social workers should be responsible for deconstructing their own practices by situating
and embodying them. Not doing so runs the risk o f trafficking in the technologies of
modem systems o f power where “truth” claims can result in oppression for not only the
persons who consult social workers but social workers themselves.
In addition to offering some deconstructive gleanings from Human Sexual Response.
it occurs to me that writing this thesis in the marmer I have might have done something
toward deconstructing the discourses about what theses “should be.” Quantitative
research in the social sciences has been around much longer than has qualitative research
so it is no surprise that lots o f ivory tower folks still think that it is the only acceptable
way to go. Indeed, the social sciences have long been caught up in the business o f trying
to “prove” themselves by using the tools o f quantification, all the while whining to the
world, “Look at the methods and language we use! See, we’re all scientific and stuff
too!” As an alternative, this thesis demonstrates how instead o f just sharing the “results”
of scientific research, those who write about their work might benefit others’ lives by
sharing their own stories.
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Limitations o f this Proiect/Other Possibilities
Indeed, the scope o f this project is admittedly very limited. What I hope to have
done here is provide a background for a certain way o f thinking, a way o f interpreting
sexual realities and how those realities have come to exist. In addition, I hope I have shed
some light on just some o f the ways Human Sexual Response has contributed to those
realities. My aim in doing all of this is not to discredit Masters and Johnson and the work
they have done. Instead, I hope this thesis serves to remind people that there are other
realities, other possibilities that are often more difficult to see because they have been
subjugated by those ideas that have ascended with the aid o f such powerful social forces
as “legitimate” science, money, and politics. While it is difficult to determine if Masters
and Johnson really intended for their ideas to take on the status o f universal “truths” in
the realm o f professional knowledge, 1 believe those ideas have done so and with some
unfortunate results.
Of course, there are many ways this study could have been done differently, perhaps
with “stronger” results, perhaps with just different results. For example, had there been
multiple investigators who, in addition to my self, read Human Sexual Response and
gleaned deconstructive observations about its contribution to the social construction of
sexuality, the results would reflect the collaboration o f different people peering through
different “lenses” (Hoffman, 1990).
Additionally, 1 could have easily focused my efforts on deconstructing Human
Sexual Response as it relates to the social construction of sexual “realities” in certain
societal spheres. For instance, I might have limited myself to looking at one specific
sexual arena, such as sex education, sexuality research, or clinical sexology. 1 am sure
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this would have turned up many other social constructions of sexuality that 1 did not
cover in this paper.
Regarding my use o f triangulation in this study, my thesis chairperson and I recently
had a conversation about how Dr. Petras’ and Dr. Preves’ comments might have been
different had I given them specific points to address. For example, I might have sent them
a sort of “checklist” along with my manuscript asking their feedback on;
(a) The ways I critiqued Masters’ and Johnson’s work.
(b) The ways I connected Masters’ and Johnson’s work to various socially constructed
sexual realities.
(c) The manners in which I presented the above observations.
What I did was offer them fi^ee reign to comment on anything they wished, as I wanted to
read about what things seemed important to them. Indeed, following an outline or guide
such as this would have prompted them to tell me different stories about their impressions
o f my work. 1 will not say that this would have made for better triangulation, just that it
most likely would have been different.
Further Considerations: Implications
When I give more thought to what 1 have written, a couple of other uses come to
mind. For one, it is possible that my discussions o f various philosophical and
methodological stances and the practices they inform, albeit brief, might serve as
invitations to considerations o f different ways o f thinking. In my experience, the related
works I have cited have been wonderful sources o f new possibilities. Also, the way I
have communicated this text might inspire social science students and other writers to
deconstruct and reconsider the rules o f “proper” writing. As I have discussed earlier, I
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believe language constitutes realities and I think it is important for writers to consider the
implications of the realities they create and the realities to which they contribute. Some
questions about writing style I think are important are;
•

Who benefits from this kind o f writing? Who might be hurt?

•

Does this writing contribute to “thick” descriptions of people’s lives and
present many possibilities or does it help create thin and restrictive ways o f
interpreting the world?

•

Does this writing and the place(s) it is published make it a resource available
to many people or mostly just the “experts” and “professionals?”

•

What kind o f “self’ or kinds o f “selves” am I storying by writing this way?
What does this writing say about the type o f person I am?

Beyond this, I welcome readers to “fill in the gaps” and perform their own meanings
around what I have written Make use o f this paper as you wish, even if it that means it
will serve as an example of ideas and practices you do not like. In my opinion,
discovering the ways one prefers to be and then seeking out and developing contexts that
support those ways are invaluable processes for keeping problems in check while
experiencing new meanings. As Victor Frankl (1978) contends, happiness is an inherent
aspect of meaning and therefore, a life predicated on meaning is a life with much
happiness. If this thesis in any way contributes to new meanings by helping readers
constitute and shape their preferred selves, my heart is very happy.
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Appendix A
A Document Presenting One Woman’s Preferred Self
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Elements of
“A C a rin g P e r s o n ”
It has com e to my attention that Mary h a s constituted am ong others, the following
w ays of being;
1. Mary is a person w ho prioritizes her children a n d d o e s all sh e can to c re a te
opportunities so they can experience th em selv es in ways they like a n d m ake
their d ream s co m e true.
2. Mary is a very independent person who h a s developed an ability to ta k e care
of herself and h e r children using her m any stren g th s and abilities. This
independence includes attending to traditionally “m asculine” ta sk s su ch a s
fixing things around the h o u se and “playing rough” with her son w hen he
needs that type of interaction.
3. Mary is an em pathetic person who not only u n d erstan d s and “feels” o th er
people's situations, s h e d o e s things to m ake their situations easier.
4. Mary is a person w ho finds m eaning in creating and passing on traditions
within her family. In this way, sh e is leaving a legacy for generations to
come.
5. Mary is and alw ays h a s been a person with a lot of T.L.C. This show s in many
a re a s of her life, including the way s h e is com m itted to giving focus an d
attention to the children and parents with whom s h e works.
6. Mary is a very nurturing person who gives support and love to not only h er
family, but other p eople a s well. For exam ple, sh e h a s volunteered h e r time
and talents to c re a te wigs for wom en with cancer, work for which sh e w a s
presented with a special award.
7. Mary is a person w ho believes strongly in taking good care of the things sh e
owns.
8. Mary is very thankful and appreciative for all th at sh e has.
Jason Kae-Smith
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Appendix B
Color Chart for Coding Human Sexual Response into Categories
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Color
Turquoise
Yellow
Bright Green
Pink

Category
Had the meanings and connotations o f the research cited in Human Sexual
Response changed signiftcantlv from the time it was published to the time it
was cited by Masters and Johnson?
In what way were Masters and Johnson’s methods politically useful? How did
they fit in with tradition, cultural values, etc?
In what wav is Human Sexual Response “social action” (hv presenting a
particular reality) and what are the consequences o f this action?
What available concepts, categories, and methods influenced the questions
Masters and Johnson asked and did these concepts, categories, and methods
preclude other questions from being asked?
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Appendix C
A Sample of Coding the First Two Pages from Chapter One o f Human Sexual Response
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I
THE SEXUAL RESPONSE
CYCLE

In 1954 an investigation of the anatomy and physiology of human sexual response was
initiated within the framework o f the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology of
Washington University School o f Medicine. [Pink]'** A closely coordinated clinicalresearch program in problems o f human sexual inadequacy was instituted in
1959. [Yellow] Since January, 1964, these programs have been continued under the
auspices of the Reproductive Biology Research Foundation. [Yellow] During the past
decade the anatomy of human response to sexual stimuli has been established, and such
physiologic variables as intensity and duration of individual reaction patterns have been
observed and recorded. [Bright Green] Intensive interrogation (medical, social,
psychosexual backgrounds) of both laboratory-study subject and clinical-research
populations has been a concomitant o f the basic science and clinical investigative
programs since their inception. [Yellow] Material of signifrcant behavioral content
derived from these interviews will be presented in general rather than in statistical
discussions. [Bright Green]
Kinsey and co-workers published a monumental compilation o f statistics reflecting
patterns o f sexual behavior in this country from 1938 to 1952.[Pink] These reports of
human sexual practices obtained by techniques of direct interrogation offer an invaluable

Because this paper is published in black and white, the names o f colors are listed in brackets immediately
after the sentences highlighted by them.
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baseline o f sociologie information. [Pink] Future evaluation o f the work may reveal its
greatest contribution to be that of opening the previously closed doors o f our culture to
definitive investigation of human sexual response. [Turquoise]
Although the Kinsey work has become a landmark of sociologic investigation, it was
not designed to interpret physiologic or psychologic response to sexual stimulation.
These fundamentals o f human sexual behavior cannot be established until two questions
are answered: [Pink] What physical reactions develop as the human male and female
respond to effective sexual stimulation?[Pink] Why do men and women behave as they
do when responding to effective sexual stimulation?[Pink] If human sexual inadequacy
ever is to be treated successfully, the medical and behavioral professions must provide
answers to these basic questions. [Bright Green] The current study o f human sexual
response has been designed to create a foundation of basic scientific information from
which definitive answers can be developed to these multifaceted problems. [Yellow]
The techniques o f defining and describing the gross physical changes which develop
during the human male’s and female’s sexual response cycles have been primarily those
of direct observation and physical measurement. [Yellow] Since the integrity o f human
observation for specific detail varies significantly, regardless o f the observer’s training
and considered objectivity, reliability o f reporting has been supported by many of the
accepted techniques of physiologic measurement and the frequent use o f color
cinematographic recording in all phases o f the sexual response cycle. [Pink]
A more concise picture o f physiologic reaction to sexual stimuli may be presented by
dividing the human male’s and female’s cycles o f sexual response into four separate
phases. [Bright Green] Progressively, the four phases are: (1) the excitement phase; (2)
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the plateau phase; (3) the orgasmic phase; and (4) the resolution phase.[Bright Green]
This arbitrary four-part division o f the sexual response cycle provides an effective
framework for detailed description o f physiologic variants in sexual reaction, some of
which are frequently so transient in character as to appear in only one phase o f the total
orgasmic cycle. [Bright Green]
Only one sexual response pattern has been diagrammed for the human male (Fig. 11). [Bright Green] Admittedly, there are many identifiable variations in the male sexual
reaction. [Bright Green] However, since these variants are usually related to duration
rather than intensity o f response, multiple diagrams would be more repetitive than
informative. [Bright Green] Comparably, three different sexual response patterns have
been diagrammed for the human female (Fig. 1-2).[Bright Green] It should be
emphasized that these patterns are simplifications o f those most frequently observed and
are only representative of the infinite variety in female sexual response. [Bright Green]
Here, intensity as well as duration o f response are...
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Appendix D
An Email Conversation between Me and My Thesis Chairperson
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Michel’s Questions’^

What remains unclear to me is any picture o f YOUR process.

1. When you selected the texts, what criteria or images were involved?

I based the selection upon the realization that these two texts have had perhaps the
largest influence on the field o f sex therapy. In addition, many believe these texts
have had significant influence on American society in general.

2. When you began to read the text, what were you "looking for"?

I began reading from a social constructionist, deconstructionist bent. In other words, I
was mindful o f the premise that realities are socially constructed as well as
models/theories about how they are constructed (particularly Gergan’s and Berger
and Luckman’s). So, the idea was to note how the “realities” presented by Masters
and Johnson were initially constructed. (I say initially because they are clear that their
participant population is skewed and should not be generalized - still, it has.)
Furthermore, I had definite questions in mind;
•

How do Masters and Johnson have the privilege to say what they do in the texts?

•

What were the contextual influences on what is/isn’t being said?

This is a transcription o f an email conversation between Michel Coconis and myself. She sent an email
message on 2-6-99 asking me the questions and I responded with my answers on 2-7-99.
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•

What available concepts, categories, and methods influenced the questions
Masters and Johnson asked and did these concepts, categories, and methods
preclude other questions from being asked?

•

In what way were Masters and Johnson’s methods politically useful? How did
they fit in with tradition, cultural values, etc?

•

In what way are these texts “social action” (by presenting a particular reality ) and
what are the consequences of this action?

3. Did you find it?

Yes.

4. Where, how, what context?

Many places, many contexts. For example. Masters and Johnson were able to write a
book and say what they said simply because they were willing/able to do the research
they did. No one else had observed live sexual activity in a laboratory before them
and no one has done it to the same extent since. So this is one thing that gave them
privilege. The availability of participants also contributed to their ability to conduct
the research and, ultimately, say what they said. How were they able to get so many
participants? How was the availability o f participants related to context? (I.e., the
city, institutions and populations within the city, the time period, the availability o f
sexual activity, etc.)
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5. How did you note this for yourself when you did find it?

I took some notes, though very few, and placed them in a computer file titled
“considerations.” Most o f this, however, is hanging around in my head (yikes!).

6. What were your plans for addressing NOT finding something?

I’m not sure what you mean by this question.

7. When you re-read the text, what was the plan o f action?

The plan was to begin categorizing information according to the questions I had in
mind.

8. What concepts, ideology, ideas, or even theories guided your reading and re-reading?

Again, social constructionism and, now that 1 look at what I’ve written here so far,
Gergen in particular.

9. What were the goals o f the 2nd reading?
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To discover elements that can be put into the “categories” that come from the
questions.

10. To look again for what was missed? To find new things?

Sure, these were also considerations. But mostly to help establish and support the
categories about which I was thinking.

11. In between readings, what might have influenced you with your own readings?

Well, 1 suppose many things; particularly, my narrative therapy training and readings
I had done before beginning work on this project.

12. Did you read and think about other works related to your idea?

Yes, particularly Gergen, Berger and Luckman, Paul Robinson, and Leonore Tiefer.

13. When and how did medical terminology become a focus?

After the initial reading. I was struck by the use o f this terminology to the extent that
the authors put a glossary in the book to define the terms. Masters and Johnson’s
writing is very awkward to begin with (they weren’t very good writers but more
recent stuff is better) and going to the glossary for definitions made it a little more
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challenging. However, it made me wonder about how much o f this terminology is
now a part o f or has influenced discourses in clinical sexology and does this serve to
separate the “experts” from the folks who come to see them (the real experts in my
opinion). Also, does this cause people to think they have to depend on “experts” to
tell them about their own sexuality?

14. Is it a measure o f M/J's influence on culture?

I think so, but is seems beyond the scope o f this project to attempt to “prove” this. I
can, however, cite others I have found and am continually finding who share my
opinion.

15. What is relevance of medical terminology influence to a thesis in social work?

Where do I begin? Not just the medical terminology piece, but the whole idea of
Masters’ and Johnson’s work operating on all the different levels that affect people.
By the way. I’d like not to only focus on the medical terminology piece if possible. 1
proposed this after meeting with Carolyn, who 1 basically allowed to scare the shit out
o f me. After talking with her, 1 accepted her conclusion that my project wasn’t
possible and 1 really closed down. Thank you for reminding me to follow my heart
and disregard the limits others are sometimes very willing to impose.

16. What are your plans for subsequent (current, 1 presume) re-reads?
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I stopped reading because I want to establish a solid methodology I can follow before
I begin. I want this method to include coding, and categorizing according to the
aforementioned questions. What do you think? O f course. I’m aware that my
methodology may change based upon what I encounter when doing this, but I now
realize how important it is to have a structure in place to begin.

17. How are you analyzing - word, sentence, paragraph, chapter, text?

I’m using the constant comparative method to put text into categories. However, the
categories are more predetermined, again according to the questions. Is this ok and
could I create categories first based on the questions I have (mostly from Gergen)?

Michel, thank you for your help. These last questions have really begun to clear
things up for me and I feel like I’m finally on my way. Another thing: If this isn’t
done in April, I have no problem taking an additional semester to finish. The most
important thing for me is that it’s strong and solid, as it is a legacy o f sorts. Also, I’ll
be trying to get something published from this so it’s even more important that my
methodology is good-to-go.
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Appendix E
Notes About Themes Gleaned from My Second Reading of Human Sexual Resix)nse
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Themes
1. M & J have helped create/support a position o f privilege for biology in sexuality.
While this privileged position has descended from early researchers' hope that
"objective science" would replace oppressive orthodoxies o f the past, it has created its
own oppressive constructions. One such construction is the result o f measuring and
describing female orgasm, that is the mechanization and trivialization o f sexual
experience. Another is a disregard/mystification of social and psychological aspects
of sexuality (see Segal, 1983).

2. Masters and Johnson hope to show that all female orgasms are alike (that is,
facilitated by the clitoris) and Freud’s distinction between vaginal and clitoral
orgasms was unjustified. Although I agree Freud’s idea o f mature (vaginal) vs.
immature (clitoral) orgasms is sexist bullshit, to what degree has M & J ’s bent
marginalized/silenced the experience o f vaginal orgasms (including G-spot)?
(Response, p. 66 -67).

3. Masters and Johnson are undoubtedly committed to equal sexual rights for women
and because o f this, seem to force their physiological findings into a procrustean
conceptual view. After selecting a homogeneous sample and testing subjects in an
environment where the definition o f sexual behavior was physical arousal and
orgasm. Masters and Johnson “found” similar patterns between men and women,
which they described in terms o f a fixed four-stage “human sexual response cycle.”

These notes were composed in a word-processing computer program. I have simply “copied” them from
their original file and “pasted” them in this document.
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The persistence o f this arbitrary model illustrates Gergen’s claim about how politics
determine many categories in sexology.

4. It can be argued that sexologists such as Masters and Johnson produce sexual
knowledge rather than discover it. With their methodology, they defined that
physiological response patterns can be observed, measured, and generalized.
Therefore, it is that way o f thinking about human sexuality that they “discovered,”
not just “human sexuality.”

5. As Tiefer (p. 196) notes. Human Sexual Response contributed significantly to the
medical/health model of female sexuality. Masters and Johnson seemed to provide
proof first of all, that female’s sexual capacities exist. Furthermore, they showed that
these capacities equaled those o f men and in some cases, maybe even surpassed them
(e.g., the ability o f some women too have multiple orgasms before reaching the
resolution phase).

6. Since this author opines the human sexual response cycle has become a socially
constructed reality for many, a discussion o f why this probably happened seems
worthwhile. Firsf Masters and Johnson’s research had an enormous impact at the
time they published it because theirs was the first major project involving direct
observation o f sexual processes, (expand)
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Second, it seemed to fit with the emerging more liberal attitudes toward sexuality o f
the time in 1966. An emerging backlash against conservatism and sexism espoused
the values of “free love” and sexual activity for the pleasure o f both genders. Books
such as Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique and were promoting the new idea that not
only could women have an orgasm, they deserved to have one and enjoy it. Before
this, many women were relegated to the “reality” that they were not supposed to
enjoy sex but do it for their husbands’ benefit.
7. Another thought: Since sexuality is a very private matter for most, it’s reasonable to
wonder how many people read Masters and Johnson, say to themselves “That fits
with my experience. I’m normal” and how many might be saying “That doesn’t fit
with my experience; there must be something wrong with me.”

Case in point: I recently saw a man in therapy who was devastated by his sexual
“abnormality.” He seems to have a very high sex drive and has multiple orgasms
(including ejaculations) without entering into the “resolution” stage of the human
sexual response cycle. In fact, he reports having to “lie there and calm myself down ”
in order to lose his erection. If he did not do this, he says he would probably “keep
going” indefinitely.

Now, this person is not a social scientist, has no “formal” sexuality education, and he
has never read Masters and Johnson (although he says he might have heard o f them
before). Still, he and his girlfnend were convinced there is something terribly wrong
with him because he did not have a “normal” way o f functioning sexually. O f course.
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his ability is certainly exceptional and his girlfnend, having had previous sexual
partners, noticed that he was different from the other men with whom she had been
sexual. Nevertheless, they were both sure that he had a problem and just before
consulting me, they were about to go to the library to research sexuality to find out
what was “wrong” with him. If they were to read Human Sexual Response, it would
have surely showed them he was “abnormal” since the sexual response cycle for
women allows for multiple orgasms before resolution, but certainly not for men and
certainly not without a resolution stage.

190

Appendix F
Notes From My Third Reading o f Human Sexual Response
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3"* Reading’’
•

Perhaps the reason M& J were successful in proposing a “universal” sexual response
cycle is because they ignored any element o f desire. Desire is variable from culture to
culture.

•

M & J never talk about “a” HSRC but “the” HSRC. They assumed its existence
before beginning their work.
required that participants be able to orgasm
research then served to study people with particular sexual functions
instead o f doing research and developing model they had model and selected
participants that fît.

•

Female participants not representative because they selected those who masturbated
at frequencies similar to men, disregarding sociosexual aspects o f female sexuality.

•

Research population purposely weighted toward higher intelligence, education,
socioeconomic classes because M & J thought they would be better able to
communicate details o f sex reaction. However, physiology might be different (cite
Kinsey).

•

M & J do not speculate as to the impact o f their biased sample. (Population also
biased because o f “basic interest in and desire for effectiveness of sexual
performance.”) See Ch. 19 profiles.

•

Experimenter Biases
-(p. 313) “period o f training” for participants
-orgasm = success

These notes have been transcribed from handwritten notes.

192
-Man in Ch. 19 says he and his wife were hoping to get “sexual instruction.” (M & J
experimenters or sex therapists?—conflicting roles?)
•

What is “effective” stimulation? (resulting in orgasm?) M & J give no definition.

